The nature of propositions and the cognitive value of names have
been the focal point of philosophy of language for the last few
decades. The advocates of the causal reference theory have favored
the view that the semantic contents of proper names are their
referents. However, Frege's puzzle about the different cognitive
value of coreferential names has made this identification seem
impossible. Geirsson provides a detailed overview of the debate to
date, and then develops a novel account that explains our
reluctance, even when we know about the relevant identity, to
substitute coreferential names in both simple sentences and belief
contexts while nevertheless accepting the view that the semantic
content of names is their referents. The account focuses on
subjects organizing information in webs; a name can then access and
elicit information from a given web. Geirsson proceeds to extend
the account of information to non-referring names, but they have
long provided a serious challenge to the causal reference theorist.
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