This volume reflects on what happens when the idea and practice of universal human rights cross the cultural borders between different communities of knowledge. Although such rights are usually presumed to be founded on certain globally shared beliefs, the norms and values of many cultures are often incommensurable with these "universal" principles, and hence the need to translate and "vernacularize" them. Any law that would successfully institutionalize them must frame human rights in a way that defers to the historically constituted cultural capital of the society in which it is to function. The essays in this book seek to illuminate different cognitive contexts that produce different meanings of rights, identify spaces of intercultural crossings where differences can coexist, and offer usable narratives and metaphors that could help mediate between distinct cultures. They show that the path forward does not lead through a unified theory of human rights that can be applied globally, nor through mere repackaging of rights in a more understandable language. What is needed is a deep understanding of the process of intercultural dialogue, the cultural "grammar" involved in relationships of difference.

This volume reflects on what happens when the idea and practice of universal human rights cross the cultural borders between different communities of knowledge. Although such rights are usually presumed to be founded on certain globally shared beliefs, the norms and values of many cultures are often incommensurable with these "universal" principles, and hence the need to translate and "vernacularize" them. Any law that would successfully institutionalize them must frame human rights in a way that defers to the historically constituted cultural capital of the society in which it is to function. The essays in this book seek to illuminate different cognitive contexts that produce different meanings of rights, identify spaces of intercultural crossings where differences can coexist, and offer usable narratives and metaphors that could help mediate between distinct cultures. They show that the path forward does not lead through a unified theory of human rights that can be applied globally, nor through mere repackaging of rights in a more understandable language. What is needed is a deep understanding of the process of intercultural dialogue, the cultural "grammar" involved in relationships of difference.

This collection of essays by a team of international scholars addresses the topic of Charity through the lenses of the three Abrahamic religions: Judaism, Christianity and Islam. The contributors look for common paradigms in the ways the three faiths address the needs of the poor and the needy in their respective societies, and reflect on the interrelatedness of such practices among the three religions. They ask how the three traditions deal with the distribution of wealth, in the recognition that not all members of a given society have equal access to it, and in the relationship of charity to the inheritance systems and family structures. They reveal systemic patterns that are similar--norms, virtue, theological validations, exclusionary rules, private responsibility to society--issues that have implications for intercultural and interfaith understanding. Conversely, the essays inquire how the three faiths differ in their understanding of poverty, wealth, and justifications for charity.

This collection of essays by a team of international scholars addresses the topic of Charity through the lenses of the three Abrahamic religions: Judaism, Christianity and Islam. The contributors look for common paradigms in the ways the three faiths address the needs of the poor and the needy in their respective societies, and reflect on the interrelatedness of such practices among the three religions. They ask how the three traditions deal with the distribution of wealth, in the recognition that not all members of a given society have equal access to it, and in the relationship of charity to the inheritance systems and family structures. They reveal systemic patterns that are similar--norms, virtue, theological validations, exclusionary rules, private responsibility to society--issues that have implications for intercultural and interfaith understanding. Conversely, the essays inquire how the three faiths differ in their understanding of poverty, wealth, and justifications for charity.

In his new book, Michal Jan Rozbicki undertakes to bridge the gap between the political and the cultural histories of the American Revolution. Through a careful examination of liberty as both the ideological axis and the central metaphor of the age, he is able to offer a fresh model for interpreting the Revolution. By establishing systemic linkages between the histories of the free and the unfree, and between the factual and the symbolic, this framework points to a fundamental reassessment of the ways we think about the American Founding.

Rozbicki moves beyond the two dominant interpretations of Revolutionary liberty--one assuming the Founders invested it with a modern meaning that has in essence continued to the present day, the other highlighting its apparent betrayal by their commitment to inequality. Through a consistent focus on the interplay between culture and power, Rozbicki demonstrates that liberty existed as an intricate fusion of political practices and symbolic forms. His deeply historicized reconstruction of its contemporary meanings makes it clear that liberty was still understood as a set of privileges distributed according to social rank rather than a universal right. In fact, it was because the Founders considered this assumption self-evident that they felt confident in publicizing a highly liberal, symbolic narrative of equal liberty to represent the Revolutionary endeavor. The uncontainable success of this narrative went far beyond the circumstances that gave birth to it because it put new cultural capital--a conceptual arsenal of rights and freedoms--at the disposal of ordinary people as well as political factions competing for their support, providing priceless legitimacy to all those who would insist that its nominal inclusiveness include them in fact.