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The book is divided into three major sections. The first presents a
theoretical discussion that underlies the other essays. The second
section deals with privatization issues from the perspective of the
United States. The third describes research addressed to the U. K.
and Canada. In the first chapter, Richard Zeckbauser and Murray
Horn develop a wide-ranging theoretical framework for assessing the
capabilities and role of state-owned enterprises; it provides a
foundation for the analyses that follow. In The Control and
Perfonnance o[ State-Owned Enterprises , they describe state-owned
enterprises as an extreme case of the separation of ownership and
control. The focus is on management --the incentives it faces and
the conflicts to which it is subjected. The distinguishing
characteristics of public enterprise, the authors suggest, give it
a comparative advantage over both public bureaucracy and private
enterprise in certain situations. They argue that legislators are
more likely to prefer SOEs over private enterprise when the
efficiency of private enterprise is undermined by regulation or the
tbreat of opportunistic state action, when the informational
demands of subsidizing private production to meet distributional
objectives are high, when it is difficult to assign property
rights, or when state ownership is ideologically appealing. These
considerations suggest why SOEs are usually assigned special rights
and responsibilities, and they help explain observed regularities
in the distribution of SOEs across countries and sectors.
Zeckhauser and Horn apply principal-agent theory to identify the
key factors underlying the performance of state-owned enterprises.
Work on this book began in the Spring of 1983, not long after an
Amax Corporation annual budget meeting. As a member of the Amax
board of directors since 1979, I had been present at such meetings
in which the molybdenum price had been forecast to move higher than
$7.00 per pound. The actual annual average prices were $9.70 in
1980, $8.50 in 1981, and $4.00 in 1982. The forecast for 1983
called for prices to return to higher levels, but as both dealer
and producer prices declined further, my research began in earnest.
Initially, the research was to address the question of why the
molybdenum price had declined by more than half in a short period.
More fundamental, as other metals prices also declined, was an
impelling need to know the causes of the abrupt and sustained
reduction in metals price levels that year. As prices stayed at low
levels, while those of other materials recovered over the 1983-1986
period, the question became that of why metals prices had remained
at startlingly low levels for over five years.
Beginning with railroad regulation in 1887 and continuing for eight
decades, the U.S. Federal Government expanded its regulatory scope
to cover key transportation, telecommunications and energy sectors.
In the last quarter of the 20th century this long-term trend was
abruptly and dramatically reversed as important sectors of the U.S.
economy were deregulated. This Research Review introduces the
causes and effects of this process, and the political and economic
forces behind the elimination of regulatory authority.
Work on this book began in the Spring of 1983, not long after an
Amax Corporation annual budget meeting. As a member of the Amax
board of directors since 1979, I had been present at such meetings
in which the molybdenum price had been forecast to move higher than
$7.00 per pound. The actual annual average prices were $9.70 in
1980, $8.50 in 1981, and $4.00 in 1982. The forecast for 1983
called for prices to return to higher levels, but as both dealer
and producer prices declined further, my research began in earnest.
Initially, the research was to address the question of why the
molybdenum price had declined by more than half in a short period.
More fundamental, as other metals prices also declined, was an
impelling need to know the causes of the abrupt and sustained
reduction in metals price levels that year. As prices stayed at low
levels, while those of other materials recovered over the 1983-1986
period, the question became that of why metals prices had remained
at startlingly low levels for over five years.
"Fifteen years before the Enron, WorldCom, and Parmalat debacles,
another company embarked on a strategy that appeared to be driven
more by the allure of short-term profits and compensation for
management than by the long-term interests of shareholders. In this
case, though, the risks those managers took extended beyond the
purely financial to the safety of several large nuclear power
plants. A sobering tale, told fairly and skillfully."--Paul
Portney, President, Resources for the Future
"MacAvoy and Rosenthal paint a vivid picture of a board of
directors ignoring not just red flags, but explicit warnings of the
impending calamity, while being calmed by a complacent management.
Their book serves as a warning to be absorbed by all boards that
diligence, surely post-Enron, requires more than probing the bottom
line; it includes all risks to the enterprise, probing beyond
management assurances, and appropriate information flow to, and
leadership of, the board."--Ira M. Millstein, Senior Partner, Weil,
Gotshal & Manges LLP and Chairman of the Private Sector
Advisory Group of the World Bank/OECD Global Corporate Governance
Forum
"This story is important for anyone with an interest in
corporate governance. It makes clear the conflicts that develop and
the danger to shareholders when an industry structure changes, but
executive compensation systems do not. MacAvoy and Rosenthal
provide a penetrating analysis of Northeast's nuclear negligence.
