This book redefines the Pearl Harbor controversy through a study of radio intelligence as practiced by the United States Navy (USN) in 1941. Newly released primary documents, supported by secondary historical and technical accounts, explain the effectiveness of USN radio intelligence in terms of its principal activities in 1941: cryptanalysis, traffic analysis and intelligence reporting. This evidence also demonstrates the extent to which the USN exchanged intelligence with its Allied counterparts. USN radio intelligence penetrated the vast expanses of the Pacific, permitting the partial reading of Japanese naval messages and the tracking of Japanese vessels. In the period preceding the Pearl Harbor attack, radio intelligence provided the USN with foreknowledge of Japan's operations in the North Pacific, although Washington failed to provide its Hawaiian commanders with adequate forewarning. Washington's response can now only be explained in terms of gross neglect or careful design, rather than complete surprise.

In December 1941, Japan attacked multiple targets in the Far East
and the Pacific, including Hong Kong, where Canadian battalions were
stationed. The disaster suggested that the Allies were totally
unprepared for war with Japan. This book dispels that assumption by
offering the first in-depth account of Canadian intelligence gathering
and strategic planning leading up to the crisis.

Timothy Wilford reminds us that Canada was both a Pacific and an
Atlantic power, and the first nation to declare war on Japan. Canadian
intelligence officers and strategists monitored Japan's movements
and worked closely with their US and Allied counterparts to develop a
picture of Japan's intentions and a strategic plan to meet
challenges in the Pacific. Although Canada wanted to avoid conflict
with Japan until US participation was assured, policy makers fully
anticipated action in the Pacific and made preparations for national
and imperial defence, which included the internment of Japanese
Canadians.

Canada's Road to the Pacific War sheds new light on
Canadian decision making, Commonwealth strategic planning, and the
emerging Anglo-American special relationship during a crisis that led
to war in the Pacific, as well as to the creation of the Grand
Alliance.

Timothy Wilford received a doctorate in history from
the University of Ottawa and specializes in twentieth-century military
history.