The authors examine the utility of the U.S. Government's whole-of-government (WoG) approach for responding to the challenging security demands of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. They specifically discuss the strategic objectives of interagency cooperation particularly in the areas of peacebuilding and conflict management. Discussions range from the conceptual to the practical, with a focus on the challenges and desirability of interagency cooperation in international interventions. The book shares experiences and expertise on the need for and the future of an American grand strategy in an era characterized by increasingly complex security challenges and shrinking budgets. All authors agree that taking the status quo for granted is a major obstacle to developing a successful grand strategy and that government, military, international and nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector are all called upon to contribute their best talents and efforts to joint global peace and security activities. Included are viewpoints from academia, the military, government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and industry. Despite the broad range of viewpoints, a number of overarching themes and tentative agreements emerged.

During a decade of global counterterrorism operations and two extended counterinsurgency campaigns, the United States was confronted with a new kind of adversary. Without uniforms, flags, and formations, the task of identifying and targeting these combatants represented an unprecedented operational challenge. The existing, Cold War-era doctrinal methods were largely unsuited to the cyber-warfare and terrorism that have evolved today. Rise of iWar examines the doctrinal, technical, and bureaucratic innovations that evolved in response to these new operational challenges. It discusses the transition from a conventionally focused, Cold War-era military approach to one optimized for the internet age, focused on combating insurgency networks and conducting identity-based targeting. It also analyzes the policy decisions and strategic choices that caused these changes. This study concludes with an in-depth examination of emerging technologies that are likely to shape how this mode of warfare will be waged in the future, and provides recommendations for how the US military should continue to adapt to be combat its foes in the digital age.

The authors begin with an examination of prewar planning for various contingencies, then move to the origins of "Germany first" in American war planning. They then focus on the concept, favored by both George C. Marshall and Dwight D. Eisenhower, that the United States and its Allies had to conduct a cross-channel attack and undertake an offensive aimed at the heartland of Germany. Following this background contained in the initial chapters, the remainder of the book provides a comprehensive discussion outlining how the European Campaign was was carried out. The authors conclude that American political leaders and war planners established logical and achievable objectives for the nation's military forces. However during the campaign's execution, American military leaders were slow to put into practice what would later be called operational level warfare. For comparison, the authors include an appendix covering German efforts at war planning in the tumultuous 1920s and 1930s.

Looking out to 2025, many see potential for a prolonged period of instability as a result of competing economic models, demographics, the rise of new international actors and the resurgence of old ones, climate change, and the scarcity of resources. The range of stability challenges will stretch the capabilities of any military force structure and require innovative thinking concerning the appropriate development and use of the military element of power. In this anthology, sixteen students of the United States Army War College Class of 2008 offer their perspectives on the use of military power across the spectrum of conflict in the 21st century, short of or following general war; they provide insights into the necessary force structure, policy, strategy, and doctrinal approaches for future success. The first chapter describes the security dilemma confronting the United States and the implications for military force structure and operations. It argues that full spectrum operations are an appropriate doctrinal response, and that stability operations will present new challenges for the use of military force. The subsequent chapters are edited student research papers from the U.S. Army War College Class of 2008 selected for their focus on operations short of general war. Each writing shares in common a worthwhile idea or set of ideas that can materially contribute to how the United States military can best conduct full spectrum operations. Collectively, these essays reveal the innovative thinking, diversity, and depth of thought that is characteristic of the U.S. and foreign military and civilian personnel that comprise each class of the U.S. Army War College. The essays also offer key insights at the policy, strategy, planning, and doctrinal levels that can be applied in the current and future strategic environments confronting the United States and its security partners