Using a straightforward rational-choice approach, Professor
Ramseyer explores the impact that law had on various markets in
Japanese history and the effect that those markets had on economic
growth. In doing so, he applies an economic logic to markets in a
different world in a different historical period with a different
political regime and a different legal system. He looks hardest at
those markets that have most often struck traditional observers as
"exploitative" (e.g., the markets for indentured servants and for
sexual services). Within those markets, he focuses on the way
participants handled informational asymmetries in the contracting
process. Ramseyer finds that Japanese courts generally defined
important property rights clearly, and that Japanese markets
generally protected an individual's control over his or her own
labor. As a result, that the Japanese economy grew at relatively
efficient levels follows directly from standard economic theory. He
also concludes that the legal system usually promoted mutually
advantageous deals, and that market participants (whether poor or
rich, female or male) generally mitigated informational asymmetries
shrewdly by contract. He finds no systematic evidence of either
sex- or age-based exploitation.
General
Imprint: |
Cambridge UniversityPress
|
Country of origin: |
United Kingdom |
Series: |
Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions |
Release date: |
2008 |
First published: |
2008 |
Authors: |
J. Mark Ramseyer
|
Dimensions: |
228 x 153 x 18mm (L x W x T) |
Format: |
Paperback - Trade
|
Pages: |
212 |
ISBN-13: |
978-0-521-04825-5 |
Categories: |
Books >
Business & Economics >
Economics >
Political economy
|
LSN: |
0-521-04825-7 |
Barcode: |
9780521048255 |
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