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Books > Social sciences > Warfare & defence > Defence strategy, planning & research > Military tactics

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The Ideology of the Offensive - Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914 (Paperback, New edition) Loot Price: R819
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The Ideology of the Offensive - Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914 (Paperback, New edition): Jack Snyder

The Ideology of the Offensive - Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914 (Paperback, New edition)

Jack Snyder

Series: Cornell Studies in Security Affairs

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Loot Price R819 Discovery Miles 8 190 | Repayment Terms: R77 pm x 12*

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Jack Snyder's analysis of the attitudes of military planners in the years prior to the Great War offers new insight into the tragic miscalculations of that era and into their possible parallels in present-day war planning. By 1914, the European military powers had adopted offensive military strategies even though there was considerable evidence to support the notion that much greater advantage lay with defensive strategies. The author argues that organizational biases inherent in military strategists' attitudes make war more likely by encouraging offensive postures even when the motive is self-defense.

Drawing on new historical evidence of the specific circumstances surrounding French, German, and Russian strategic policy, Snyder demonstrates that it is not only rational analysis that determines strategic doctrine, but also the attitudes of military planners. Snyder argues that the use of rational calculation often falls victim to the pursuit of organizational interests such as autonomy, prestige, growth, and wealth. Furthermore, efforts to justify the preferred policy bring biases into strategists' decisions biases reflecting the influences of parochial interests and preconceptions, and those resulting from attempts to simplify unduly their analytical tasks.

The frightening lesson here is that doctrines can be destabilizing even when weapons are not, because doctrine may be more responsive to the organizational needs of the military than to the implications of the prevailing weapons technology. By examining the historical failure of offensive doctrine, Jack Snyder makes a valuable contribution to the literature on the causes of war."

General

Imprint: Cornell University Press
Country of origin: United States
Series: Cornell Studies in Security Affairs
Release date: February 1989
First published: 2013
Authors: Jack Snyder
Dimensions: 229 x 152 x 15mm (L x W x T)
Format: Paperback - Trade
Pages: 272
Edition: New edition
ISBN-13: 978-0-8014-8244-1
Categories: Books > Humanities > History > General
Books > Social sciences > Warfare & defence > Defence strategy, planning & research > Military tactics
Books > History > General
LSN: 0-8014-8244-5
Barcode: 9780801482441

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