This is an up-to-date and approachable exploration of the age-old question, 'What is free will and do we have it?' In everyday life, we often suppose ourselves to be free to choose between several courses of action. But if we examine further, we find that this view seems to rest on metaphysical and meta-ethical presuppositions almost all of which look problematic. How can we be free if everything is determined by factors beyond our control, stretching back in time to the Big Bang and the laws of nature operating then? The only alternative to determinism is indeterminism, but is not indeterminism just there being a certain amount of randomness in the world? Does not randomness hinder you from being the author of your actions? This book looks at how much of the structure of our everyday judgments can survive the arguments behind such questions and thoughts. In doing so, it explores the alternative arguments that have been advanced concerning free will and related notions, including an up-to-date overview of the contemporary debates. In essence, the book seeks to understand and answer the age-old question, 'What is free will and do we have it?'

Some philosophers have thought that life could only be meaningful if there is no God. For Sartre and Nagel, for example, a God of the traditional classical theistic sort would constrain our powers of self-creative autonomy in ways that would severely detract from the meaning of our lives, possibly even evacuate our lives of all meaning. Some philosophers, by contrast, have thought that life could only be meaningful if there is a God. God and the Meanings of Life is interested in exploring the truth in both these schools of thought, seeking to discover what God could and couldn't do to make life meaningful (as well as what he would and wouldn't do). Mawson espouses a version of the 'amalgam' or 'pluralism' thesis about the issue of life's meaning - in essence, that there are a number of different legitimate meanings of 'meaning' (and indeed 'life') in the question of life's meaning. According to Mawson, God, were he to exist, would help make life meaningful in some of these senses and hinder in some others. He argues that whilst there could be meaning in a Godless universe, there could be other sorts of meaning in a Godly one and that these would be deeper.

Monotheism and the Meaning of Life explores the role of God, and the relationship to the question 'What is the meaning of life?' for adherents of the main monotheistic religions - Judaism, Christianity and Islam. Exploring the various senses of 'meaning' and 'life', Mawson argues that there are various questions implicit in the notion of the meaning of life and that the God of monotheistic religion is central to the correct answers to all of them.

The Divine Attributes explores the traditional theistic concept of God as the most perfect being possible, discussing the main divine attributes which flow from this understanding - personhood, transcendence, immanence, omnipresence, omniscience, omnipotence, perfect goodness, unity, simplicity and necessity. It argues that the atemporalist's conception of God is to be preferred over the temporalist's on the grounds of perfect being theology, but that, if it were to be the case that the temporal God existed, rather than the atemporal God, He'd still be 'perfect enough' to count as the God of Theism.

Belief in God answers two questions: What, if anything, is it that Jews, Christians, and Muslims are agreeing about when they join in claiming that there is a God? and What, if any, prospects are there for rationally defending or attacking this claim? A highly accessible and engaging introduction to the philosophy of religion, this book offers full coverage of the key issues, from ideas about God's nature and character to arguments for and against his existence. Author T. J. Mawson makes striking new claims and defends or attacks established positions in original ways. His conversational style, lively wit, and enlightening examples make Belief in God simultaneously instructive, thought-provoking, and enjoyable to read.

Belief in God answers two questions: what, if anything, is it that Jews, Christians, and Muslims are agreeing about when they join in claiming that there is a God; and what, if any, prospects are there for rationally defending or attacking this claim? In the context of a sustained argument for particular answers to these questions, Tim Mawson tackles many of the most prominent topics in the philosophy of religion. He argues that those who believe that there is a God are best interpreted as believing that there is a being who is essentially personal, transcendent, immanent, omnipotent, omniscient, eternal, perfectly free, perfectly good, and necessary; and non-essentially creator of the world and value; revealer of Himself; and offerer of everlasting life. Having explored the meaning and consistency of this conception of God in the first half of the book, Mawson goes on to consider whether or not belief or the absence of belief in such a God might be the sort of thing that does not rationally require argument and, if not, what the criteria for a good argument for or against such a God's existence might be. Having established some criteria, he uses them to evaluate specific arguments for and against the existence of such a God. He looks at the Argument to Design; the Cosmological Argument; the Ontological Argument; the Argument from Religious Experience; the Argument from Apparent Miracles; the Problem of Evil; and Pascal's Wager. Finally, he explores the relation between faith and reason. In the course of his argument, Mawson makes striking new claims and defends or attacks established positions in new ways. His conversational style, lively wit, and enlightening examples make Belief in God as pleasurable as it is instructive and thought-provoking. It makes an ideal text for beginning undergraduate courses and for anyone thinking about these most important of questions.

This is an up-to-date and approachable exploration of the age-old question, 'What is free will and do we have it?' In everyday life, we often suppose ourselves to be free to choose between several courses of action. But if we examine further, we find that this view seems to rest on metaphysical and meta-ethical presuppositions almost all of which look problematic. How can we be free if everything is determined by factors beyond our control, stretching back in time to the Big Bang and the laws of nature operating then? The only alternative to determinism is indeterminism, but is not indeterminism just there being a certain amount of randomness in the world? Does not randomness hinder you from being the author of your actions? This book looks at how much of the structure of our everyday judgments can survive the arguments behind such questions and thoughts. In doing so, it explores the alternative arguments that have been advanced concerning free will and related notions, including an up-to-date overview of the contemporary debates. In essence, the book seeks to understand and answer the age-old question, 'What is free will and do we have it?'