Members of Congress often delegate power to bureaucratic
experts, but they fear losing permanent control of the policy. One
way Congress has dealt with this problem is to require
reauthorization of the program or policy. Cox argues that Congress
uses this power selectively, and is more likely to require
reauthorization when policy is complex or they do not trust the
executive branch. By contrast, reauthorization is less likely to be
required when there are large disagreements about policy within
Congress. In the process, Cox shows that committees are important
independent actors in the legislative process, and that committees
with homogenous policy preferences may have an advantage in getting
their bills through Congress.
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