This book examines the presidency in twentieth century America and explores why some presidents succeed as makers of U.S. foreign policy while others fail, sometimes tragically. It explores each president's ability to apply his skills to a foreign policy issue in the face of opposition that may come from a variety of sources, including the Congress, the Pentagon, the State Department, the press, and often their own in-house advisers. This volume in particular focuses on Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, Herbert Hoover, Franklin D Roosevelt, and Harry Truman.

This book, the second of two volumes, examines the presidency in last half of twentieth century America and explores the successes and failures of presidents in their foreign policy initiatives. It examines each president's ability to apply his skills to a foreign policy issue in the face of opposition that may come from a variety of sources, including the Congress, the Pentagon, the State Department, the press, and often their own in-house advisers. This volume in particular focuses on John F. Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson, Richard Nixon, Ronald Reagan, and George W. Bush.

This book, the second of two volumes, examines the presidency in last half of twentieth century America and explores the successes and failures of presidents in their foreign policy initiatives. It examines each president's ability to apply his skills to a foreign policy issue in the face of opposition that may come from a variety of sources, including the Congress, the Pentagon, the State Department, the press, and often their own in-house advisers. This volume in particular focuses on John F. Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson, Richard Nixon, Ronald Reagan, and George W. Bush.

This book examines the presidency in twentieth century America and explores why some presidents succeed as makers of U.S. foreign policy while others fail, sometimes tragically. It explores each president's ability to apply his skills to a foreign policy issue in the face of opposition that may come from a variety of sources, including the Congress, the Pentagon, the State Department, the press, and often their own in-house advisers. This volume in particular focuses on Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, Herbert Hoover, Franklin D Roosevelt, and Harry Truman.

This volume discusses the presidential foreign policies of the post-Cold War era, beginning with George H. W. Bush and ending with the first 17 months of Donald Trump's presidency. During this period, the United States emerged from the Cold War as the world's most powerful nation. Nevertheless, the presidents of this era faced a host of problems that tested their ability to successfully blend realism and idealism. Some were more successful than others.

This timely and accessible book traces the evolution of the nuclear arms race from its origin in Roosevelt's decision to develop an atomic bomb to Reagan's decision to continue its expansion in the 1980s. As Powaski explains, the United States and the Soviet Union have a combined total of almost 50,000 nuclear weapons. Nuclear arms treaties and agreements are threatening to collapse, he argues, while the proliferation of nuclear materials and weapons throughout the world has given many countries the capability to produce nuclear weapons. Powaski shows how one President after another has promised to do his utmost to end the nuclear weapons competition, yet each one has actually increased the quantity of these weapons in the American arsenal, revealing a startling discrepancy between Presidential words and actions.

Return to Armageddon covers the extraordinary years spanning the Reagan, Bush and Clinton administrations, a period when the United States, through its victory in the Cold War, led the world away from the brink of nuclear annihilation, and then slowly became aware of the increased threat of nuclear confrontation in a world more splintered than ever before.

Return to Armageddon covers the extraordinary years spanning the Reagan, Bush, and Clinton administrations, a period when the United States, through its victory in the Cold War, led the world away from the brink of nuclear annihilation, and then slowly became aware of the increased threat of nuclear confrontation in a world more splintered than ever before and more at the mercy of fanatics and zealots.

For half of the twentieth century, the Cold War gripped the world. International relations everywhere--and domestic policy in scores of nations--pivoted around this central point, the American-Soviet rivalry. Even today, much of the world's diplomacy grapples with chaos created by the Cold War's sudden disappearance. Here indeed is a subject that defies easy understanding. Now comes a definitive account, a startlingly fresh, clear eyed, comprehensive history of our century's longest struggle.
In The Cold War, Ronald E. Powaski offers a new perspective on the great rivalry, even as he provides a coherent, concise narrative. He wastes no time in challenging the reader to think of the Cold War in new ways, arguing that the roots of the conflict are centuries old, going back to Czarist Russia and to the very infancy of the American nation. He shows that both Russia and America were expansionist nations with messianic complexes, and the people of both nations believed they possessed a unique mission in history. Except for a brief interval in 1917, Americans perceived the Russian government (whether Czarist or Bolshevik) as despotic; Russians saw the United States as conspiring to prevent it from reaching its place in the sun. U.S. military intervention in Russia's civil war, with the aim of overthrowing Lenin's upstart regime, entrenched Moscow's fears. Soviet American relations, difficult before World War II--when both nations were relatively weak militarily and isolated from world affairs--escalated dramatically after both nations emerged as the world's major military powers. Powaski paints a portrait of the spiraling tensions with stark clarity, as each new development added to the rivalry: the Marshall Plan, the communist coup in Czechoslovakia, the Berlin blockade, the formation of NATO, the first Soviet nuclear test. In this atmosphere, Truman found it easy to believe that the Communist victory in China and the Korean War were products of Soviet expansionism. He and his successors extended their own web of mutual defense treaties, covert actions, and military interventions across the globe--from the Caribbean to the Middle East and, finally to Southeast Asia, where containment famously foundered in the bog of Vietnam.
Powaski skillfully highlights the domestic politics, diplomatic maneuvers, and even psychological factors as he untangles the knot that bound the two superpowers together in conflict. From the nuclear arms race, to the impact of U.S. recognition of China on detente, to Brezhnev's inflexible persistence in competing with America everywhere, he casts new light on familiar topics. Always judicious in his assessments, Powaski gives due credit to Reagan and especially Bush in facilitating the Soviet collapse, but also notes that internal economic failure, not outside pressure, proved decisive in the Communist failure. Perhaps most important, he offers a clear eyed assessment of the lasting distortions the struggle wrought upon American institutions, raising questions about whether anyone really won the Cold War. With clarity, fairness, and insight, he offers the definitive account of our century's longest international rivalry.