Hong Kong is one of the very few places in the world where the common law can be practiced in a language other than English. Introduced into the courtroom over a decade ago, Cantonese has significantly altered the everyday working of the common law in China's most Westernized city. In "The Common Law in Two Voices," Ng explores how English and Cantonese respectively reinforce and undermine the practice of legal formalism.
This first-ever ethnographic study of Hong Kong's unique legal system in the midst of social and political transition, this book provides important insights into the social nature of language and the work of institutions. Ng contends that the dilemma of legal bilingualism in Hong Kong is emblematic of the inherent tensions of postcolonial Hong Kong. Through the legal dramas presented in the book, readers will get a fresh look at the former British colony that is now searching for its identity within a powerful China.

Through the lenses of comparative and critical rhetoric, this book theorizes how alternative approaches to communication can transform legal meanings and legal outcomes, infusing them with more inclusive participation, equity and justice. Viewing legal language through a radical lens, the book sets aside longstanding norms that derive from White and Euro-centric approaches in order to re-situate legal methods as products of new rhetorical models that come from diasporic and non-Western cultures. The book urges readers to re-consider how they think about logic and rhetoric and to consider other ways of building knowledge that can heal the law's current structures that often perpetuate and reinforce systems of privilege and power.

Volume 22 of The Jewish Law Annual adds to the growing list of articles on Jewish law that have been published in volumes 1–21 of this series, providing English-speaking readers with scholarly articles presenting jurisprudential, historical, textual and comparative analysis of issues in Jewish law. This volume features articles on rabbinic criminal law, tort law, jurisprudence, and judicial practice.

This work, like its two predecessors, is divided into two parts. Part One sets out in a clearly understandable manner the main principles underlying the law of negotiable instruments. Part Two contains the text of the Bills of Exchange Act 34 of 1964 (as amended by Act 56 of 2000) and conveniently and methodically deals consecutively with each section accompanied by a detailed commentary thereon.

This book presents a clear, carefully-analysed picture of the operation of equity today, across the common law world. Rather than revisit the abstract debate as to whether or not equity has 'fused' with the common law, it focuses on specific equitable principles and doctrines. Expert contributors step back and take a wider view of those doctrines, examining how they can best be understood today, and how they might develop in the future. This will prove invaluable to practitioners and courts (at first instance as well as appellate level), allowing them to navigate the constantly-growing mass of case law. Drawing on expertise from across the worlds of academia, practice and the bench, this seminal collection provides the most illuminating picture available of how equity operates.

Over two billion people still live under authoritarian rule. Moreover, authoritarian regimes around the world command enormous financial and economic resources, rivaling those controlled by advanced democracies. Yet authoritarian regimes as a whole are facing their greatest challenges in the recent two decades due to rebellions and economic stress. Extended periods of hardship have the potential of introducing instability to regimes because members of the existing ruling coalition suffer welfare losses that force them to consider alternatives, while previously quiescent masses may consider collective uprisings a worthwhile gamble in the face of declining standards of living. Economic Shocks and Authoritarian Stability homes in on the economic challenges facing authoritarian regimes through a set of comparative case studies that include Iran, Iraq under Saddam Hussein, Malaysia, Indonesia, Russia, the Eastern bloc countries, China, and Taiwan-authored by the top experts in these countries. Through these comparative case studies, this volume provides readers with the analytical tools for assessing whether the current round of economic shocks will lead to political instability or even regime change among the world's autocracies. This volume identifies the duration of economic shocks, the regime's control over the financial system, and the strength of the ruling party as key variables to explain whether authoritarian regimes would maintain the status quo, adjust their support coalitions, or fall from power after economic shocks.

Rome was the law-giver for much of the modern world. She was also the greatest military power of antiquity, operating her military organization with remarkable efficiency and effectiveness throughout most of the then-known world. In view of the importance of both the legal and military aspects of the Roman Empire, an account of their combination in a system of disciplinary control for the Roman armies is of considerable significance to historians in both fields-and, in fact, to scholars in general. In Roman Military Law,C. E. Brand describes this system of control. Since a characterization of such a system can be made most meaningful only against a background of Roman constitutional government and in the light of ideologies current at the time, Brand follows his initial "Note on Sources" with a sketch of the contemporary Roman scene. This first section includes a discussion of the Roman constitution and an examination ofRoman criminal law. The history of Rome, as a republic, principate, and empire, extended over a period of a thousand years, so any attempt to represent a generalized picture must be essentially a matter of extraction and condensation from the voluminous literature of the whole era. Nevertheless, from the fantastic evolution that is the history of Rome, Brand has been able to construct a more or less static historical mosaic that may be considered typically"Roman." This comes into sharpest focus during the period of the PunicWars, when the city and its people were most intensely Roman. The picture of the Roman armies is set into this basic framework, in chapters dealing with military organization, disciplinary organization, religion and discipline, and offenses and punishments. The final section of the book considers briefly the vast changes in Romaninstitutions that came about under the armies of the Empire, and then concludes with the Latin text and an English translation of the only knowncode of Roman military justice, promulgated sometime during the laterEmpire, preserved in Byzantine literature, and handed down to medieval times in Latin translations of Byzantine Greek law, which it has heretofore been confused.

