This book draws upon the phenomenological tradition of Husserl and
Heidegger in order to provide an alternative elaboration of John
McDowell's thesis that in order to understand how self-conscious
subjectivity relates to the world, perception must be understood as
a genuine unity of spontaneity ('concept') and receptivity
('intuition'). This alternative elaboration permits clarification
of McDowell's critique of Donald Davidson and development of an
alternative conception of perceptual experience giving clear sense
to McDowell's claim that self-conscious subjectivity is so
inherently in touch with its world that scepticism about the latter
must be incoherent. It also permits development of a more accurate,
historically oriented critique of the metaphysics constraining one
to construe perceptual experience in ways which misrepresent how
self-conscious subjectivity bears upon the world. It shows that
many of McDowell's meta-philosophical views are implicitly
Husserlian and that had McDowell developed them further, he would
have avoided the paradoxical meta-philosophy he adopts from
Wittgenstein. In conclusion, it intimates the central weakness in
Husserl's position which takes one from Husserl to Heidegger. The
book is written in terms accessible to analytic philosophers and
will thus enable them to see the central differences between
analytic and phenomenological approaches to intentionality and
self-consciousness.
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