This book is a ground-breaking analysis of the India-Pakistan nuclear confrontation as a form of 'cold war' -- that is, a hostile relationship between nuclear rivals. Drawing on nuclear rivalries between similar pairs (United States-Soviet Union, United States-China, Soviet Union-China, and United States-North Korea), the work examines the rise, process and potential end of the cold war between India and Pakistan. It identifies the three factors driving the India-Pakistan rivalry: ideational factors stemming from partition; oppositional roles created by the distribution of power in South Asia; and the particular kind of relationship created by nuclear weapons. The volume assesses why India and Pakistan continue in non-crisis times to think about power and military force in outmoded ways embedded in pre-nuclear times, and draws lessons applicable to them as well as to other contemporary nuclear powers and states that might be engaged in future cold wars.

An important reappraisal of the continuing conflict in South Asia, drawing an unprecedented parallel between the proliferation of nuclear arms in Pakistan and India and the spiralling tensions between the U.S. and the Soviet Union during the Cold War.

Rajesh Basrur begins by re-examining the term 'Cold War', focussing his enquiry on the problems of nation building and the tensions of a nuclear strategic relationship between nations. He investigates the plausibility of inflating 'Cold War' to a generic term by reviewing both the similarities and differences between the current conflict in South Asia and that which divided and defined political ideologies in the post war world. This book then assesses the role of political theoreticians and their role in helping to illuminate problems and draws key lessons from past conflicts. Basrur outlines his theory for a resolution to the conflict and the closely related instigation of healthy competition between India and Pakistan.

This is a fresh and unique perspective, indispensable for anybody with a particular interest in South Asia and world stability and in the wider fields of security studies and international relations.

In this book, a leading authority on India's nuclear program offers an informed and thoughtful assessment of India's nuclear strategy. He shows that the country's nuclear-strategic culture is generally in accord with the principle of minimum deterrence, but is sometimes inconsistent and has a tendency to drift into a more open-ended process. He addresses areas of concern, notably the relationship between minimum deterrence and subnuclear conflict, the threat from nuclear terrorism, and the special challenges nuclear weapons pose for a democratic society.

In this book, a leading authority on India's nuclear program offers an informed and thoughtful assessment of India's nuclear strategy. He shows that the country's nuclear-strategic culture is generally in accord with the principle of minimum deterrence, but is sometimes inconsistent and has a tendency to drift into a more open-ended process. He addresses areas of concern, notably the relationship between minimum deterrence and subnuclear conflict, the threat from nuclear terrorism, and the special challenges nuclear weapons pose for a democratic society.