Department of Agriculture, which administers agricultural conservation programs a source of federal funding that can complement EPA's water quality improvement efforts. USDA's conservation programs provide billions of dollars in assistance to farmers. In particular, through its Environmental Quality Incentives Program, which is implemented by the Natural Resources Conservation Service, USDA develops contracts with agricultural producers to implement conservation practices on working agricultural land to, for example, reduce soil erosion and nonpoint source water pollution.

GAO reviewed the Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) program to determine whether: (1) planned testing would demonstrate operational effectiveness before a significant number of units are produced for deployment; and (2) missile target resources are adequate to support testing plans. GAO noted that: (1) the current THAAD program review and evaluation provides the Department of Defense (DOD) with the opportunity to: (a) reduce risk and minimize the number of initial quantities of unproven system hardware by reexamining the schedule for operational testing and production; and (b) ensure that realistic targets will be used for testing; (2) the last approved THAAD acquisition plan calls for significant production of deployment hardware almost 2 years before beginning independent operational testing to assess the system's operational effectiveness; (3) the Army maintains that it needs to buy a number of THAAD systems during low-rate initial production to "ramp-up" to the full rate of production; (4) delaying production until after completing sufficient testing that provides assurance that key performance requirements can be met reduces the risk of buying unproven systems and facilitates production of proven systems at more efficient rates; (5) a suitable target for testing the THAAD system against longer range missiles does not exist, and funds have not been requested for target development and production; and (6) without a longer range test target to represent the more formidable, higher velocity missiles that THAAD could face, the system's operational effectiveness will remain in doubt and DOD will not have reasonable assurance that it could rely on THAAD in an actual conflict.

GAO provided information regarding the Air Force's progress in achieving and sustaining full operational capability for the Peacekeeper missile force. GAO found that the Air Force: (1) delayed its plans to start full operational capability testing, citing congressional directions, basing mode redirections, gaps between developmental and operational flight testing, and production delays; (2) believes that developmental flight testing has demonstrated the system's capability; (3) plans to conduct only three phase I flight tests a year until fiscal year 1994 in order to meet the scheduled full operational capability milestone for the Peacekeeper in Minuteman Silo Program; (4) plans phase II testing to consist of 84 flight tests over 12 years; (5) plans to sustain required alert rates for a force of 50 Peacekeeper missiles with an inventory of 61 serviceable units and 20 units in repair; (6) had accepted 81 units by December 1988, although only 71 were fully operational; (7) improved its mean recycling time from 2,444 to 2,839 hours, but had not attained its planned level of 3,000 hours; and (8) will have difficulty sustaining its average 30-day repair time.

The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) is an independent agency that works for Congress. The GAO watches over Congress, and investigates how the federal government spends taxpayers dollars. The Comptroller General of the United States is the leader of the GAO, and is appointed to a 15-year term by the U.S. President. The GAO wants to support Congress, while at the same time doing right by the citizens of the United States. They audit, investigate, perform analyses, issue legal decisions and report anything that the government is doing. This is one of their reports.

The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) is an independent agency that works for Congress. The GAO watches over Congress, and investigates how the federal government spends taxpayers dollars. The Comptroller General of the United States is the leader of the GAO, and is appointed to a 15-year term by the U.S. President. The GAO wants to support Congress, while at the same time doing right by the citizens of the United States. They audit, investigate, perform analyses, issue legal decisions and report anything that the government is doing. This is one of their reports.

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined how replacing the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA) with a no-fault compensation system would affect the railroad industry. GAO found that: (1) the cost of replacing FELA with a nationwide no-fault compensation system depends on the number of injured railroad workers permanently disabled and the number of workers unable to return to work at preinjury wages; (2) the costs under a no-fault compensation system would be the same as or lower than FELA costs; (3) overall injury compensation costs would be lower under a no-fault system if fewer than 70 percent of injured rail workers are able to return to work; (4) railroads would save an average of $100 per employee if injured workers continue to work after receiving settlement; (5) a no-fault compensation system would reduce railroads' administrative costs, but limit the amount of compensation and legal counsel that injured workers receive; (6) small railroads have fewer lost workdays and lower injury rates than large railroads; (7) small railroads have lower FELA costs than large railroads and rely on insurance payments to avoid high FELA payouts; (8) railroads could reduce their administrative costs by placing a cap on compensation for noneconomic losses and limiting plaintiff's legal fees; (9) railroad management and labor disagree over how well FELA is working and whether it should be replaced or changed; and (10) FELA is no more burdensome for passenger and small freight railroads than it is for large freight railroads.

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the effects of leveraged buyouts (LBO) and hostile business takeovers, focusing on: (1) what happened to companies that had been taken over through LBO; (2) how those companies have performed since the takeover; and (3) the effect on communities. GAO found that: (1) in five LBO that GAO reviewed, purchasers bought out the target companies' equity holders with money from loans and bond issues; (2) the capitalization of the companies studied changed from primarily equity to primarily long-term debt after LBO or recapitalization; (3) employment at the companies declined after LBO and recapitalization as a result of asset divestitures and cost reduction efforts; (4) the overall performance of three of the five companies reviewed diminished after LBO, while one company's performance initially was mixed but then improved, and the last company's fluctuated; (5) since of the companies had locations across the country and were generally a small part of the economic base of any one community, communities were not adversely affected, but one company's headquarters formed a major part of the economic base for the local community and layoffs affected the overall earning power of the community; (6) financial success of the companies after LBO depended largely on their ability to meet the service requirements when due, which was dependent upon the initial price paid, future economic conditions, the value of the company's assets, and management's ability to cut costs, reduce debt, and improve profits afterwards; and (7) in these highly leveraged transactions the purchasers had little to lose if they paid too much and a lot to gain if they could make the surviving company a success, while their advisers earned large fees regardless of the price paid or ultimate fate of the surviving company.