It has been said that the only thing new in the world is the history you don't know. This Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) Occasional Paper (OP) is a timely reminder for the US Army about the history we do not know, or at least the history we do not know well. The Army has recently embarked on massive advisory missions with foreign militaries in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere around the globe. We are simultaneously engaged in a huge effort to learn how to conduct those missions for which we do no consistently prepare. Mr. Robert Ramsey's historical study examines three cases in which the US Army has performed this same mission in the last half of the 20th century. In Korea during the 1950s, in Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s, and in El Salvador in the 1980s the Army was tasked to build and advise host nation armies during a time of war. The author makes several key arguments about the lesson the Army though it learned at the time. Among the key points Mr. Ramsey makes are the need for US advisors to have extensive language and cultural training, the lesser importance for them of technical and tactical skills training, and the need to adapt US organizational concepts, training techniques, and tactics to local conditions. Accordingly, he also notes the great importance of the host nation's leadership buying into and actively supporting the development of a performance-based selection, training, and promotion system. To its credit, the institutional Army learned these hard lessons, form successes and failures, during and after each of the cases examined in this study. However, they were often forgotten as the Army prepared for the next major conventional conflict. These lessons are still important and relevant today. In fact, prior to its publication the conclusions of this study were delivered by the author to several of the Army's current advisory training task forces. We at CSI believe this GWOT OP can contribute significant insights to the Army as it works to prepare for and conduct its current advisory missions.

Combat Studies Institute (CSI) presents Long War Series Occupational Paper (OP) 25, "A Masterpiece of Counterguerrilla Warfare: BG J. Franklin Bell in the Philippines, 1901-1902, by Robert Ramsey. OP 25 is a companion to OP 24, "Savage Wars of Peace: Case Studies of Pacification in the Philippines, 1900-1902. IN OP 24 Ramsey analyzed case studies from two different Philippine military districts discovering several themes relevant to today's ongoing operations in the Long War. IN OP 25 he focuses on the philosophy that guided Bell in the conduct of one of those campaigns. Over the ages military historians have employed many types of research and writing to understand, and ultimately learn from, the past. These methods range from studies of grand strategy to studies of small unit tactics to, most recently, studies of the history of war and society. OP 25 takes a different approach, one whose origins are old and rather infrequently practiced today. This technique examines the inner thinking of a commander in an attempt to understand how he viewed the operation he was conducting. In reading Bell's words today, it becomes clear he displayed at least two of the key attributes that constitute Clausewitz's concept of military genius - the inner light or vision that points a commander toward victory in the fog of war and the determination to act decisively in the fact of danger. Mr. Ramsey, in his introduction, makes note of British Field Marshal Sir Archibald P. Wavell's endorsement of this kind of history: "The real way to get value out of the study of military history is to take particular situations, and as far as possible get inside the skin of the man who made a decision, realize the conditions in which the decision was made, and then see in what way you could have improved upon it." This quote captures the intent of this study. The collected messages and circulars issued by Bell to his subordinate commanders, and the text of the US Army's famous General Orders 100 from which he drew that guidance, provide the means to accomplish what Clausewitz and Wavell urged us to do.

Consider the following: The United States is engaged in what some political and media leaders call an immoral war, a war that did not have to be fought. After a relatively easy initial conquest, the US Army finds itself faced with armed resistance to US occupation. US strategic goals have changed since the war began; domestic political opposition increases as insurgent activities prolong the war. Insurgent leaders monitor US domestic politics and adjust their strategy accordingly. US Army Soldiers adapt to the uncertainty and employ novel techniques to complex military and nonmilitary problems in a land where they are strangers and about which they have little understanding. Does this sound familiar? It should, but this description does not depict events from 2003 to 2007 in the Middle East-it describes events from 1898 to 1902 in the Philippines. Combat Studies Institute (CSI) is pleased to publish its 24th Long War Series Occasional Paper, Savage Wars of Peace: Case Studies of Pacification in the Philippines, 1900-1902, by CSI historian Robert Ramsey. In it he analyzes case studies from two key Philippine military districts and highlights several themes that are relevant to today's ongoing operations in the Long War. Between 1899 and 1902 the US Army was successful in defeating Filipino resistance to American occupation using what military leaders at the time called a combination of attraction and coercion. However, success came only after initial setbacks, disappointments, and significant changes in leadership, military strategy, and political adaptation. In the two regions of the Luzon Island analyzed in this occasional paper, Army leaders employed a mix of political and economic incentives, combined with military actions and strict martial law to subdue the resistance. The geographic isolation of the insurrectos on the Philippine archipelago was also an advantage for US forces. The capture of key insurrecto leaders provided critical intelligence, and their post-capture pledge of support for the new government helped break the resistance by 1902. This work highlights, among many other themes, the importance of perseverance, adaptability, and cultural understanding. Written at the request of the Command and General Staff College for use in their curriculum, we believe this occasional paper will be a valuable addition to the professional development of all Army leaders.

Recent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have given the US military an appreciation of both the importance and the challenges of working with and through host nation security forces in the aftermath of major combat operations. Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates has indicated that these types of efforts will be an ongoing military requirement for the foreseeable future. The US military effort in support of Colombian security forces offers a different and a lesser known experience from which to learn: one that has been long-term, low-key, and seemingly successful. Between 1998 and 2008, Colombian security forces dramatically improved as they moved from what many considered the brink of disaster to being on the verge of victory. The Combat Studies Institute (CSI) is pleased to publish its 34th Occasional Paper, From El Billar to Operations Fenix and Jaque: The Colombian Security Force Experience, 1998-2008. Written at the request of US Southern Command, this study begins with an overview of the general security situation prior to 1998, then traces Colombian and US efforts during the Pastrana presidency and Plan Colombia, and concludes with the subsequent actions of the Uribe administration. In the final section, the author offers observations from the Colombian experience for those in the US military who will be called on to work with and through host nation security forces in the future. Although the Colombian experience offers no simple model to be replicated mindlessly elsewhere, it does offer observations and analysis that may be useful to the military professional struggling to address similar situations. Robert Ramsey's Occasional Paper not only provides a useful reminder of the inherent challenges for both host nation and US military personnel in those situations, but also shows that, given the right people, the right programs, and sufficient time, those challenges can be met successfully. Perhaps that is the best insight of all to be drawn from a reading of this work.