On March 8, 1971, the Supreme Court of the United States decided a case, "Griggs v. Duke Power Co.", brought by thirteen African American employees who worked as common laborers and janitors at one of Duke Power's facilities. The decision, in plaintiffs' favor, marked a profound and enduring challenge to the dominance of white males in the workplace. In this book, Robert Belton, who represented the plaintiffs for the NAACP Legal Defense Fund and argued the case in the lower courts, gives a firsthand account of legal history in the making--and a behind-the-scenes look at the highly complex process of putting civil rights law to work.

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 eliminated much blatant discrimination, but after its enactment and before "Griggs," businesses held the view that a commitment to equality required only eliminating policies and practices that were intentionally discriminatory--the "disparate treatment" test.

In "Griggs v. Duke Power Co.," the Supreme Court ruled that a "disparate impact" test could also apply--that the 1964 Civil Rights Act extended to practices with a discriminatory "effect." In tracing the impact of the "Griggs" ruling on employment practices, this book documents the birth, maturation, death, and rebirth of the disparate impact theory, including its erosion by later Supreme Court decisions and its restoration by congressional action in the Civil Rights Act of 1991.

Belton conducts us through this historic case from the original lawsuit to the Supreme Court decision in "Griggs" and beyond as he traces the post-"Griggs" developments in the lower courts, the Supreme Court, and Congress; he provides informed insights into both litigators' and judges' perspectives and decision-making. His work situates the case in its legal, social, and historical contexts and explores the relationship between public and private enforcement of the law, with a focus on the Legal Defense Fund's litigation campaign against employment discrimination. A detailed examination of the development of legal principles under Title VII, this book tells the story of this seminal decision on equal employment law and offers an unprecedented close-up view of personal conviction, legal strategy, and historical forces combining to effect dramatic social change.

Few issues are as mired in rhetoric and controversy as affirmative action. This is certainly no less true now as when Ronald J. Fiscus's "The Constitutional Logic of Affirmative Action" was first published in 1992. The controversy has, perhaps, become more charged over the past few years. With this compelling and rigorously reasoned argument for a constitutional rationale of affirmative action, Fiscus clarifies the moral and legal ramifications of this complex subject and presents an important view in the context of the ongoing debate.
Beginning with a distinction drawn between principles of compensatory and distributive justice, Fiscus argues that the former, although often the basis for judgments made in individual discrimination cases, cannot sufficiently justify broad programs of affirmative action. Only a theory of distributive justice, one that assumes minorities have a right to what they would have gained proportionally in a nonracist society, can persuasively provide that justification. On this basis, the author argues in favor of proportional racial quotas--and challenges the charge of "reverse discrimination" raised in protest in the name of the "innocent victims" of affirmative action--as an action necessary to approach the goals of fairness and equality.
"The Constitutional Logic of Affirmative Action" focuses on Supreme Court affirmative action rulings from "Bakke" (1976) to "Croson" (1989) and includes an epilogue by editor Stephen L. Wasby that considers developments through 1995. General readers concerned with racial justice, affirmative action, and public policy, as well as legal specialists and constitutional scholars will find Fiscus's argument passionate, balanced, and persuasive.

After a successful career as a law professor and government regulator, William O. Douglas was appointed to the Supreme Court by Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1939. During his thirty-six years on the court, he became known as one of its most outspoken and controversial members. In this volume, which was originally published for the William O. Douglas Institute, distinguished scholars examine four major aspects of Justice Douglas's work: his relations with his colleagues; his views on civil liberties, which primarily led to his reputation as a liberal; his stance as an environmentalist; and his views as an internationalist.