US Intervention Policy and Army Innovation examines how the US Army rebuilt itself after the Vietnam War and how this has affected US intervention policy, from the victory of the Gulf War to the failure of Somalia, the Bosnian and Kosovo interventions and the use of force post 9/11. Richard Lock-Pullan analyzes the changes in US military intervention strategy by examining two separate issues: the nature of the US Army as it rebuilt itself after the Vietnam War, and the attempts by the US to establish criteria for future military interventions. He first argues that US strategy traditionally relied upon national mobilization to co-ordinate political aims and military means; he subsequently analyzes how this changed to a formula of establishing militarily achievable political objectives prior to the use of force. Drawing on a vast body of material and on strategic culture and military innovation literature, Lock-Pullan demonstrates that the strategic lessons were a product of the rebuilding of the Army's identity as it became a professional all-volunteer force and that the Army's new doctrine developed a new 'way of war' for the nation, embodied in the AirLand Battle doctrine, which changed the approach to strategy. This book finally gives a practical analysis of how the interventions in Panama and the Gulf War vindicated this approach and brought a revived confidence in the use of force while more recent campaigns in Somalia, Kosovo and Bosnia exposed its weaknesses and the limiting nature of the Army's thinking. The legacy of the Army's innovation is examined in the new strategic environment post 9/11 with the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.

After the Vietnam War the US Army had to rebuild itself while the US government had to reconsider its military intervention strategy. This book examines how it was done and how this has affected US intervention policy, from the victory of the Gulf War to the failure of Somalia, before examining the Bosnian and Kosovo interventions.
This volume sets out to analyze the changes in US military intervention strategy by examining two separate issues: the nature of the US Army as it rebuilt itself after the Vietnam War, and the attempts by the US to establish criteria for future military interventions. Richard Lock-Pullan first argues that US strategy traditionally relied upon national mobilization to co-ordinate political aims and military means; he subsequently analyses how this changed to a formula of establishing militarily achievable political objectives prior to the use of force. Drawing on a vast body of strategic culture and military innovation literature, the author demonstrates that the strategic lessons were a product of the rebuilding of the Army's identity as it became a professional all-volunteer force and that the Army's new doctrine developed a new 'way of war' for the nation, embodied in the Air Land Battle doctrine, which changed the approach to strategy.
The book finally gives a practical analysis of how the interventions in Panama and the Gulf War vindicated this approach and brought a revived confidence in the use of force while more recent campaigns in Somalia, Kosovo and Bosnia exposed its weaknesses and the limiting nature of the Army's thinking.
This book will be of interest to students of strategic studies, international relations and American politics aswell as to military professionals.

How has 9/11 and George W. Bush's self-declared 'war' on terror changed American government and US foreign policy? This is the central question addressed in the nine original essays in this book. Following an introduction by the editors, in which they survey issues and debates raised by America's 'War' on Terrorism and its consequences for US government and politics, foreign policy, and for American foreign relations, the contributions to this volume_from British and American scholars_explain the implications of the post-9/11 mobilization and reconfiguration of US foreign and internal security policies. Issues addressed in the book include: the growth of presidential power, executive branch reconfiguration and the managerial presidency, the Bush doctrine of pre-emption, the changing role of the US in the international order, the impact of the 'war' on terrorism on the US military, intelligence failure and the changed role of US intelligence, renewed tension in US-European relations, and Bush's alliance with Tony Blair's government in the United Kingdom. Taken together, the essays represent an original and timely assessment of the domestic and international repercussions of George W. Bush's responses to the terrorist attacks September 11, 2001.

How has 9/11 and George W. Bush's self-declared "war" on terror changed American government and US foreign policy? This is the central question addressed in the nine original essays in this book. Following an introduction by the editors, in which they survey issues and debates raised by America's "War" on Terrorism and its consequences for US government and politics, foreign policy, and for American foreign relations, the contributions to this volume-from British and American scholars-explain the implications of the post-9/11 mobilization and reconfiguration of US foreign and internal security policies. Issues addressed in the book include: the growth of presidential power, executive branch reconfiguration and the managerial presidency, the Bush doctrine of pre-emption, the changing role of the US in the international order, the impact of the "war" on terrorism on the US military, intelligence failure and the changed role of US intelligence, renewed tension in US-European relations, and Bush's alliance with Tony Blair's government in the United Kingdom. Taken together, the essays represent an original and timely assessment of the domestic and international repercussions of George W. Bush's responses to the terrorist attacks September 11, 2001.