Cook's principles of coalition politics are really rules of thumb followed by boundedly rational actors, and can predict much coalition politics behavior. Agents prefer to create marginally winning coalitions with like-minded groups in the expectation of receiving rewards commensurate with investments. Four distinct types of coalitions--country, regime, agenda, and cabinet--are explored, along with a thorough examination of current coalition literature. Normally nested, the broader coalitions give rise to narrower ones, revealing diminishing bases of support and duration. Also, barring political catastrophe, change in coalitions at the program or cabinet level usually do not harm, and may actually strengthen, the regime or country coalitions from which they arise.

Students and scholars in comparative politics and political theory will benefit from Cook's ability to rise above the usual divisions and limitations of sub-fields. A distinctive and refreshing mix of theory and empirical material, DEGREESINested Political Coalitions DEGREESR provides a sensible digest of diverse theoretical literatures, a good overview of coalition dynamics from one level to the next, and illustrates all this with breathtaking empirical coverage.

Ethnic violence is rampant, but avoidable. Cook compares and contrasts all major options in ethnic minority policy, including forms of separation, assimilation, or accommodation typically favored by subordinate ethnic groups. Topics include segregation and genocide, emigrations and secessionist struggles, attempts at cultural annihilation, assimilating for individual or collective opportunities, accommodations as minimal concessions in such things as tolerance, special group rights or power-sharing, and accommodations as maximal demands on those same themes. Grounded in current concrete examples, Cook's analysis brings coherence to a confused and often lethal political problem.

Cook's principles of coalition politics are really rules of thumb followed by boundedly rational actors, and can predict much coalition politics behavior. Agents prefer to create marginally winning coalitions with like-minded groups in the expectation of receiving rewards commensurate with investments. Four distinct types of coalitions--country, regime, agenda, and cabinet--are explored, along with a thorough examination of current coalition literature. Normally nested, the broader coalitions give rise to narrower ones, revealing diminishing bases of support and duration. Also, barring political catastrophe, change in coalitions at the program or cabinet level usually do not harm, and may actually strengthen, the regime or country coalitions from which they arise. Students and scholars in comparative politics and political theory will benefit from Cook's ability to rise above the usual divisions and limitations of sub-fields. A distinctive and refreshing mix of theory and empirical material, ^INested Political Coalitions^R provides a sensible digest of diverse theoretical literatures, a good overview of coalition dynamics from one level to the next, and illustrates all this with breathtaking empirical coverage.