Tying in with major traditions of ordinary language philosophy, the
author presents an account of practical reasons in social agency
that radically challenges the two mainstream accounts of practical
reasons, the desire-belief model and the neo-Aristotelian
"sub-specie-boni" model of practical reasons. She argues that the
traditional focus on instrumental rationality and teleological
reasoning ignores important types of non-purposive and
agent-related reasons that play a major role in rule-based context
of social agency and reciprocal interaction. The argument
contributes to the analysis of promising and social conventions,
reconstructions of acting together and shared intentions, and
develops a new account of institutional and rule-based agency in
terms of non-moral normativity.
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