Since October 2001, the bomber force has, in effect, been in surge operations in order to support the regional combatant commander requests. This paper identifies bomber deployment difficulties and defines the causal factors of the deployment problem within the limits of the AEF construct and offers possible solutions. A brief historical review of the United States air force's pursuit of increased expeditionary capability and improved force management provides a foundation for this analysis. The current situation in the Air Force bomber forces highlights the criticality of instituting a viable solution to this problem. The dual requirements of expeditionary air forces to supply warfighting capability and to project forward presence provide a comparative construct to evaluate this problem and to identify solutions. The historic paradigm of strategic bomber operations suggests that improving the capabilities of bombers would resolve the problem by requiring fewer bombers per deployment. However, this analysis asserts that the paradigm has expanded to include the requirements for tactical and operational responsiveness and presence, which reduces the viability of a capability-based solution. As a forward presence problem, this paper asserts that neither a stricter adherence to the concepts inherent in Global Reach- Global Power or a permanent forward basing of a bomber unit is a viable long-term solution. The conclusion is that improved bomber capabilities are necessary, but only when coupled with the reorganization of the bomber forces to match the AEF construct. In order to accomplish this, the Air Force should reorganize the 80 combat coded B-1s and B-52s into 10 independent squadrons in support of the AEF. This solution does not require the acquisition of any bombers; however, it does require the resources necessary to create 10 independently deployable bomber units from the six that are available now.