Given that persons typically have a right not to be subjected to the hard treatment of punishment, it would seem natural to conclude that the permissibility of punishment is centrally a question of rights. Despite this, the vast majority of theorists working on punishment focus instead on important aims, such as achieving retributive justice, deterring crime, restoring victims, or expressing society's core values. Wellman contends that these aims may well explain why we should want a properly constructed system of punishment, but none shows why it would be permissible to institute one. Only a rights-based analysis will suffice, because the type of justification we seek for punishment must demonstrate that punishment is permissible, and it would be permissible only if it violated no one's rights. On Wellman's view, punishment is permissible just in case the wrongdoer has forfeited her right against punishment by culpably violating (or at least attempting to violate) the rights of others. After defending rights forfeiture theory against the standard objections, Wellman explains this theory's implications for a number of core issues in criminal law, including the authority of the state, international criminal law, the proper scope of the criminal law and the tort/crime distinction, procedural rights, and the justification of mala prohibita.

Outside the United States, Norway's 1814 constitution is the oldest still in force. Constitutional judicial review has been a part of Norwegian court decision-making for most of these 200 years. Since the 1990s, Norway has also exercised review under the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR). Judicial review of legislation can be controversial: having unelected judges overruling popularly elected majorities seems undemocratic. Yet Norway remains one of the most democratic countries in the world. How does Norway manage the balance between democracy and judicial oversight? Author Anine Kierulf tells the story of Norwegian constitutionalism from 1814 until today through the lens of judicial review debates and cases. This study adds important insights into the social and political justifications for an active judicial review component in a constitutional democracy. Anine Kierulf argues that the Norwegian model of judicial review provides a useful perspective on the dichotomy of American and European constitutionalism.

Although American scholars sometimes consider European legal scholarship as old-fashioned and inward-looking and Europeans often perceive American legal scholarship as amateur social science, both traditions share a joint challenge. If legal scholarship becomes too much separated from practice, legal scholars will ultimately make themselves superfluous. If legal scholars, on the other hand, cannot explain to other disciplines what is academic about their research, which methodologies are typical, and what separates proper research from mediocre or poor research, they will probably end up in a similar situation. Therefore we need a debate on what unites legal academics on both sides of the Atlantic. Should legal scholarship aspire to the status of a science and gradually adopt more and more of the methods, (quality) standards, and practices of other (social) sciences? What sort of methods do we need to study law in its social context and how should legal scholarship deal with the challenges posed by globalization?

The trial of former SS lieutenant and Gestapo chief Klaus Barbie was France's first trial for crimes against humanity. Known as the "Butcher of Lyon" during the Nazi occupation of that city from 1942 to 1944, Barbie tortured, deported, and murdered thousands of Jews and Resistance fighters. Following a lengthy investigation and the overcoming of numerous legal and other obstacles, the trial began in 1987 and attracted global attention. Justice in Lyon is the first comprehensive history of the Barbie trial, including the investigation leading up to it, the legal background to the case, and the hurdles the prosecution had to clear in order to bring Barbie to justice. Richard J. Golsan examines the strategies used by the defence, the prosecution, and the lawyers who represented Barbie's many victims at the trial. The book draws from press coverage, articles, and books about Barbie and the trial published at the time, as well as recently released archival sources and the personal archives of lawyers at the trial. Making the case that, despite the views of its many critics, the Barbie trial was a success in legal, historical, and pedagogical terms, Justice in Lyon details how the trial has had a positive impact on French and international law governing crimes against humanity.

This book is an analytical study of the current English law of traditional contracts of employment and of other personal employment contracts. Concentrating on the common law basis of individual employment law, it takes full account of relevant British and European Community legislation up to and including the Employment Act 2002. It argues for, and is constructed around a whole new category of employment contracts, which includes not only contracts of employment but also other "personal employment contracts", a concept which the author articulates and justifies.

