The Coast Guard, within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), is charged with preventing loss of life, injury, and property damage in the maritime environment through its SAR mission. It maintains over 200 stations with various assets, such as boats and helicopters (depending on the station), along U.S. coasts and inland waterways to carry out this mission, as well as its other missions such as maritime security. Chapter 1 will review: the status of the Coast Guard's recapitalisation program; new technologies that could assist the Coast Guard; maintenance requirements of its ageing vessels; operating costs for the new vessels; and shoreside infrastructure needs and priorities. The Coast Guard's missions in the Arctic include: defense readiness, ice operations, marine environmental protection, and ports, waterways and coastal security. Chapter 2 discusses the Coast Guard's Arctic capabilities. Chapter 3 addresses the extent to which the Coast Guard has (1) a sound process for analysing the need for its boat stations and (2) taken actions to implement its boat station process results.

No external observer knows more about Myanmar's security and intelligence apparatus than Andrew Selth. In this book he presents an account of the structure and functions of Myanmar's deep state, along with a tale of personal ambition, rivalry and ruthless power politics worthy of John Le Carre. A thoroughly educative, entertaining and intriguing read."" - Professor Michael Wesley, Dean, College of Asia and the Pacific, The Australian National University ""Andrew Selth has once again amply illustrated the depth and penetration of his study of Myanmar/Burma and its institutions. This work on the more recent aspects of the country's intelligence apparatus goes beyond a masterful and comprehensive analysis of the Burmese intelligence community, and probes the social and institutional bases of the attitudes giving rise to that critical aspect of power. We are once again in Dr Selth's debt. This is required reading for serious observers of the Burmese scene."" - David I. Steinberg, Distinguished Professor of Asian Studies Emeritus, Georgetown University ""By lifting the lid on a pervasive yet secretive intelligence apparatus, Andrew Selth makes an outstanding contribution to Myanmar Studies. For scholars and practitioners alike, this book provides an essential history of a security state that remains powerful even during the transition away from overt authoritarian rule."" - Professor Ian Holliday, Vice-President (Teaching and Learning), The University of Hong Kong

Now, for the first time, Robert K. DeArment has told the full story of George Scarborough's life, illuminating his activity as a lawman during the final part of the nineteenth century and his controversial killings while wearing the badge-he was tried for murder on three occasions and acquitted each time.

Following terrorist attacks against the U.S. embassy in Beirut, Lebanon, in 1983, the U.S. Department of State began an embassy construction program -- known as the Inman program -- to protect U.S. personnel. However, the U.S. Department of State completed only 24 of the 57 planned construction projects, in part due to poor planning, systemic weaknesses in program management, difficulties acquiring sites, schedule delays, cost increases, and subsequent funding limitations. Following the demise of the Inman program in the early 1990s, very few new construction projects were initiated until after the two 1998 embassy bombings in Africa. Following those attacks, the Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of 1999 required the U.S. Department of State to maintain a list of diplomatic facilities to be scheduled for replacement based on their vulnerability to attack. The U.S. Department of State determined that diplomatic facilities at over 180 posts -- more than half of U.S. overseas missions -- needed to be replaced to meet security standards. By 2016, over 30,000 staff were moved into more secure facilities. From October 2012 to September 2016, State evacuated overseas post staff and family members from 23 overseas posts in response to various threats, such as terrorism, civil unrest, and natural disasters. Overseas posts undergoing evacuations generally experience authorised departure or ordered departure of specific post staff or family members, potentially leading to suspended operations. On 29 September 2017 the U.S. Department of State ordered the departure of nonemergency personnel assigned to the U.S. Embassy in Havana, Cuba, as well as their families, in order to minimise the risk of their exposure to harm because of a series of unexplained injuries suffered by embassy personnel since November 2016.

The United States has poured over a billion dollars into a network of interagency intelligence centers called "fusion centers." These centers were ostensibly set up to prevent terrorism, but politicians, the press, and policy advocates have criticized them for failing on this account. So why do these security systems persist? Pacifying the Homeland travels inside the secret world of intelligence fusion, looks beyond the apparent failure of fusion centers, and reveals a broader shift away from mass incarceration and toward a more surveillance- and police-intensive system of social regulation. Provided with unprecedented access to domestic intelligence centers, Brendan McQuade uncovers how the institutionalization of intelligence fusion enables decarceration without fully addressing the underlying social problems at the root of mass incarceration. The result is a startling analysis that contributes to the debates on surveillance, mass incarceration, and policing and challenges readers to see surveillance, policing, mass incarceration, and the security state in an entirely new light.

