Why has the United States become involved in so many wars in the Middle East, and why just now? What explains the extraordinary disconnect between pre-war statements by the Bush Administration and the post-war reality? How much of U.S. intelligence was wrong, and why? Why did the Bush Administration ignore warnings by senior military commanders about the difficulties they would confront in trying to occupy Iraq? Why was there virtually no pre-war planning for administering Iraq once the war was successfully concluded? Pelletiere argues that, in going to war twice against Iraq and once against Afghanistan, the United States was seeking to put a lock on its future energy supplies. In neglecting diplomacy for so long in dealing with the Gulf States, Washington was practically compelled to use force to get what it wanted. Pelletiere explores the context of events that produced the attacks of September 11, 2001, the pretext for the United States' military move into the region. He debunks the Bush Administration's claim that the United States was beset by Islamic terrorists bent on destroying western civilization and set the stage for an examination of other possible motives. Next, he details the history of U.S. involvement in the region, beginning with the discovery of oil and the pioneering efforts of American and British companies to open the region to exploration. After the OPEC Revolution, he argues, the United States would allow itself to be drawn into an arms-supplying relationship with the Shah of Iran and the military-industrial complex would become hooked on subsidies from the Gulf monarchs. Finally, after discussing the First Gulf War and recent events in Afghanistan, Pelletierecontends that these conflicts and the current war in Iraq are really part of a greater struggle between North and South, a struggle that will have significant consequences for the future of the United States.

This book is a major reinterpretation of the Iran-Iraq War and is a source for reexamining the U.S. involvement in the Gulf. Pelletiere demonstrates that the war was not a standoff in which Iraq finally won a grinding war of attrition through luck, persistence, and the use of poison gas. Instead, Iraq planned the last campaign almost two years prior to its unfolding. The Iraqis] trained extensively and expended enormous sums of money to make their effort succeed. What won for them was their superior fignting prowess and greater commitment. Gas--if it was used at all--played only a minor part in the victory.'

Pelletiere concludes that the key to understanding the war is the Extraordinary Congress of the Ba'th Party held in July 1986. It was there that the initial planning for the final campaign was done, and this campaign is what decided the fate of the conflict. The study centers around the last Iraqi campaign, which Pelletiere argues was based upon World War II blitzkrieg tactics, but he also treats the background, the politics, and the history of the conflict, and analyzes the significance of the war to the Middle East and to the position of the United States there.

A former CIA analyst looks at nearly three decades of U.S. Middle East policy to examine the pervasive and too-often disastrous influence of Israel's right wing Likud party. In this revelatory volume, Stephen Pelletière, the CIA's Iraq analyst in the 1980s, argues that not only did Rumsfeld's plan for a quick, decisive military victory in Iraq reflect the ideas of Israel's right-wing party, but that it exemplifies Lukid's profound, little-understood, and at times disatrous influence on the United States' Middle East policy for nearly three decades. Israel in the Second Iraq War: The Influence of Likud describes U.S.-Israeli relations from the fall of the Shah—when President Reagan anointed the Israel as America's surrogate in the Middle East—through a string of Mid-East policy fiascos, including the 1982 invasion of Lebanon, the Iran-Contra arms-for-hostages scandal, and the ill-fated second Iraq War, which Likudniks in the Pentagon promoted and which produced the ongoing Iraqi resistance. The book also chronicles the growth of resistance movements including Hamas and Hezbollah, arguing that these are not part of a vast jihadi conspiracy, but are instead Arab attempts to stop land seizures by the Israelis and the Americans.