Historically, Spain has often been represented as a financial failure, a state limited by its absolutist monarchy and doomed to fiscal and financial failure without hope of lasting growth. The collapse of the Spanish state at the beginning of the nineteenth century would seem to bear out this view of the limitations of Spain's absolutist state, and this historical school of thought presents the eighteenth century as the last episode in a long history of decline that is directly linked to the failure of the sixteenth-century Spanish imperial absolutist monarchy. This study provides a different perspective, suggesting that in fact during the eighteenth century, Spain's fiscal-military state was reconstructed and grew. It shows how the development of the Spanish fiscal-military state was based on different growth factors to those of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; and that with this change, most of the state's structure and its relationship with elites and taxpayers altered irrevocably. In the ceaseless search for solutions, the Spanish state applied a wide range of financial and fiscal policies to expand its empire. The research in this book is inspired by current historical discussions, and provides a new perspective on the historical debate that often compares English 'success' with continental 'failure'.

Military Entrepreneurs and the Spanish Contractor State in the Eighteenth Century offers a new approach to the relationship between warfare and state construction. Historians looking at how war funding impinged on state development, and how state growth made wars more significant, have tended to downplay the role of military-provisioning entrepreneurs. Written off as corrupt and selfish, these entrepreneurs jarred with the received view of a rationally growing and modernising state. This volume shows that the state-entrepreneur relationship was much more fluid and constant than previously thought. The state was not able to enforce a top-down military supply policy; at the same time it benefited from the entrepreneurs' collaboration and their shared mercantilist ambitions. The entrepreneurs' mobilisation of military supplies was crucial for extending state authority and helped to knit together national and colonial markets. But this fluid state-entrepreneur relationship gradually became shrouded in privileges and monopolies, not so much ideology driven or imposed by the entrepreneurs but rather as an arrangement exploited by the state to boost its control over them, whittling down middlemen and ensuring the solvency and creditworthiness of the chosen few. This arrangement spiralled into a risky inter-dependence and cramped entrepreneurial competition. Rafael Torres Sanchez furnishes new insights into the role of military entrepreneurs in debates about warfare and state construction.

This book aims to bring state expenditure into the debate over the construction of modern states. It has traditionally been argued that the differences in state development could be put down to the state's particular systems and methods for raising warfare resources. Historians have long stressed that the different levels of state development on a world level should be explained in terms of the origin and management of fiscal and financial resources. But this historical research did not pay the same attention to how that income was spent. This book aims to redress the balance by focusing on expenditure. As the book shows, there were glaring inter-state differences in expenditure management and analysis that may help to explain the patchy development of modern states. A wide-ranging trawl of national cases, all centred on the long eighteenth century, shows the consequences of different expenditure policies and management methods on the underlying state and economy. This book offers a broad panorama of national cases to show how warfare expenditure could become a source of problems for some states and a source of opportunities and growth for others.