In February of 2011, Libyan citizens rebelled against Muammar Qaddafi and quickly unseated him. The speed of the regime's collapse confounded many observers, and the ensuing civil war showed Foreign Policy's index of failed states to be deeply flawed-FP had, in 2010, identified 110 states as being more likely than Libya to descend into chaos. They were spectacularly wrong, but this points to a larger error in conventional foreign policy wisdom: failed, or weak and unstable, states are not anomalies but are instead in the majority. More states resemble Libya than Sweden. Why are most states weak and unstable? Taking as his launching point Charles Tilly's famous dictum that 'war made the state, and the state made war,' Arjun Chowdhury argues that the problem lies in our mistaken equation of democracy and economic power with stability. But major wars are the true source of stability: only the existential crisis that such wars produced could lead citizens to willingly sacrifice the resources that allowed the state to build the capacity it needed for survival. Developing states in the postcolonial era never experienced the demands major interstate war placed on European states, and hence citizens in those nations have been unwilling to sacrifice the resources that would build state capacity. For example, India and Mexico are established democracies with large economies. Despite their indices of stability, both countries are far from stable: there is an active Maoist insurgency in almost a quarter of India's districts, and Mexico is plagued by violence, drug trafficking, and high levels of corruption in local government. Nor are either effective at collecting revenue. As a consequence, they do not have the tax base necessary to perform the most fundamental tasks of modern states: controlling organized violence in a given territory and providing basic services to citizens. By this standard, the majority of states in the world-about two thirds-are weak states. Chowdury maintains that an accurate evaluation of international security requires a normative shift : the language of weakness and failure belies the fact that strong states are exceptions. Chowdhury believes that dismantling this norm is crucial, as it encourages developing states to pursue state-building via war, which is an extremely costly approach-in terms of human lives and capital. Moreover, in our era, such an approach is destined to fail because the total wars of the past are highly unlikely to occur today. Just as importantly, the non-state alternatives on offer are not viable alternatives. For better or worse, we will continue to live in a state-dominated world where most states are weak. Counterintuitive and sweeping in its coverage, The Myth of International Order demands that we fundamentally rethink foundational concepts of international politics like political stability and state failure.

U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) are updating their existing civil support plans to include a complex catastrophe scenario, as directed by the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff. However, the commands are delaying the identification of capabilities that could be provided to execute the plans until the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the lead federal response agency, completes its regional planning efforts in 2018. This book assesses the extent to which DOD has planned for and identified capabilities to respond to complex catastrophes; and established a command and control construct for complex catastrophes and other multistate incidents. It also establishes Department of Defense (DoD) priorities in the areas of homeland defense and defense support of civil authorities through 2020, consistent with the president's National Security Strategy and the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance.

The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) mission includes law enforcement elements, which require the department, through its components, to manage various types of firearms. DHS's annual ammunition purchases have declined since fiscal year 2009 and are comparable in number to the Department of Justice's (DOJ) ammunition purchases. In fiscal year 2013, DHS purchased 84 million rounds of ammunition, which is less than DHS's ammunition purchases over the past 5 fiscal years. DHS component officials said the decline in ammunition purchases in fiscal year 2013 was primarily a result of budget constraints, which meant reducing the number of training classes, and drawing on their ammunition inventories. This book addresses trends in DHS's ammunition purchases since fiscal year 2008, how DHS's purchases compare with DOJ's, and what factors affect DHS's purchase decisions.

A most timely publication in view of current concerns about snooping. Thomas Mathiesen describes how the major databases of Europe have become interlinked and accessible to diverse organizations and third States; meaning that, largely unchallenged, a 'Surveillance Monster' now threatens rights, freedoms, democracy and the Rule of Law. As information is logged on citizens' every move, data flows across borders via systems soon to be under central, global or even non-State control. Secret plans happen behind closed doors and 'systems func tionaries' become defensive of their own role. Goals expand and entire processes are shrouded in mystery. Alongside the integration of automated systems sits a weakening of State ties as the Prum Treaty and Schengen Convention lead to systems lacking transparency, restraint or Parliamentary scrutiny. As Mathiesen explains, the intention may have been fighting terrorism or organized crime, but the means have become disproportionate, unaccountable, over-expensive and lacking in results which ordinary vigilance and sound intelligence in communities should provide.

The deaths of Ambassador Christopher Stevens and three other U.S. personnel in Benghazi, Libya, on 11 September 2012, along with attacks on U.S. embassies in Egypt, Sudan, Tunisia, and Yemen, have drawn renewed attention to the challenges facing U.S. diplomats abroad, as well as to the difficulty in balancing concerns for their security against the outreach required of their mission. Congress plays a key role in shaping the response to these challenges, such as by providing resources for diplomatic security and examining security breaches overseas. The inability to provide perfect security, especially against the evident threat of mob violence, has focused particular scrutiny on the deployment of diplomatic personnel in high-threat environments. This book provides background information on the authorities, regulations, and procedures in place at the Department of State regarding diplomatic security with additional discussion on embassy security funding trends.

According to Homeland Security Presidential Directive 10 (HSPD-10): Biodefense for the 21st Century, a national bioawareness capability providing early warning, detection, or recognition of a biological weapon attack is an essential component of biodefense. To contribute to this national capability, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) operates the BioWatch program, which uses routine laboratory testing designed to detect an aerosolised biological attack for five specific biological agents considered high risk for use as biological weapons. The BioWatch program is a federally-managed, locally operated system with collectors deployed primarily in outdoor locations in more than 30 major metropolitan areas. This book provides an overview of the BioWatch Generation-3 Acquisition program with a focus on meeting mission needs for effective biosurveillance.

