If Raz and Dworkin disagree over how law should be
characterised,how are we, their jurisprudential public, supposed to
go about adjudicating between the rival theories which they offer
us? To what considerations would those theorists themselves appeal
in order to convince us that their accounts of law are accurate and
successful? Moreover, what is it that makes an account of law
successful? Evaluation and Legal Theory tackles methodological or
meta-theoretical issues such as these, and does so via attempting
to answer the question: to what extent, and in what sense, must a
legal theorist make value judgements about his data in order to
construct a successful theory of law? Dispelling the obfuscatory
myth that legal positivism seeks a 'value-free' account of law, the
author attempts to explain and defend Joseph Raz's position that
evaluation is essential to successful legal theory, whilst refuting
John Finnis and Ronald Dworkin's contentions that the legal
theorist must morally evaluate and morally justify the law in order
to properly explain its nature. The book does not claim to solve
the many mysteries of meta-legal theory but does seek to contribute
to and engender rigorous and focused debate on this topic.
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