Until recently, Southeast Asia was plagued by separatist insurgencies that had simmered, seemingly intractable, for several decades. But peace processes in Indonesia and the Philippines have been some of the most innovative and successful in the world-a model and counterpoint for Thailand and other protracted conflicts. Since the 1970s, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand have wrestled with secessionist groups. Each government entered into peace talks then, though without any sincerity or willingness to make significant concessions. By the turn of the millennium, the governments of Indonesia and the Philippines began to reevaluate their strategies while insurgents came to the conclusion that the changed global environment and waning capabilities made victory unlikely. Further, the impact of the 2004 tsunami brought not only another impetus, but also the involvement of the international donor community and peace processes began in both countries where they were successfully implemented. Successful devolution of political and economic powers that protected the cultural rights of the minority population, as well as substantial wealth sharing brought an end to these conflicts. Such successful peace building efforts serve as both a model and counterpoint for Thailand. Each of the case studies begins with a history of the insurgency, an analysis of the insurgent group's organization, operations, tactics, and capabilities before delving into the history of the peace processes and analyzing the factors that made them successful. Nothing is harder than a peace process, but the lessons of Southeast Asia show that it is made possible through such factors as a national devaluation of power, bold and creative statesmanship, the successful neutralization of spoilers, and the role of neutral third party facilitators. These cases provide important lessons for the fields of counterinsurgency and peace making.

Until recently, Southeast Asia was plagued by separatist insurgencies that had simmered, seemingly intractable, for several decades. But peace processes in Indonesia and the Philippines have been some of the most innovative and successful in the world-a model and counterpoint for Thailand and other protracted conflicts. Since the 1970s, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand have wrestled with secessionist groups. Each government entered into peace talks then, though without any sincerity or willingness to make significant concessions. By the turn of the millennium, the governments of Indonesia and the Philippines began to reevaluate their strategies while insurgents came to the conclusion that the changed global environment and waning capabilities made victory unlikely. Further, the impact of the 2004 tsunami brought not only another impetus, but also the involvement of the international donor community and peace processes began in both countries where they were successfully implemented. Successful devolution of political and economic powers that protected the cultural rights of the minority population, as well as substantial wealth sharing brought an end to these conflicts. Such successful peace building efforts serve as both a model and counterpoint for Thailand. Each of the case studies begins with a history of the insurgency, an analysis of the insurgent group's organization, operations, tactics, and capabilities before delving into the history of the peace processes and analyzing the factors that made them successful. Nothing is harder than a peace process, but the lessons of Southeast Asia show that it is made possible through such factors as a national devaluation of power, bold and creative statesmanship, the successful neutralization of spoilers, and the role of neutral third party facilitators. These cases provide important lessons for the fields of counterinsurgency and peace making.

Political Islam and Violence in Indonesia presents a penetrating new investigation of religious radicalism in the largest Muslim country in the world.

Indonesia is a country long known for its diversity and tolerant brand of Islam. However, since the fall of Suharto, a more intolerant form of Islam has been growing, one whose adherents have carried out terrorist attacks, waged sectarian war, and voiced strident anti-Western rhetoric.

Zachary Abuza's unique analysis of radical Islam draws upon primary documents such as Jemaah Islamiyah's operations manual, interviews, and recorded testimonies of politicians, religious figures, and known militants, as well as personal interviews with numerous security and intelligence experts in Indonesia and elsewhere, to paint a picture at once guardedly optimistic about the future of Indonesian democracy and concerned about the increasing role of conservative and radical Islam in Indonesian society.

This book will be of great interest to students of Indonesian politics, Asian studies, political violence and security studies in general.

Since January 2004, a Malay-Muslim-based insurgency has engulfed the three southernmost provinces in Thailand. More than 4,500 people have been killed and over 9,000 wounded, making it the most lethal conflict in Southeast Asia. Now in its 8th year, the insurgency has settled into a low-level stalemate. Violence is down significantly from its mid-2007 peak, but it has been steadily climbing since 2008. On average, 32 people are being killed and 58 wounded every month. Most casualties are from drive-by shootings, but there are also about 12 improvised explosive device (IED) attacks a month. The insurgency is now characterized by less indiscriminate violence and more retaliatory attacks. Insurgents continue to target security forces, government officials, and Muslim moderates who seek accommodation with the Thai state as part of efforts to make the region ungovernable by limiting provision of social services and driving Buddhists from the south. The overall level of violence may be influenced more by insurgent calculations about the optimum amount of violence needed to advance their political goals than by improved capabilities of the security forces. Despite better coordination, Thai counterinsurgency operations are still hampered by bureaucratic infighting and a lack of professionalism. Human rights abuses by security services with blanket immunity under the Emergency Decree continue to instill mistrust among the local population. Moreover, as long as violence is contained in the deep south, the insurgency will remain a low priority for the new Thai government, which is focused on national political disputes and is reluctant to take on the military by pursuing more conciliatory policies toward the south. Indeed, even under the 30-month tenure of the Democrat Party with an electoral base in the south, the insurgency was a very low priority and its few policy initiatives were insufficient to quell the violence. The new Pheu Thai government under Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra, the younger sister of Thaksin Shinawatra, who was ousted in a September 2006 coup, will have its hands tied in the south. Its election victory and focus on national reconciliation have already engendered mistrust of the Thai military. The new government will be reluctant to criticize the military's handling of the insurgency, take on the culture of impunity, or push for any form of political autonomy. This will make any devolution of political authority unlikely, limiting chances for a negotiated solution. As a result, low level violence is likely to continue indefinitely. The most important immediate U.S. objective in Thailand is political stability at the national level and deepening bilateral economic ties. Absent a cohesive Thai government with the political will to overcome military resistance to policies that might address underlying causes of the insurgency, U.S. pressure to do more is likely to be ineffective or even counterproductive. Accordingly, the United States should maintain quiet diplomatic pressure on the government to broaden its counterinsurgency efforts and offer any requested intelligence and law enforcement assistance, while being cognizant of Thai sensitivity over its sovereignty.

Since the fall of Suharto in 1998, Indonesia has made a successful transition to democracy. However, during the past few years the country has also been racked by Islamist terrorism, most notably the 2002 Bali bombings, and sectarian violence that have left thousands dead. While the two are not linked, they are the most notable trends in Indonesian political development. This volume first analyses the newfound role of Islamist parties in Indonesian politics and explains how they are now shaping public policy. It then provides an in-depth analysis of the state of terrorism in Indonesia and strives to understand how Jemaah Islamiyah has reacted to the "War on Terror" and shifted its tactics and strategies to cope with the arrests and crackdowns. Also focusing on the various laskars, or militias, that are engaged in both sectarian violence and attempts to impose sharia law through vigilante actions, the author examines the degree to which these groups, overt and covert, legal and illegal, are able or willing to cooperate with one another. Finally, the book concludes with policy implications for the Indonesian government, the neighboring ASEAN states and the Western world.
This book will be of great interest to students of Indonesian politics, Asian studies, political violence and security studies in general.