This book provides background information and potential oversight issues for Congress on the Coast Guard's programs for procuring eight National Security Cutters, 25 Offshore Patrol Cutters, and 58 Fast Response Cutters. These 91 planned cutters are intended as replacements for 90 ageing Coast Guard cutters and patrol craft. Additionally discussed is the sustainment and modernization of the Coast Guard's polar icebreaker fleet, which performs a variety of missions supporting U.S. interests in polar regions. The issue for Congress is whether to approve, reject, or modify Coast Guard funding and modernization requests and acquisition strategies. Congressional decisions could affect the Coast Guard's capabilities and funding requirements, the performance of polar missions and the U.S. shipbuilding industrial base.

One of the most serious crises since the end of the Cold War began with Russia's seizure and annexation of Crimea in March 2014 and subsequent 'secret' war in Eastern Ukraine. As more territory was taken from Eastern Ukraine, Western countries countered with economic sanctions directed against Russia. While the conflict did not escalate to the levels originally feared, over time, it became apparent that President Putin had failed to affect the regime change intended in Ukraine, and Russia's economy had been damaged. In Ukraine and the Art of Strategy, Sir Lawrence Freedman provides an account of the origins and course of the Russia-Ukraine conflict through the lens of the theory and practice of strategy. That is, he explores Putin's near, medium, and long-term strategies when he decided to initiate the conflict. How successful has he been? In contrast to many who see Putin as a master operator who has resuscitated a supine Russia against all odds, Freedman is less impressed with his strategic acumen in terms of the long-term fallout. By exploring concepts such as coercive diplomacy, limited war, escalation and information operations, Freedman brings the story up to the present, where a low-level conflict between Ukrainian and breakaway rebel forces in the east grinds on, and illuminates the external challenges faced by the governments' involved. Freedman's application of his unique strategic perspective to this supremely important conflict has the potential to reshape our understanding of it, and his analysis of the likely outcomes will force readers to reconsider the idea that Vladimir Putin is unmatched as a strategic mastermind.

Data Borders investigates entrenched and emerging borderland technology that ensnares all people in an intimate web of surveillance where data resides and defines citizenship. Detailing the new trend of biologically mapping undocumented people through biotechnologies, Melissa Villa-Nicholas shows how surreptitious monitoring of Latinx immigrants is the focus of and driving force behind Silicon Valley's growing industry within defense technology manufacturing. Villa-Nicholas reveals a murky network that gathers data on marginalized communities for purposes of exploitation and control that implicates law enforcement, border patrol, and ICE, but that also pulls in public workers and the general public, often without their knowledge or consent. Enriched by interviews of Latinx immigrants living in the borderlands who describe their daily use of technology and their caution around surveillance, this book argues that in order to move beyond a heavily surveilled state that dehumanizes both immigrants and citizens, we must first understand how our data is being collected, aggregated, correlated, and weaponized with artificial intelligence and then push for immigrant and citizen information privacy rights along the border and throughout the United States.

In seeking to evaluate the efficacy of post-9/11 homeland security expenses--which have risen by more than a trillion dollars, not including war costs--the common query has been, "Are we safer?" This, however, is the wrong question. Of course we are "safer"--the posting of a single security guard at one building's entrance enhances safety. The correct question is, "Are any gains in security worth the funds expended?"
In this engaging, readable book, John Mueller and Mark Stewart apply risk and cost-benefit evaluation techniques to answer this very question. This analytical approach has been used throughout the world for decades by regulators, academics, and businesses--but, as a recent National Academy of Science study suggests, it has never been capably applied by the people administering homeland security funds. Given the limited risk terrorism presents, expenses meant to lower it have for the most part simply not been worth it. For example, to be considered cost-effective, increased American homeland security expenditures would have had each year to have foiled up to 1,667 attacks roughly like the one intended on Times Square in 2010--more than four a day. Cataloging the mistakes that the US has made--and continues to make--in managing homeland security programs, Terror, Security, andMoney has the potential to redirect our efforts toward a more productive and far more cost-effective course.

Conventional wisdom holds that weak and failing states are the source of the world's most pressing security threats. After all, the 9/11 attacks originated in an impoverished, war-ravaged country, and transnational crime appears to flourish in weakly governed states. However, our assumptions about the threats posed by failing states are based on anecdotal arguments, not on a systematic analysis of the connections between state failure and transnational security threats. Analyzing terrorism, transnational crime, WMDs, pandemic diseases, and energy insecurity, Stewart Patrick shows that while some global threats do emerge in fragile states, most of their weaknesses create misery only for their own citizenry. Moreover, many threats originate farther up the chain, in wealthier and more stable countries like Russia and Venezuela. Weak Links will force policymakers to rethink what they assume about state failure and transnational insecurity.