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This book is concerned with two intimately related topics of
metaphysics: the identity of entities and the foundations of
classification. What it adds to previous discussions of these
topics is that it addresses them with respect to human-made
entities, that is, artefacts. As the chapters in the book show,
questions of identity and classification require other treatments
and lead to other answers for artefacts than for natural entities.
These answers are of interest to philosophers not only for their
clarification of artefacts as a category of things but also for the
new light they may shed on these issue with respect to to natural
entities. This volume is structured in three parts. The
contributions in Part I address basic ontological and metaphysical
questions in relation to artefact kinds: How should we conceive of
artefact kinds? Are they real kinds? How are identity conditions
for artefacts and artefact kinds related? The contributions in Part
II address meta-ontological questions: What, exactly, should an
ontological account of artefact kinds provide us with? What scope
can it aim for? Which ways of approaching the ontology of artefact
kinds are there, how promising are they, and how should we assess
this? In Part III, the essays offer engineering practice rather
than theoretical philosophy as a point of reference. The issues
addressed here include: How do engineers classify technical
artefacts and on what grounds? What makes specific classes of
technical artefacts candidates for ontologically real kinds, and by
which criteria?
This volume provides a broad overview of issues in the
philosophy of behavioral biology, covering four main themes:
genetic, developmental, evolutionary, and neurobiological
explanations of behavior. It is both interdisciplinary and
empirically informed in its approach, addressing philosophical
issues that arise from recent scientific findings in biological
research on human and non-human animal behavior. Accordingly, it
includes papers by professional philosophers and philosophers of
science, as well as practicing scientists. Much of the work in this
volume builds on presentations given at the international
conference, "Biological Explanations of Behavior: Philosophical
Perspectives," held in 2008 at the Leibniz Universitat Hannover in
Germany. The volume is intended to be of interest to a broad range
of audiences, which includes philosophers (e.g., philosophers of
mind, philosophers of biology, and metaethicists), as well as
practicing scientists, such as biologists or psychologists whose
interests relate to biological explanations of behavior. "
The present volume originated in 2001 when we, together with our
publishing editors at (then) Kluwer Academic Publishers, realized
that the th following year the 50 volume of our journal Acta
Biotheoretica would see the light. We felt that this milestone
should not pass unnoticed and that the appropriate way to mark it
would be the publication of a special volume of papers on
theoretical biology. While editing this book during 2003 and early
2004, we realized that another milestone was not far off: in 2005
it will be 70 years ago that the journal was founded. We hope that
the book lying before you will serve well to mark both events. The
papers collected here have been written on invitation by
representatives of the theoretical biology community in The
Netherlands. They are intended to reflect the entire spectrum of
topics on which Acta Biotheoretica publishes, ranging from
philosophy of biology on one end to mathematical biology on the
other. All chapters (except our own introductory one) have been
peer reviewed according to the standards that are maintained with
respect to regular submissions to Acta Biotheoretica.
This volume aims to clarify the epistemic potential of applying
evolutionary thinking outside biology, and provides a survey of the
current state of the art in research on relevant topics in the life
sciences, the philosophy of science, and the various areas of
evolutionary research outside the life sciences. By bringing
together chapters by evolutionary biologists, systematic
biologists, philosophers of biology, philosophers of social
science, complex systems modelers, psychologists, anthropologists,
economists, linguists, historians, and educators, the volume
examines evolutionary thinking within and outside the life sciences
from a multidisciplinary perspective. While the chapters written by
biologists and philosophers of science address theoretical aspects
of the guiding questions and aims of the volume, the chapters
written by researchers from the other areas approach them from the
perspective of applying evolutionary thinking to non-biological
phenomena. Taken together, the chapters in this volume do not only
show how evolutionary thinking can be fruitfully applied in various
areas of investigation, but also highlight numerous open problems,
unanswered questions, and issues on which more clarity is needed.
As such, the volume can serve as a starting point for future
research on the application of evolutionary thinking across
disciplines.
This book is concerned with two intimately related topics of
metaphysics: the identity of entities and the foundations of
classification. What it adds to previous discussions of these
topics is that it addresses them with respect to human-made
entities, that is, artefacts. As the chapters in the book show,
questions of identity and classification require other treatments
and lead to other answers for artefacts than for natural entities.
These answers are of interest to philosophers not only for their
clarification of artefacts as a category of things but also for the
new light they may shed on these issue with respect to to natural
entities. This volume is structured in three parts. The
contributions in Part I address basic ontological and metaphysical
questions in relation to artefact kinds: How should we conceive of
artefact kinds? Are they real kinds? How are identity conditions
for artefacts and artefact kinds related? The contributions in Part
II address meta-ontological questions: What, exactly, should an
ontological account of artefact kinds provide us with? What scope
can it aim for? Which ways of approaching the ontology of artefact
kinds are there, how promising are they, and how should we assess
this? In Part III, the essays offer engineering practice rather
than theoretical philosophy as a point of reference. The issues
addressed here include: How do engineers classify technical
artefacts and on what grounds? What makes specific classes of
technical artefacts candidates for ontologically real kinds, and by
which criteria?
This volume provides a broad overview of issues in the
philosophy of behavioral biology, covering four main themes:
genetic, developmental, evolutionary, and neurobiological
explanations of behavior. It is both interdisciplinary and
empirically informed in its approach, addressing philosophical
issues that arise from recent scientific findings in biological
research on human and non-human animal behavior. Accordingly, it
includes papers by professional philosophers and philosophers of
science, as well as practicing scientists. Much of the work in this
volume builds on presentations given at the international
conference, "Biological Explanations of Behavior: Philosophical
Perspectives," held in 2008 at the Leibniz Universitat Hannover in
Germany. The volume is intended to be of interest to a broad range
of audiences, which includes philosophers (e.g., philosophers of
mind, philosophers of biology, and metaethicists), as well as
practicing scientists, such as biologists or psychologists whose
interests relate to biological explanations of behavior. "
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