More than a tool of policy makers to gather intelligence, Air Force
reconnaissance efforts shaped early Cold War doctrine and war
planning. Dr. Farquhar argues that a lack of information on Soviet
strategic capabilities dominated the organization, operational
planning, and equipment of the postwar Air Force. To support his
assertion, Farquhar traces the development of aerial reconnaissance
from the first balloon ascents through World War II as a prelude.
He then examines early Cold War peripheral reconnaissance and
overflights of the Soviet Union. He explains the evolution of
intelligence-gathering technology, bureaucratic growth, and a
relative lack of attention paid to electronic warfare before the
Korean War. Based primarily on archival sources, this book (first
published in 2004) serves as an excellent reference for air
doctrine, intelligence, and electronic warfare in the formative
years of the Cold War.
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