This book investigates the underlying reasons for the longevity of detente and its impact on East-West relations. The volume examines the relevance of trade across the Iron Curtain as a means to facilitate mutual trust, as well as the emergence of new habits of transparency regardless of recurring military crises. A major theme of the book concerns Helmut Schmidt's foreign policy and his contribution to the resilience of cooperative security policies in East-West relations. It examines Schmidt's crucial role in the Euromissile crisis, his Ostpolitik diplomacy and his pan-European trade initiatives to engage the Soviet Union in a joint perspective of trade, industry and technology. Another key theme concerns the crisis in US-Soviet relations and the challenges of meaningful leadership communication between Washington and Moscow in the absence of backchannel diplomacy during the Carter years. The book depicts the freeze in US-Soviet relations after the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan, the declaration of martial law in Poland, and Helmut Schmidt's efforts to serve as a mediator and interpreter working for a relaunch of US-Soviet dialogue. Eventually, the book highlights George Shultz's pivotal role in the Reagan Administration's efforts to improve US-Soviet relations, well before Mikhail Gorbachev's arrival. This book will be of interest to students of Cold War studies, diplomatic history, foreign policy and international relations.

This book investigates the underlying reasons for the longevity of detente and its impact on East-West relations. The volume examines the relevance of trade across the Iron Curtain as a means to facilitate mutual trust, as well as the emergence of new habits of transparency regardless of recurring military crises. A major theme of the book concerns Helmut Schmidt's foreign policy and his contribution to the resilience of cooperative security policies in East-West relations. It examines Schmidt's crucial role in the Euromissile crisis, his Ostpolitik diplomacy and his pan-European trade initiatives to engage the Soviet Union in a joint perspective of trade, industry and technology. Another key theme concerns the crisis in US-Soviet relations and the challenges of meaningful leadership communication between Washington and Moscow in the absence of backchannel diplomacy during the Carter years. The book depicts the freeze in US-Soviet relations after the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan, the declaration of martial law in Poland, and Helmut Schmidt's efforts to serve as a mediator and interpreter working for a relaunch of US-Soviet dialogue. Eventually, the book highlights George Shultz's pivotal role in the Reagan Administration's efforts to improve US-Soviet relations, well before Mikhail Gorbachev's arrival. This book will be of interest to students of Cold War studies, diplomatic history, foreign policy and international relations.

This book examines the dynamic evolution of Western detente policies which sought to transform Europe and overcome its Cold War division through more communication and engagement. Kieninger challenges the traditional Cold War narrative that detente prolonged the division of Europe and precipitated America's decline in the aftermath of the Vietnam War. Rather, he argues that policymakers in the U.S. Department of State and in Western Europe envisaged the stability enabled by detente as a precondition for change, as Communist regimes saw a sense of security as a prerequisite for opening up their societies to Western influence over time. Kieninger identifies the Helsinki Accords, Lyndon Johnson's bridge building, and Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik as efforts aimed at constructive changes in Eastern Europe through a multiplication of contacts, communication, and cooperation on all societal levels. This study also illuminates the longevity of America's policy of peaceful change against the background of the nuclear stalemate and the military status quo.