This book explains how a creditor of an insolvent debtor can take priority over other creditors by claiming a proprietary interest in assets held by the debtor, and concentrates on the circumstances in which proprietary interests are created by operation of law or are implied from the arrangements between the parties. This is a subject of particular importance and difficulty in common law systems because of the changeable nature of equitable proprietary interests, and this book provides a clear and structured explanation of the current state of the law, with detailed reference to case law from England and Wales as well as Commonwealth jurisprudence, and suggests how it might be clarified and simplified by returning to first principles. The new edition considers a number of important developments which pertain to proprietary rights and insolvency. It evaluates the key decision of the Supreme Court in FHR European Ventures v Cedar Capital Partners. Although this has settled the question of whether constructive trusts extend to bribes, it has raised more general issues regarding the approach of the courts to the imposition of proprietary remedies, which the book explores. It also covers recent Privy Council and Court of Appeal decisions concerning constructive notice (Credit Agricole v Papadimitrou, Central Bank of Ecuador v Conticorp, and SFO v Lexi), as well as interesting issues concerning the new status of intangibles (Armstrong v Winnington) and the status of the anti-deprivation rule (Belmont Park v BNY). Proprietary Rights and Insolvency is a lucid and practical reference source on insolvency and property law.

Written with the busy practitioner in mind, this concise and insightful book sets out the principles that guide the courts in interpreting contracts. Each principle is covered in its own dedicated chapter, supported by case law which illustrates how the principle works in practice and in its wider context. In addition to interpretation of contracts, the book also considers the implication of terms, rectification, and estoppel by convention. This new edition considers the implications of key decisions of the Supreme Court in Arnold v Britton and Marks & Spencer v BNP Paribas, and BNY Mellon v LBG Capital. Other writing, including from judges writing extra-judicially, is also analysed. This book provides an invaluable reference for lawyers drafting, interpreting and litigating on contracts.

The interpretation of legal texts is, essentially, a question of judgement. But that judgement cannot be exercised arbitrarily, it must be exercised in accordance with the rule of law. In Principles of Statutory Interpretation, Richard Calnan explains these rules using seven defined principles that should be considered when interpreting legislation. The first principle of 'object intention' concerns establishing how a reasonable person would interpret the legislation. The second confirms that the actual text or words of the statute are the source of that objective intention. Principle 3 reminds us that words used must be interpreted given their role in the statute as a whole, and the fourth principle examines how that context may be judged. The fifth and sixth highlight that words should, generally, be given their natural meaning in statute, and for those words that are ambiguous, the approach is to apply the meaning that the legislature is most likely to have intended. However, the seventh principle recognises that there are circumstances when words are given a meaning which differs from their natural meaning. These principles are not a series of self-contained precepts which can be applied independently of each other, rather they need to be understood together. Principles of Statutory Interpretation, provides the reader with examples which illustrate how the various principles of statutory interpretation, work in practice