Peter Bornedal provides an interpretation of Nietzsche's philosophy as a whole in the context of 19th century philosophy of mind and cognition. The study explains Nietzsche's notion of truth; his epistemology; his notions of the split and fragmented subject, of master, slave, and priest; furthermore, it offers a new interpretation of the enigmatic "eternal recurrence". It also suggests how important aspects of Nietzsche's thinking can be read as a sophisticated critique of ideology. From studies in Nietzsche's work as a whole, not least in his so-called Nachgelassene Fragmente, the book reconstructs aspects of Nietzsche's thinking that have largely been under-described in especially the Anglo-Saxon Nietzsche-reception. The study makes the case that Nietzsche in his epistemology, his psychology, and his cognitive theory is responding to several scientific discoveries occuring during the 19th century. Read within the context of contemporary cognitive-psychological-evolutionary debates, Nietzsche's philosophy is seen as far more scientistic, and far less poetical-metaphysical, than it has in recent reception-history been received.

Nietzsche's Naturalist Deconstruction of Truth: A World Fragmented in Late Nineteenth-Century Epistemology offers a new interpretation of Nietzsche's discussions of truth and knowledge, covering the period from his early essay "On Truth and Lies in an Extra-Moral Sense" to his late notebooks. It places these discussions in the context of the neo-Kantian, Naturalist, Positivist, and Pragmatic schools influential in Nietzsche's late nineteenth-century Europe. Peter Bornedal argues for a view of Nietzsche's epistemological thought as an elaboration of this paradigm: proposing ideas that are anti-metaphysical and anti-theological in their polemic orientation, and in general promoting new scientific naturalist ideals in the discussions of knowledge. Bornedal suggests that the rational pursuit of these new ideals to the unencumbered mind logically leads to Nihilism in its most profound epistemological sense. Nietzsche's "critique of metaphysics" is thus seen as having sprung from sources different from and, at times, in patent opposition to more recent postmodern and deconstructionist critiques. This book contextualizes Nietzsche in relation to a number of philosophical peers and juxtaposes him to contemporary thinkers in a way that resolves some of the difficulties that have plagued recent Nietzsche scholarship.

In three exemplary essays, author Peter Bornedal promotes Deconstruction as a cogent analytical method whose distinctive critical object is foundational knowledge. In this, he wants to restore Deconstruction as a rational discourse, while continuing to emphasize it as a critique of metaphysics. Two of the essays discuss the works of Paul Grice and Jurgen Habermas and their theories on language and communication. In these essays, the author demonstrates that despite the attempts of Grice and Habermas to give ontological foundations for inherent communicative rationality, their endeavors are unsuccessful. The third essay discusses John Stuart Mill's utilitarianism and argues that Mill's attempts to decide what is in principle good remain futile and incomplete. Ultimately, Bornedal argues that we cannot give metaphysical reasons for rationality or the good life. We can only decide to pursue these ideals, but there is nothing beyond the decision that makes the pursuit necessary or inherent. According to this position, Deconstruction becomes a kind of Pragmatism; or, as the author states, by way of paradox, "Analytic Deconstruction gives Pragmatism a scientific foundation."

Nietzsche’s Naturalist Deconstruction of Truth: A World Fragmented in Late Nineteenth-Century Epistemology offers a new interpretation of Nietzsche’s discussions of truth and knowledge, covering the period from his early essay “On Truth and Lies in an Extra-Moral Sense” to his late notebooks. It places these discussions in the context of the neo-Kantian, Naturalist, Positivist, and Pragmatic schools influential in Nietzsche’s late nineteenth-century Europe. Peter Bornedal argues for a view of Nietzsche’s epistemological thinking as elaborations of this paradigm: proposing ideas that are anti-metaphysical and anti-theological in their polemic orientation, and in general promoting new scientific naturalist ideals in the discussions of knowledge. Bornedal suggests that the rational pursuit of these new ideals to the unencumbered mind logically leads to Nihilism in its most profound epistemological sense. Nietzsche’s “critique of metaphysics” is thus seen as springing from sources different from and sometimes in patent opposition to more recent postmodern and deconstructionist “critiques of metaphysics.” This book contextualizes Nietzsche in relation to a number of philosophical peers and juxtaposes him to contemporary thinkers in a way that resolves some of the difficulties that have plagued recent Nietzsche scholarship.

Peter Bornedal provides an interpretation of Nietzsche's philosophy as a whole in the context of 19th century philosophy of mind and cognition. The study explains Nietzsche's notion of truth; his epistemology; his notions of the split and fragmented subject, of master, slave, and priest; furthermore, it offers a new interpretation of the enigmatic "eternal recurrence". It also suggests how important aspects of Nietzsche's thinking can be read as a sophisticated critique of ideology. From studies in Nietzsche's work as a whole, not least in his so-called Nachgelassene Fragmente, thebook reconstructs aspects of Nietzsche's thinking that have largely been under-described in especially the Anglo-Saxon Nietzsche-reception. The study makes the case that Nietzsche in his epistemology, his psychology, and his cognitive theory is responding to several scientific discoveries occuring during the 19th century. Read within the context of contemporary cognitive-psychological-evolutionary debates, Nietzsche's philosophy is seen as far more scientistic, and far less poetical-metaphysical, than it has in recent reception-history been received.

In this investigation, creative writing and philosophy are shown to be specific types of language games, distinct from speech as used in communicative interaction between individuals. The author deals with thinking, speech and systems, respectively. The author's philosophical position is closest to that of Paul Ricoeur and Jacques Derrida, but on crucial issues he advances his own ideas on the relationship between speech and writing, also establishing a criticism of metaphysics that may be more radical than what has previously been developed.