Chinese and Greco-Roman ethics present highly articulate views on how one should live; both of these traditions remain influential in modern philosophy. The question arises how these traditions can be compared with one another. Comparative ethics is a relatively young discipline, and this volume is a major contribution to the field. Fundamental questions about the nature of comparing ethics are treated in two introductory chapters, followed by chapters on core issues in each of the traditions : harmony, virtue, friendship, knowledge, the relation of ethics to morality, relativism. The volume closes with a number of comparative studies on emotions, being and unity, simplicity and complexity, and prediction.

Two treatises on memory which have come down to us from antiquity are Aristotle's "On memory and recollection" and Plotinus' "On perception and memory" (IV 6); the latter also wrote at length about memory in his "Problems connected with the soul" (IV 3-4, esp. 3.25-4.6). In both authors memory is treated as a 'modest' faculty: both authors assume the existence of a persistent subject to whom memory belongs; and basic cognitive capacities are assumed on which memory depends. In particular, both theories use phantasia (representation) to explain memory. Aristotle takes representations to be changes in concrete living things which arise from actual perception. To be connected to the original perception the representation has to be taken as a (kind of) copy of the original experience - this is the way Aristotle defines memory at the end of his investigation. Plotinus does not define memory: he is concerned with the question of what remembers. This is of course the soul, which goes through different stages of incarnation and disincarnation. Since the disembodied soul can remember, so he does not have Aristotle's resources for explaining the continued presence of representations as changes in the concrete thing. Instead, he thinks that when acquiring a memory we acquire a capacity in respect of the object of the memory, namely to make it present at a later time.

The volume presents essays on the philosophical explanation of the relationship between body and soul in antiquity from the Presocratics to Galen, including papers on Parmenides on thinking (E. Hussey, R. Dilcher), Empedocles' Love (D. O'Brien), tripartition of the soul in Plato (T. Buchheim), Aristotle - especially the Parva Naturalia - (C. Rapp, T. Johansen, P.-M. Morel), Peripatetics after Aristotle (R. Sharples), Hellenistic Philosophy (C. Rapp, C. Gill), and Galen (R. J. Hankinson). The title of the volume alludes to a phrase found in Plato, Aristotle and Plotinus, referring to aspects of living behaviour involving both body and soul, and is a commonplace in ancient philosophy, dealt with in very different ways by different authors.

Two treatises on memory which have come down to us from antiquity are Aristotle's "On memory and recollection" and Plotinus' "On perception and memory" (IV 6); the latter also wrote at length about memory in his "Problems connected with the soul" (IV 3-4, esp. 3.25-4.6). In both authors memory is treated as a 'modest' faculty: both authors assume the existence of a persistent subject to whom memory belongs; and basic cognitive capacities are assumed on which memory depends. In particular, both theories use phantasia (representation) to explain memory.Aristotle takes representations to be changes in concrete living things which arise from actual perception. To be connected to the original perception the representation has to be taken as a (kind of) copy of the original experience - this is the way Aristotle defines memory at the end of his investigation.Plotinus does not define memory: he is concerned with the question of what remembers. This is of course the soul, which goes through different stages of incarnation and disincarnation. Since the disembodied soul can remember, so he does not have Aristotle's resources for explaining the continued presence of representations as changes in the concrete thing. Instead, he thinks that when acquiring a memory we acquire a capacity in respect of the object of the memory, namely to make it present at a later time.