Durable authoritarian rule often rests on the co-optation of challengers. The conventional story is straightforward: rulers entice opposition groups to “sell out,” offering them benefits if they set aside their antiauthoritarian aspirations and become part of the system. However, co-optation does not always neutralize former adversaries, and even seemingly domesticated opponents can turn on their rulers. Co-optation does weaken opposition—but it is not as simple, reliable, or transactional as existing theories claim. Shouting in a Cage offers new ways to understand co-optation’s power and its limits by examining two co-opted parties, the Wafd Party in Egypt and the Istiqlal Party in Morocco. Sofia Fenner argues that co-optation is less a corrupt bargain than a discursive contest—a clash of competing interpretations. Co-opted parties conjure up imagined futures in which their short-term choices will lead to the realization of their long-term democratic goals. Meanwhile, other actors point to the disconnect between these parties’ antiauthoritarian aspirations and their participation in authoritarian systems. Fenner demonstrates that co-opted parties come to look hypocritical precisely because they refuse to give up their oppositional commitments. Their credibility sapped, they become unappealing allies and, eventually, political afterthoughts. However, such parties retain a surprising capacity for opposition, rooted in the literal and metaphorical idea of “party as family.” Based on extensive archival research and ethnographic fieldwork in North Africa, Shouting in a Cage broadens our understanding of political behavior under authoritarianism.

Durable authoritarian rule often rests on the co-optation of challengers. The conventional story is straightforward: rulers entice opposition groups to “sell out,” offering them benefits if they set aside their antiauthoritarian aspirations and become part of the system. However, co-optation does not always neutralize former adversaries, and even seemingly domesticated opponents can turn on their rulers. Co-optation does weaken opposition—but it is not as simple, reliable, or transactional as existing theories claim. Shouting in a Cage offers new ways to understand co-optation’s power and its limits by examining two co-opted parties, the Wafd Party in Egypt and the Istiqlal Party in Morocco. Sofia Fenner argues that co-optation is less a corrupt bargain than a discursive contest—a clash of competing interpretations. Co-opted parties conjure up imagined futures in which their short-term choices will lead to the realization of their long-term democratic goals. Meanwhile, other actors point to the disconnect between these parties’ antiauthoritarian aspirations and their participation in authoritarian systems. Fenner demonstrates that co-opted parties come to look hypocritical precisely because they refuse to give up their oppositional commitments. Their credibility sapped, they become unappealing allies and, eventually, political afterthoughts. However, such parties retain a surprising capacity for opposition, rooted in the literal and metaphorical idea of “party as family.” Based on extensive archival research and ethnographic fieldwork in North Africa, Shouting in a Cage broadens our understanding of political behavior under authoritarianism.

Canonical theories of political economy struggle to explain patterns of distribution in authoritarian regimes. In this Element, Albertus, Fenner, and Slater challenge existing models and introduce an alternative, supply-side, and state-centered theory of 'coercive distribution'. Authoritarian regimes proactively deploy distributive policies as advantageous strategies to consolidate their monopoly on power. These policies contribute to authoritarian durability by undercutting rival elites and enmeshing the masses in lasting relations of coercive dependence. The authors illustrate the patterns, timing, and breadth of coercive distribution with global and Latin American quantitative evidence and with a series of historical case studies from regimes in Latin America, Asia, and the Middle East. By recognizing distribution's coercive dimensions, they account for empirical patterns of distribution that do not fit with quasi-democratic understandings of distribution as quid pro quo exchange. Under authoritarian conditions, distribution is less an alternative to coercion than one of its most effective expressions.