A study of how English legal culture, with its strong emphasis on common law, engaged with the new ideas of the Enlightenment. This book explores how English legal culture, deeply imbued with the ideas and practices of common law, engaged with the new intellectual, institutional and cultural changes of the Enlightenment. It argues that common law survivedas an important part of English legal culture because it was able to meet the various challenges posed by Enlightenment rationalism and civic and commercial discourse. Drawing on works of jurisprudence, legal histories, manuals of law and notebooks of legal practice, and looking in detail at four pivotal, widely-discussed cases, the book illuminates the ways in which common law custom and tradition continued to be valued foundations for the authority of law, even during a period of political change, commercial growth and philosophical rationalism. Exploring the challenges to and adaptations within common law thinking in England in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, the book reveals that the common law played a much wider role beyond the legal world in shaping Enlightenment concepts. JULIA RUDOLPH is Associate Professor of History at North Carolina State University. She is the author of Revolution by Degrees: James Tyrrell and Whig Political Thought in the Late Seventeenth Century (Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), and of various articles on gender, crime, and the history of the book in early modern England. She has also edited a collection of theoretical and interdisciplinary essays entitled History and Nation (Bucknell University Press, 2006).

A collaboration of leading historians of European law and philosophers of law and politics identifying and explaining the practice of interpretation of law in the 18th century. The goal: establishing the actual practice in the Age of Enlightenment, and explaining why this was the case. The ideology of the Age was that law, i.e., the will of the sovereign, can be explicitly and appropriately stated, thus making interpretation redundant. However, the reality was that in the 18th century, there was no one leading source of national law that would be the object of interpretation. Instead, there was a plurality of sources of law: the Roman Law, local customary law, and the royal ordinance. However, in deciding a case in a court of law, the law must speak with one voice. Hence, interpretation to unify the norms was inevitable. What was the process? What role did justification in terms of reason, the hallmark of the Enlightenment, play? These are some of the questions addressed.

This book compares the respective concepts of the law of nations put forward by the Spanish theologian Francisco Suarez and by the Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius. This comparison is based on the fact that both thinkers developed quite similar notions and were the first to depart from the Roman conception, which persisted throughout the entire Middle Ages and the early Renaissance. In Rome, jus gentium was a law that applied to foreigners within the Empire, and one which was often mistaken for Natural Law itself. These two features can be found even in the works of writers such as Francisco de Vitoria and Alberico Gentili. In Suarez and Grotius, the law of nations is applicable to an extra-national domain and inarguably becomes positive law. Yet, it also contains an ethical element that prevents it from transforming into a mere reflection of state interests. This work argues that this resemblance is hardly a coincidence: Grotius has read Suarez, and that influence has modified the foundations of his early thoughts on jus gentium. This should not be taken to imply that the Dutch jurist wasn't original: in both authors, the definition of the law of nations pursues his own internal logic. Nevertheless, Suarez's oeuvre allowed Grotius to solve a fundamental problem touched on in his early writings that had remained unanswered. Accordingly, his oeuvre promises to clarify one of the most significant moments in the History of International Law.

There are twenty-nine Islamic law states (ILS) in the world today, and their Muslim population is over 900 million. Muslims in these countries-and, to some extent, all Muslims-are ethically, morally, doctrinally, or politically committed to the Islamic legal tradition, a unique logic and culture of justice based on nonconfrontational dispute resolution. In Islamic Law and International Law, Emilia Justyna Powell examines the differences and similarities between the Islamic legal tradition and international law, focusing in particular on the issue of conflict management and resolution. In many Islamic Law States, Islamic law displaces secular law in state governance and shapes these countries' international dealings. Powell considers why some of Islamic Law States accept international courts while others avoid them, stressing throughout that we cannot make blanket claims about such states. Each relationship is context-specific, hinging on the nature of the domestic legal system. Moreover, not all of these states are Islamic to the same degree or in the same way. Secular law and religious law fuse in different ways in different domestic legal systems. Often, the Islamic legal tradition points in one direction, while the Western-based, secularized international law points in another. However, Powell argues that Islamic legal tradition contains elements that are compatible with modern international law. She marshals original data on the legal systems structures in thirty Islamic Law States over the entire course of the post-World War Two era, and she draws from in-depth interviews with Islamic law scholars and leading practitioners of international law, including judges of the International Court of Justice. Rich in empirical evidence, this book will reshape how we think about the relationship between ILS and the international system.

Explains the most effective ways to discuss the legal and financial responsibilities that come with the end of life and tools for managing them—such as wills, trusts, estate planning, and cash management—in the context of financial psychology. Dying is complicated. It presents myriad challenges at a time when people are least prepared to deal with complexity. Typically, aging people turn to their adult children and grandchildren, their caregivers, and their professional advisors to guide them in their final years. This book is aimed directly at the children and grandchildren of aging parents to prepare them for meaningful conversations with their parents and among themselves. It gives them the tools they need to communicate knowledgeably with caregivers and professional advisors and to make important decisions with, or on behalf of, those who depend on them. The authors provide legal and financial tools and techniques, including wills and trusts, cash management, and investment planning, approaching each from both a financial and a psychological perspective. They recognize that some of the challenges that people face during their last few years of life cannot be controlled and describe not only what these tools and techniques can do but also what they can't. Those that cannot be controlled, however, can still be managed, and the authors explain with clarity and compassion how to deal with them through psychological and spiritual engagement.

