This book is a challenging, thought-provoking yet highly accessible introduction to discrimination law. It takes a thematic approach, illuminating the major issues in discrimination law, while imparting an in-depth understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of legal responses to complex social problems of inequality. This is enhanced by the comparative approach. By considering equality law in the UK, US, India, Canada, and South Africa, as well as the European Union and under the European Convention on Human Rights, the book exposes common problems across different jurisdictions and canvasses a variety of differing solutions. As in the highly successful previous editions, the book locates discrimination law within its historical and social context. One of its major strengths is the development of an analytic framework of substantive equality, drawing on a range of sources, and the author's wide experience of equality law in many jurisdictions. As well as chapters charting the social challenges and legal responses, the book compares the ways in which different jurisdictions formulate grounds of discrimination or protected characteristics; the meaning of key concepts such as direct discrimination (disparate treatment); indirect discrimination (disparate impact); and when limitations on equality are legitimate. Later chapters test these concepts in some of the most challenging contexts: pregnancy and parenting, equal pay, reasonable accommodation, and sexual harassment; as well as to the particularly controversial issue of affirmative action or deliberate preference policies. Discussing at length how racisms, sexism, LGBTQ+ rights, and other topics impact these contexts. The final chapter asks how the right to equality can be made more effective, critically assessing the paradigm individual complaints model, and possible alternatives, from class actions and strategic litigation to mainstreaming and positive duties to promote equality.

This book is a challenging, thought-provoking yet highly accessible introduction to discrimination law. It takes a thematic approach, illuminating the major issues in discrimination law, while imparting an in-depth understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of legal responses to complex social problems of inequality. This is enhanced by the comparative approach. By considering equality law in the UK, US, India, Canada, and South Africa, as well as the European Union and under the European Convention on Human Rights, the book exposes common problems across different jurisdictions and canvasses a variety of differing solutions. As in the highly successful previous editions, the book locates discrimination law within its historical and social context. One of its major strengths is the development of an analytic framework of substantive equality, drawing on a range of sources, and the author's wide experience of equality law in many jurisdictions. As well as chapters charting the social challenges and legal responses, the book compares the ways in which different jurisdictions formulate grounds of discrimination or protected characteristics; the meaning of key concepts such as direct discrimination (disparate treatment); indirect discrimination (disparate impact); and when limitations on equality are legitimate. Later chapters test these concepts in some of the most challenging contexts: pregnancy and parenting, equal pay, reasonable accommodation, and sexual harassment; as well as to the particularly controversial issue of affirmative action or deliberate preference policies. Discussing at length how racisms, sexism, LGBTQ+ rights, and other topics impact these contexts. The final chapter asks how the right to equality can be made more effective, critically assessing the paradigm individual complaints model, and possible alternatives, from class actions and strategic litigation to mainstreaming and positive duties to promote equality.

Human rights have traditionally been understood as protecting individual freedom against intrusion by the State. In this book, Sandra Fredman argues that this understanding requires radical revision. Human rights are based on a far richer view of freedom, which goes beyond being let alone, and instead pays attention to individuals' ability to exercise their rights.
This view fundamentally shifts the focus of human rights. As well as restraining the State, human rights require the State to act positively to remove barriers and facilitate the exercise of freedom. This in turn breaks down traditional distinctions between civil and political rights and socio-economic rights. Instead, all rights give rise to a range of duties, both negative and positive. However, because positive duties have for so long been regarded as a question of policy or aspiration, little sustained attention has been given to their role in actualising human rights. Drawing on comparative experience from India, South Africa, the European Convention on Human Rights, the European Union, Canada and the UK, this book aims to create a theoretical and applied framework for understanding positive human rights duties.
Part I elaborates the values of freedom, equality, and solidarity underpinning a positive approach to human rights duties, and argues that the dichotomy between democracy and human rights is misplaced. Instead, positive human rights duties should strengthen rather than substitute for democracy, particularly in the face of globalization and privatization. Part II considers justiciability, fashioning a democratic role for the courts based on their potential to stimulate deliberative democracy in the widerenvironment. Part III applies this framework to key positive duties, particularly substantive equality and positive duties to provide, traditionally associated with the Welfare State or socioeconomic rights.

Human rights have traditionally been understood as protecting individual freedom against intrusion by the State. In this book, Sandra Fredman argues that this understanding requires radical revision. Human rights are based on a far richer view of freedom, which goes beyond being let alone, and instead pays attention to individuals' ability to exercise their rights.
This view fundamentally shifts the focus of human rights. As well as restraining the State, human rights require the State to act positively to remove barriers and facilitate the exercise of freedom. This in turn breaks down traditional distinctions between civil and political rights and socio-economic rights. Instead, all rights give rise to a range of duties, both negative and positive. However, because positive duties have for so long been regarded as a question of policy or aspiration, little sustained attention has been given to their role in actualising human rights. Drawing on comparative experience from India, South Africa, the European Convention on Human Rights, the European Union, Canada and the UK, this book aims to create a theoretical and applied framework for understanding positive human rights duties.
Part I elaborates the values of freedom, equality, and solidarity underpinning a positive approach to human rights duties, and argues that the dichotomy between democracy and human rights is misplaced. Instead, positive human rights duties should strengthen rather than substitute for democracy, particularly in the face of globalization and privatization. Part II considers justiciability, fashioning a democratic role for the courts based on their potential to stimulate deliberative democracy in the widerenvironment. Part III applies this framework to key positive duties, particularly substantive equality and positive duties to provide, traditionally associated with the Welfare State or socio-economic rights.