This book explains the conditions under which great powers are
likely to cooperate to improve their security by engaging in
qualitative arms control. In agreeing to limit or proscribe certain
classes of weapons, states will constrain their military
capabilities and therefore decrease the threat they pose to
potential adversaries. Focusing on the expected military impact of
technological change and the capacity of states to confidently
monitor the activities of its negotiating partners, it may be
possible to forge lasting agreements that improves the security of
the participating states. However, at other times, the nature
technological change may force states to engage in competitive
behavior, precluding cooperation and increasing the probability of
conflict. Examining a diverse set of cases, including the
Washington Naval Conference, The World Disarmament Conference at
Geneva, the Baruch Plan for the International Control of Atomic
Energy, and the SALT I Accords (including the ABM Treaty), this
volume presents a persuasive, comprehensive and interesting
contribution to the literature on arms racing and arms control, and
should be of interest to students of international relations theory
and security studies. By presenting a theoretical-informed model
that explicitly links the security strategies of states to their
choices about development and deployment of new weapons and,
consequently, their willingness to engage in arms control
cooperation, this book provides an important refinement upon
existing theoretical and historical approaches.
General
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