The governance of natural resources used by many individuals in
common is an issue of increasing concern to policy analysts. Both
state control and privatization of resources have been advocated,
but neither the state nor the market have been uniformly successful
in solving common pool resource problems. After critiquing the
foundations of policy analysis as applied to natural resources,
Elinor Ostrom here provides a unique body of empirical data to
explore conditions under which common pool resource problems have
been satisfactorily or unsatisfactorily solved. Dr Ostrom uses
institutional analysis to explore different ways - both successful
and unsuccessful - of governing the commons. In contrast to the
proposition of the 'tragedy of the commons' argument, common pool
problems sometimes are solved by voluntary organizations rather
than by a coercive state. Among the cases considered are communal
tenure in meadows and forests, irrigation communities and other
water rights, and fisheries.
General
Is the information for this product incomplete, wrong or inappropriate?
Let us know about it.
Does this product have an incorrect or missing image?
Send us a new image.
Is this product missing categories?
Add more categories.
Review This Product
No reviews yet - be the first to create one!
Welcome to Loot.co.za!
Sign in / Register |Wishlists & Gift Vouchers |Help | Advanced search
