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A groundbreaking historical analysis of how global capitalism and
advanced democracies mutually support each other It is a widespread
view that democracy and the advanced nation-state are in crisis,
weakened by globalization and undermined by global capitalism.
Torben Iversen and David Soskice argue that this view is wrong. In
fact, advanced democracies are resilient and their enduring
relationship with capitalism has been mutually beneficial. Iversen
and Soskice show how democratic states continuously reinvent their
economies through public investment in research and education, by
imposing competitive product markets and cooperation in the
workplace, and by securing macroeconomic discipline as the
preconditions for innovation and the promotion of advanced sectors
of the economy. Challenging the prevailing wisdom on globalization,
Democracy and Prosperity reveals how advanced capitalism is neither
footloose nor unconstrained-and how it thrives under democracy
precisely because it cannot subvert it.
A groundbreaking new historical analysis of how global capitalism
and advanced democracies mutually support each other It is a
widespread view that democracy and the advanced nation-state are in
crisis, weakened by globalization and undermined by global
capitalism, in turn explaining rising inequality and mounting
populism. This book, written by two of the world's leading
political economists, argues this view is wrong: advanced
democracies are resilient, and their enduring historical
relationship with capitalism has been mutually beneficial. For all
the chaos and upheaval over the past century-major wars, economic
crises, massive social change, and technological revolutions-Torben
Iversen and David Soskice show how democratic states continuously
reinvent their economies through massive public investment in
research and education, by imposing competitive product markets and
cooperation in the workplace, and by securing macroeconomic
discipline as the preconditions for innovation and the promotion of
the advanced sectors of the economy. Critically, this investment
has generated vast numbers of well-paying jobs for the middle
classes and their children, focusing the aims of aspirational
families, and in turn providing electoral support for parties.
Gains at the top have also been shared with the middle (though not
the bottom) through a large welfare state. Contrary to the
prevailing wisdom on globalization, advanced capitalism is neither
footloose nor unconstrained: it thrives under democracy precisely
because it cannot subvert it. Populism, inequality, and poverty are
indeed great scourges of our time, but these are failures of
democracy and must be solved by democracy.
A core principle of the welfare state is that everyone pays taxes
or contributions in exchange for universal insurance against social
risks such as sickness, old age, unemployment, and plain bad luck.
This solidarity principle assumes that everyone is a member of a
single national insurance pool, and it is commonly explained by
poor and asymmetric information, which undermines markets and
creates the perception that we are all in the same boat. Living in
the midst of an information revolution, this is no longer a
satisfactory approach. This book explores, theoretically and
empirically, the consequences of 'big data' for the politics of
social protection. Torben Iversen and Philipp Rehm argue that more
and better data polarize preferences over public insurance and
often segment social insurance into smaller, more homogenous, and
less redistributive pools, using cases studies of health and
unemployment insurance and statistical analyses of life insurance,
credit markets, and public opinion.
A core principle of the welfare state is that everyone pays taxes
or contributions in exchange for universal insurance against social
risks such as sickness, old age, unemployment, and plain bad luck.
This solidarity principle assumes that everyone is a member of a
single national insurance pool, and it is commonly explained by
poor and asymmetric information, which undermines markets and
creates the perception that we are all in the same boat. Living in
the midst of an information revolution, this is no longer a
satisfactory approach. This book explores, theoretically and
empirically, the consequences of 'big data' for the politics of
social protection. Torben Iversen and Philipp Rehm argue that more
and better data polarize preferences over public insurance and
often segment social insurance into smaller, more homogenous, and
less redistributive pools, using cases studies of health and
unemployment insurance and statistical analyses of life insurance,
credit markets, and public opinion.
This book, first published in 2005, builds on institutionalist
theory in both economics and political science to offer a general
political economy framework for the study of welfare capitalism.
Based on the key idea that social protection in a modern economy,
both inside and outside the state, can be understood as protection
of specific investments in human capital, the book offers a
systematic explanation of popular preferences for redistributive
spending, the economic role of political parties and electoral
systems, and labor market stratification (including gender
inequality). Contrary to the popular idea that competition in the
global economy undermines international differences in the level of
social protection, the book argues that these differences are made
possible by a high international division of labor. Such a division
is what allows firms to specialize in production that requires an
abundant supply of workers with specific skills, and hence high
demand for protection.
This book focuses on some of the most important political-economic changes in advanced industrialized countries over the past two decades, namely, the sharp rise in unemployment in some countries and the growth of inequality in others. Using a variety of methodological approaches, the essays provide different pieces to this puzzle and explain how economic outcomes may be linked to macroeconomic policies and wage bargaining practices. Focusing on the experiences of northern European countries, the book also explores the intersection of partisan politics, the international economy, and nationally specific institutions.
This book helps explain one of the most intriguing and politically
salient puzzles in comparative political economy: why some
countries have much higher unemployment rates than others. Contrary
to new classical economics the focus is on explaining distribution
and equilibrium unemployment, and contrary to neo-corporatist
theory the role of monetary policy and rational expectation is
integral to the analysis. The book makes two central arguments. The
first is that monetary policies affect equilibrium employment
whenever wages are set above the firm level. The second argument
focuses on the distributive effects of different institutions, and
models institutional design as a strategic game between partisan
governments and cross-class alliances of unions and employers.
This book, first published in 2005, builds on institutionalist
theory in both economics and political science to offer a general
political economy framework for the study of welfare capitalism.
Based on the key idea that social protection in a modern economy,
both inside and outside the state, can be understood as protection
of specific investments in human capital, the book offers a
systematic explanation of popular preferences for redistributive
spending, the economic role of political parties and electoral
systems, and labor market stratification (including gender
inequality). Contrary to the popular idea that competition in the
global economy undermines international differences in the level of
social protection, the book argues that these differences are made
possible by a high international division of labor. Such a division
is what allows firms to specialize in production that requires an
abundant supply of workers with specific skills, and hence high
demand for protection.
This book helps explain one of the most intriguing and politically
salient puzzles in comparative political economy: why some
countries have much higher unemployment rates than others. Contrary
to new classical economics the focus is on explaining distribution
and equilibrium unemployment, and contrary to neo-corporatist
theory the role of monetary policy and rational expectation is
integral to the analysis. The book makes two central arguments. The
first is that monetary policies affect equilibrium employment
whenever wages are set above the firm level. The second argument
focuses on the distributive effects of different institutions, and
models institutional design as a strategic game between partisan
governments and cross-class alliances of unions and employers.
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