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This collection is in honour of Adrian Zuckerman, Emeritus
Professor of Civil Procedure at the University of Oxford. Bringing
together a distinguished group of judges and academics to reflect
on the impact of his work on our understanding of civil procedure
and evidence today. An internationally renowned scholar, Professor
Zuckerman has dedicated his professional life to the law of
evidence and civil procedure, drawing attention to the principles
and policies that shape litigation practice and their wider social
impact. His pioneering scholarship is admired by the judiciary and
the academy and has influenced several major reforms of the civil
justice system including the Woolf Reforms that heralded the
introduction of the Civil Procedure Rules, and Lord Justice
Jackson's Review of Civil Litigation Costs. His work has also
informed law reform bodies and courts in other jurisdictions.
Building upon Professor Zuckerman's work, the contributors address
outstanding problems in the field of civil procedure and evidence,
and in keeping with Adrian's record of always exploring new areas,
the book includes chapters on the prospects for a digital justice
system, including the new online court being developed in England
and the potential role of algorithms in the court room.
In common law jurisdictions, litigants are free to choose whether
to procure legal representation or litigate in person. There is no
formal requirement that civil litigants obtain legal
representation, and the court has no power to impose it on them,
regardless of whether the litigant has the financial means to hire
a lawyer or is capable of conducting litigation effectively.
Self-representation is considered indispensable even in
circumstances of extreme abuse of process, such as in 'vexatious
litigation'. Intriguingly, although self-representation is regarded
as sacrosanct in common law jurisdictions, most civil law systems
take a diametrically opposite view and impose obligations of legal
representation as a condition for conducting civil litigation,
except in low-value claims courts or specific tribunals. This
disparity presents a conundrum in comparative law: an unfettered
freedom to proceed in person is afforded in those legal systems
that are more reliant on the litigants' professional skills and
whose rules of procedure and evidence are more formal, complex, and
adversarial, whereas legal representation tends to be made
obligatory in systems that are judge-based and offer more flexible
and informal procedures, which would seem, intuitively, to be more
conducive to self-representation. In Injustice in Person: The Right
to Self Representation, Rabeea Assy assesses the theoretical value
of self-representation, and challenges the conventional wisdom that
this should be a fundamental right. With a fresh perspective, Assy
develops a novel justification for mandatory legal representation,
exploring a number of issues such as the requirements placed by the
liberal commitment to personal autonomy on the civil justice
system; the utility of plain English projects and the extent to
which they render the law accessible to lay people; and the idea
that a high degree of litigant control over the proceedings
enhances litigants' subjective perceptions of procedural fairness.
On a practical level, the book discusses the question of mandatory
representation against the case law of English and American courts
and also that of the European Court of Human Rights, the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, and the
Human Rights Committee.
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