"Increasing concern has been expressed by Third World leaders and international organizations alike over the growing gap between rich and poor nations. Between 1950 and 1980 alone, the per capita income gap between low-income and industrialized countries grew from $3,677 to $9,648. In addition, within the developing nations themselves, an ever-widening gap separates the rich from the poor. Other evidence suggests that middle-income countries may be gaining on the rich countries. Some research shows that the gap in education and health is narrowing rather rapidly, and studies of domestic inequality have revealed that growth with equity has occurred in a number of developing nations that have committed themselves to such a policy. This volume presents the evidence for both sides of the debate. It begins by stating the conventional wisdom-that international and internal gaps are widening-and goes on to examine the major explanations offered, which focus on culture, urban bias, dependency, and world-system analysis. The book then presents empirical studies on the existence and causes of the gap, as well as key case studies that challenge the conventional wisdom. Unique in its objectivity, this text does not seek to serve either side of the debate, but instead draws upon the best research in the field to highlight major issues and to present studies that have subjected the differing perspectives to rigorous empirical analysis. It will prove especially useful in courses on Third World development, political economy, comparative politics, development economics, the sociology of development, and related topics. "

Political scientists for more than two decades have worried about declining levels of citizens support for their regimes (legitimacy), but have failed to empirically link this decline to the survival or breakdown of democracy. This apparent paradox is the legitimacy puzzle, which this book addresses by examining political legitimacy s structure, sources, and effects. With exhaustive empirical analysis of high-quality survey data from eight Latin American nations, it confirms that legitimacy exists as multiple, distinct dimensions. It finds that one s position in society, education, knowledge, information, and experiences shape legitimacy norms. Contrary to expectations, however, citizens who are unhappy with their government s performance do not drop out of politics or resort mainly to destabilizing protest. Rather, the disaffected citizens of these Latin American democracies participate at high rates in conventional politics and in such alternative arenas as communal improvement and civil society. And despite regime performance problems, citizen support for democracy remains high. These findings resolve the puzzle citizen actions and values, even among the disaffected, likely strengthen rather than weaken democratic governments.

Political scientists for more than two decades have worried about declining levels of citizens support for their regimes (legitimacy), but have failed to empirically link this decline to the survival or breakdown of democracy. This apparent paradox is the legitimacy puzzle, which this book addresses by examining political legitimacy s structure, sources, and effects. With exhaustive empirical analysis of high-quality survey data from eight Latin American nations, it confirms that legitimacy exists as multiple, distinct dimensions. It finds that one s position in society, education, knowledge, information, and experiences shape legitimacy norms. Contrary to expectations, however, citizens who are unhappy with their government s performance do not drop out of politics or resort mainly to destabilizing protest. Rather, the disaffected citizens of these Latin American democracies participate at high rates in conventional politics and in such alternative arenas as communal improvement and civil society. And despite regime performance problems, citizen support for democracy remains high. These findings resolve the puzzle citizen actions and values, even among the disaffected, likely strengthen rather than weaken democratic governments.