"Steel Wind" is a piece of historical detective work that
explains how Colonel Georg Bruchmuller, an obscure German artillery
officer recalled from retirement, played a pivotal role in the
revolution of offensive tactics that took place in 1917-18.
Ironically, the methods developed by Bruchmuller ultimately were
rejected by the German Army of World War II, but they were taken up
and applied with a vengeance by the emerging Red Army. The Soviets
further developed Bruchmuller's principles and incorporated them
into their doctrine, where they remain to this day. Through Soviet
doctrine, they have become fundamental to the practice of many
other armies. Bruchmuller's influence in shaping the former Soviet
Army has also been mirrored in the shape of those armies designed
to oppose it.
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Review This Product
Sat, 22 Oct 2005 | Review
by: Carl H.
On the opening day of the 1918 spring offensive, Bruchmuller’s 6608 artillery pieces fired 3.2 million rounds (some 13 000 tonne of high explosive) and the German army took back approximately the same amount of territory lost to the British and French during the 5-month long Somme battles.
The fascinating and well researched story of how Bruchmuller (1863-1948) had won wide renown as Durchbruchmuller ('breakthrough Muller') throughout the German Army as a pioneer of artillery fire and movement tactics. These tactics were controversial by conversely using short, sharp artillery offensives (3 / 5 hours instead of days or even weeks) as a means of neutralizing rather than destroying the enemy while maintaining the crucial element of surprise. Rather than targeting fixed locations and maintaining a steady barrage he ensured the artillery barrage constantly shifted focus, always targeting important targets rather than the enemy front line and using gas shells extensively to aid enemy confusion.
These techniques were ignored by the post Versailles German army in favour of the air supported Blitzkrieg and had to be relearned at great cost by the Israelis in the 1973 Yom Kippur war when the Egyptian army crossed the Suez Canal using Bruchmuller’s tactics. The Israeli defence force had neglected artillery and almost lost a war.
Carl Hoehler Johannesburg ([email protected])
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