The law of estoppel is a modern concept with a medieval label. It concerns the enforcement of obligations outside the law of contract and tort; we might call it the law of consistency, which obliges people to stand by things they have said. This is a book for lawyers, but will be of interest to other readers as a picture of how the law has tried to deal with its own shortcomings. The book will be of interest practitioners and scholars in other jurisdictions particularly Australia and New Zealand.

A signal feature of legal and political institutions is that they exercise coercive power. The essays in this volume examine institutional coercion with the aim of trying to understand its nature, justification and limits. Included are essays that take a fresh look at perennial questions ? what, if anything, can legitimate state exercises of coercive force? What is coercion in politics and law? ? and essays that take a first or nearly first look at newer questions ? may the state coercively hold certain terrorists indefinitely? Does the state coerce those seeking to join in same-sex marriage when it refuses to extend legal recognition to same-sex marriage? Can there be a just international order without some agency possessed of the final and rightful authority to coerce states? Leading scholars from philosophy, political science and law examine these and related questions shedding new light on an apparently inescapable feature of political and legal life: Coercion.

As Kent Greenwalt's second volume on aspects of legal interpretation, this book analyzes statutory and common law interpretation and compares the two. In respect to statutory interpretation, it first asks whether judges are "faithful agents" of the legislature or "independent cooperative partners." It concludes that the obvious answer is that neither simple categorization really fits-that the function of judges involves a combination of roles. The next issue addressed is whether the intent of those in authority matters for interpreting the kinds of instructions contained in statutes. At the general level, the answer is "yes." This answer follows even if one thinks interpretation should concentrate on the understanding of readers, because readers themselves would treat intentions as part of the relevant context of the language of statutes. It would take some special reasons, such as constitutional structure or unreliability, to discount actual intents of legislators and use of legislative history. The book argues that none of these special reasons are convincing. On the question whether judges should focus on the language of specific provision or overall purpose, both are relevant, and purpose should become more important as time passes. In an analysis of various other features of statutory interpretation, the book claims that presidential signing statements should not have weight, that subsequent legislative actions short of new statutes should only occasionally carry importance, that "canons of interpretation," such as the rule of lenity, can provide some, limited, guidance, and that there are special reasons for courts to adhere to precedents in statutory cases, but these should not yield any absolute rule. A chapter on administrative interpretation of statutes claims that the standards agencies apply should differ to a degree from those of courts and that judicial deference to those interpretations is ordinarily warranted. The book's second part, on common law interpretation, considers the force of precedents, resisting any simple dichotomy between holding and dictum. It also defends the use of reasoning by analogy, not only in the initial stages thinking about a problem, but also in respect to some final justifications for decisions. An examination of the place of rules, principles, and policies argues that all three are relevant in common law interpretation; and shows that common law interpretation is not reducible to any formula. A final chapter compares statutory and common law interpretation, similarities and differences, how each can affect the other, and the significance of having a legal system in which they both play prominent roles.

Like many countries around the world, Chile is undergoing a political moment when the nature of democracy and its political and legal institutions are being challenged. Senior Chilean legal scholar and constitutional historian Pablo Ruiz-Tagle provides an historical analysis of constitutional change and democratic crisis in the present context focused on Chilean constitutionalism. He offers a comparative analysis of the organization and function of government, the structure of rights and the main political agents that participated in each stage of Chilean constitutional history. Chile is a powerful case study of a Latin American country that has gone through several threats to its democracy, but that has once again followed a moderate path to rebuild its constitutional republican tradition. Not only the first comprehensive study of Chilean constitutional history in the English language from the nineteenth-century to the present day, this book is also a powerful defence of democratic values.

Properties of Law is a legal-theoretical analysis about modern state law; about sociality, normativity and plurality as its properties, and what will come after modern state law. The main objective of this study is to offer a legal theoretical recapitulation of modern state law that avoids the fallacies of Legal Positivism. This calls for a relationist approach where law's sociality is related to normativity, and normativity to sociality. Avoiding Legal Positivism's fallacies also includes refraining from extrapolating from modern state law to law in general; replacing Legal Positivism's conceptual universalism with sensitivity to the varieties of law, and acknowledging that law existed before modern state law, that it will exist after modern state law, and that other law exists alongside modern state law. The book concludes with a discussion of the impact of digitalization on law.

The story of the English barristers and the culture of common law between 1690 and 1820 is a complex one. In Professors of the Law David Lemmings provides a wealth of detail about barristers' numbers, education, working habits, reputation, and self-image, and compares them with colonial American lawyers. The broad-ranging conclusion suggests that the bar ultimately failed English society and contributed to the marginalization of the common law.