The edited collection is the first attempt to take a more coherent look at the Russian perception of the Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact occupation of Czechoslovakia in August 1968. The publication is therefore a collection of interviews, memoirs and academic studies focusing on Russian soldiers, dissidents and journalists involved in and affected by the Soviet invasion. The book begins with a focus on the Soviet soldiers who came to Czechoslovakia. It depicts their inner world and the mighty machinery of the Soviet propaganda to which they were exposed. The Archive supplement offers a fresh look at the role of KGB and the Soviet embassy in the Czechoslovak events of August 1968 by Russian historians Nikita Petrov and Olga Pavlenko. The second part presents the Soviet journalists living in Prague in 1968 who supported the Prague Spring and subsequently paid for their stance by being deported and losing their job. The last part of the book focuses on the kinship that the Soviet liberal intelligentsia and dissident movement, which emerged while Leonid Brezhnev was tightening the screws in the USSR in late 1960s, felt toward events in Prague, which for them represented one of the last hopes for change. It begins with the study of the Czech researcher Tomas Glanc exploring the different reactions on Prague Spring and August 1968 invasion among the Soviet inteligentsia. Interviews with former Soviet dissidents Lyudmila Alexeeva and Natalia Gorbanevskaya follow. As a supplement, the diary of the ordinary Soviet citizen Elvira Filipovich - a Russian biologist married to a Czech who witnessed the August 1968 in Moscow - is included.

At the beginning of June 1961, the tensions of the Cold War were supposed to abate as both sides sought a resolution. The two most important men in the world, John F. Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev, met for a summit in Vienna. Yet the high hopes were disappointed. Within months the Cold War had become very hot: Khrushchev built the Berlin Wall and a year later he sent missiles to Cuba to threaten the United States directly. Despite the fact that the Vienna Summit yielded barely any tangible results, it did lead to some very important developments. The superpowers came to see for the first time that there was only one way to escape from the atomic hell of their respective arsenals: dialogue. The "peace through fear" and the "hotline" between Washington and Moscow prevented an atomic confrontation. Austria successfully demonstrated its new role as neutral state and host when Vienna became a meeting place in the Cold War. In The Vienna Summit and Its Importance in International History international experts use new Russian and Western sources to analyze what really happened during this critical time and why the parties had a close shave with catastrophe.

At the beginning of June 1961, the tensions of the Cold War were supposed to abate as both sides sought a resolution. The two most important men in the world, John F. Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev, met for a summit in Vienna. Yet the high hopes were disappointed. Within months the Cold War had become very hot: Khrushchev built the Berlin Wall and a year later he sent missiles to Cuba to threaten the United States directly. Despite the fact that the Vienna Summit yielded barely any tangible results, it did lead to some very important developments. The superpowers came to see for the first time that there was only one way to escape from the atomic hell of their respective arsenals: dialogue. The "peace through fear" and the "hotline" between Washington and Moscow prevented an atomic confrontation. Austria successfully demonstrated its new role as neutral state and host when Vienna became a meeting place in the Cold War. In The Vienna Summit and Its Importance in International History international experts use new Russian and Western sources to analyze what really happened during this critical time and why the parties had a close shave with catastrophe.

The edited collection is the first attempt to take a more coherent look at the Russian perception of the Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact occupation of Czechoslovakia in August 1968. The publication is therefore a collection of interviews, memoirs and academic studies focusing on Russian soldiers, dissidents and journalists involved in and affected by the Soviet invasion. The book begins with a focus on the Soviet soldiers who came to Czechoslovakia. It depicts their inner world and the mighty machinery of the Soviet propaganda to which they were exposed. The Archive supplement offers a fresh look at the role of KGB and the Soviet embassy in the Czechoslovak events of August 1968 by Russian historians Nikita Petrov and Olga Pavlenko. The second part presents the Soviet journalists living in Prague in 1968 who supported the Prague Spring and subsequently paid for their stance by being deported and losing their job. The last part of the book focuses on the kinship that the Soviet liberal intelligentsia and dissident movement, which emerged while Leonid Brezhnev was tightening the screws in the USSR in late 1960s, felt toward events in Prague, which for them represented one of the last hopes for change. It begins with the study of the Czech researcher Tomas Glanc exploring the different reactions on Prague Spring and August 1968 invasion among the Soviet inteligentsia. Interviews with former Soviet dissidents Lyudmila Alexeeva and Natalia Gorbanevskaya follow. As a supplement, the diary of the ordinary Soviet citizen Elvira Filipovich - a Russian biologist married to a Czech who witnessed the August 1968 in Moscow - is included.