Most livestock in the United States currently live in cramped and unhealthy confinement, have few stable social relationships with humans or others of their species, and finish their lives by being transported and killed under stressful conditions. In Livestock, Erin McKenna allows us to see this situation and presents alternatives. She interweaves stories from visits to farms, interviews with producers and activists, and other rich material about the current condition of livestock. In addition, she mixes her account with pragmatist and ecofeminist theorizing about animals, drawing in particular on John Dewey's account of evolutionary history, and provides substantial historical background about individual species and about human-animal relations. This deeply informative text reveals that the animals we commonly see as livestock have rich evolutionary histories, species-specific behaviors, breed tendencies, and individual variation, just as those we respect in companion animals such as dogs, cats, and horses. To restore a similar level of respect for livestock, McKenna examines ways we can balance the needs of our livestock animals with the environmental and social impacts of raising them, and she investigates new possibilities for humans to be in relationships with other animals. This book thus offers us a picture of healthier, more respectful relationships with livestock.

This book provides an overview of recent research presenting conflicting interpretations of children's understanding of the psychology of pretense and describes sociocultural factors which influence children's pretenses. Studies of nonhuman primates provide examples of their pretenses and other simulative activities, explore their representational and imaginative capacities and compare their skills with children. Although the psychological requirements for pretending are controversial, evidence presented in this volume suggests that great apes and even monkeys may share capacities for imagination with children and that children's early pretenses may be less psychological than they appear.

How does knowledge of the body in space relate to an understanding of space itself? Spatial cognition is discussed from two closely related perspectives: the internal mapping of external stimuli (e.g., landmarks and sensory perception of environmental information) and the internal mapping of internally perceived stimuli (e.g., kinesthetic and visual imagery), and their subsequent effects on behaviour. Clarification of what spatial information is present in most perceptual processes and how this is used cognitively in relation to the self in space is then established. Major points and controversies of the various models are discussed, along with evolutionary perspectives of spatial perception and object recognition and comparisons between human and non-human spatial cognitive abilities and behaviours. Written for postgraduate students and researchers, the authors present theoretical and experimental accounts at multiple levels of analysis - perceptual, behavioural and cognitive - providing a thorough review of the mechanisms of spatial cognition.

It is well known that children's activities are full of pretending and imagination, but it is less appreciated that animals can also show similar activities. Originally published in 2002, this book focuses on comparing and contrasting children's and animals' pretenses and imaginative activities. In the text, overviews of research present conflicting interpretations of children's understanding of the psychology of pretense, and describe sociocultural factors which influence children's pretenses. Studies of nonhuman primates provide examples of their pretenses and other simulative activities, explore their representational and imaginative capacities and compare their skills with children. Although the psychological requirements for pretending are controversial, evidence presented in this volume suggests that great apes and even monkeys may share capacities for imagination with children, and that children's early pretenses may be less psychological than they appear.

How does knowledge of the body in space relate to an understanding of space itself? Spatial cognition is discussed from two closely related perspectives: the internal mapping of external stimuli (e.g., landmarks and sensory perception of environmental information) and the internal mapping of internally perceived stimuli (e.g., kinesthetic and visual imagery), and their subsequent effects on behaviour. Clarification of what spatial information is present in most perceptual processes and how this is used cognitively in relation to the self in space is then established. Major points and controversies of the various models are discussed, along with evolutionary perspectives of spatial perception and object recognition and comparisons between human and non-human spatial cognitive abilities and behaviours. Written for postgraduate students and researchers, the authors present theoretical and experimental accounts at multiple levels of analysis - perceptual, behavioural and cognitive - providing a thorough review of the mechanisms of spatial cognition.

Research on the mental abilities of chimpanzees and bonobos has been widely celebrated and used in reconstructions of human evolution. In contrast, less attention has been paid to the abilities of gorillas and orangutans. This 1999 volume aims to help complete the picture of hominoid cognition by bringing together the work on gorillas and orangutans and setting it in comparative perspective. The introductory chapters set the evolutionary context for comparing cognition in gorillas and orangutans to that of chimpanzees, bonobos and humans. The remaining chapters focus primarily on the kinds and levels of intelligence displayed by orangutans and gorillas compared to other great apes, including performances in the classic domains of tool use and tool making, imitation, self-awareness, social communication and symbol use. All those wanting more information on the mental abilities of these sometimes neglected, but important primates will find this book a treasure trove.

Research on the mental abilities of chimpanzees and bonobos has been widely celebrated and used in reconstructions of human evolution. In contrast, scant attention has been paid to the abilities of gorillas and orangutans. This volume aims to complete the picture of hominoid cognition by bringing together the work on gorillas and orangutans and setting it in comparative perspective. This book's introductory chapters set the evolutionary context for comparing cognition in gorillas and orangutans to that of chimpanzees, bonobos, and humans. The remaining chapters focus primarily on the kinds and levels of intelligence displayed by orangutans and gorillas compared to other great apes, including performances in the classic domains of tool use and tool making, imitation, self awareness, social communication, and symbol use.

Self-Awareness in Animals and Humans, a collection of original articles on self-awareness in monkeys, apes, humans, and other species, focuses on controversies about how to measure self-awareness, which species are capable of self-awareness and which are not, and why. Several chapters focus on the controversial question of whether gorillas, like other great apes and human infants, are capable of mirror self-recognition (MSR) or whether they are anomalously unable to do so. Other chapters focus on whether macaque monkeys are capable of MSR. The focus of the chapters is both comparative and developmental: several contributors explore the value of frameworks from human developmental psychology for comparative studies. This dual focus - comparative and developmental - reflects the interdisciplinary nature of the volume, which brings together biological anthropologists, comparative and developmental psychologists, and cognitive scientists from Japan, France, Spain, Hungary, New Zealand, Scotland and the United States.