At Northeast, an electric utility, regulation was giving way to
competition, but no change was occurring in nuclear safety
requirements. Northeast executives, whose short-term compensation
incentives were based on income, cut nuclear operating
andmaintenance costs, making safety violations and plant shutdowns
inevitable in the long term. Shareholders suffered while executives
were unscathed."--Richard Bower, Leon E. Williams Professor of
Finance and Managerial Economics, Emeritus, Tuck School of Business
at Dartmouth College
"This book provides an entertaining and informative look at the
implications of competition for nuclear safety. It should be read
widely."--R. Preston McAfee, J. Stanley Johnson Professor of
Business, Economics, and Management, California Institute of
Technology, author of "Competitive Solutions: The Strategist's
Toolkit"
"Paul MacAvoy and Jean Rosenthal offer an interesting discussion
of one of the unforeseen problems associated with deregulating the
electric utility industry. Their book will serve as a useful
warning to other nuclear power plant operators--and operators in
other safety-critical industries, such as airlines--that safety is
a constraint, not a variable, in maximizing profits."--Geoffrey
Rothwell, Stanford University
Three decades ago, federal policymakers--Republicans and
Democrats--embarked on a general strategy of deregulation. In the
electricity, gas delivery, and telecommunications industries, the
strategy called for restructuring to separate production from
transmission and distribution, followed by elimination of price
controls. The expected results were lower prices and increased
quality, reliability, and scope of services. Paul W. MacAvoy, an
economist with forty years of experience in the regulatory field,
here assesses the results and concludes that deregulation has
failed to achieve any of these goals in any of these
industries.
MacAvoy shows that we now have only "partial" deregulation, a
mixture of oligopoly structure with direct price control. He
explores why this system leads to volatile and high prices, reduced
investment, and low profitability, and what policy actions can be
implemented to address these problems.
Over the past six decades federal regulatory agencies have
attempted different strategies to regulate the natural gas industry
in the United States. All have been unsuccessful, resulting in
nationwide gas shortages or massive gas surpluses and costing the
nation scores of billions of dollars. In addition, partial
deregulation has led the regulatory agency to become more involved
in controlling individual transactions among gas producers,
distributors, and consumers. In this important book, Paul MacAvoy
demonstrates that no affected group has gained from these
experiments in public control and that all participants would gain
from complete deregulation. Although losses have declined with
partial deregulation in recent years, current regulatory practices
still limit the growth of supply through the transmission system.
MacAvoy's history of the regulation of natural gas is a cautionary
tale for other natural resource or network industries that are
regulated or are about to be regulated.
In recent years, government regulation of industry has had effects
throughout the economy. What began nearly a century ago as a single
federal agency to curb monopolistic practices of utilities and
railroads has become a maze of commissions applying pricing or
investment constraints on industries both with and without monopoly
power.
These shocks produced and immediate and strong regulatory reaction
by US policy makers. More new regulations were instituted for
energy markets in the 1970s than for any other product in the
economy. How effective was this upsurge in energy policy? MacAvoy,
a former member of the Council of Economic Advisers, examines these
regulations and policies: their goals, their implementation, their
success, and their costs to the economy.
Regulation reached its zenith in the 1960s. The 1980s was the
decade of deregulation. The 1990s afford us an important
opportunity to assess what is left of regulation and its impact on
the economy. And who better to do this than Paul W. MacAvoy, one of
America's most respected experts on the economics of industry?
Beginning with the Act to Regulate Commerce of 1887, Professor
MacAvoy traces the rise of regulation over one hundred years to its
sharp curtailment in the 1980s. Originally invoked as a means of
controlling the prices set by monopolies, this policy tool found
extended use in the last quarter-century to do everything from
keeping down energy prices to protecting the health and safety of
workers and the quality of the environment. In most cases
regulation has been founded on the best of intentions, but as the
deregulation of the airline, trucking, and railroad industries in
the 1980s made clear there are other ways of achieving social
objectives. It is thus useful to ask whether the remaining
regulation is having its intended effects, as well as whether there
are more effective ways of achieving those same objectives,
including strict reliance on open and competitive markets. With
this comprehensive study of the economywide effect of regulation,
Paul MacAvoy considers just this issue. His analysis begins with
price regulation, assessing its impact in terms of lost growth in
output due to rigid prices and declining quality of service. He
then does the same for health, safety, and environmental protection
regulation, this time measuring the higher costs from regulatory
standards against safer working conditions and better air quality.
He finds that regulation is expensive, particularly when you
consider that there are other ways to achieve both greater consumer
welfare and a larger economy. In a concluding chapter, Professor
MacAvoy looks at regulatory reform and finds plenty of room for
further reductions in regulation.
An authority on regulation who has served on the Council of
Economic Advisers calls attention to the explosive growth in
regulation since the late 1960s and its effects and examines
movements for reform and deregulation.
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