Jurisprudence in an African Context, Second Edition, is devoted to the philosophy of law in a way that engages earnestly with African thought and the African context. The textbook features primary texts by leading African intellectuals, putting these in critical dialogue with works by Western theorists. It addresses core jurisprudential topics, such as the nature and functions of law, the manner in which judges do and should interpret the law, theories of distributive justice, and accounts of civil and criminal justice. These abstract philosophical issues are considered in the light of both African and Western principles as applied to salient controversies on the African continent.

This revised and updated second edition offers a deepened examination of the philosophical theories, the African context and African customary law. It includes new chapters that address critical race theory and feminism, and provides expanded analysis of primary texts. Further reading lists are also n ow available in each chapter, and links to online media are integrated throughout the work.

Jurisprudence in an African Context, Second Edition, is suited as core material for courses in African jurisprudence, legal philosophy or political theory, and may be of interest to scholars who wish to engage with African thought about the making, interpretation and enforcement of law.

There is already ample evidence that the new constitutional order has triggered an unprecedented flowering of South African jurisprudential debate. The aim of this book is to provide a sensitive and intuitive understanding of these debates. In addition, lecturers will be given an innovative approach to what has been previously regarded as a difficult, boring and irrelevant subject.

In these vibrant narratives, 25 of the world’s most accomplished movement lawyers and activists become storytellers, reflecting on their experiences at the frontlines of some of the most significant struggles of our time. In an era where human rights are under threat, their words offer both an inspiration and a compass for the way movements can use the law – and must sometimes break it – to bring about social justice.

The contributors here take you into their worlds: Jennifer Robinson frantically orchestrating a protest outside London’s Ecuadorean embassy to prevent the authorities from arresting her client Julian Assange; Justin Hansford at the barricades during the protests over the murder of Black teenager Mike Brown in Ferguson, Missouri; Ghida Frangieh in Lebanon’s detention centres trying to access arrested protestors during the 2019 revolution; Pavel Chikov defending Pussy Riot and other abused prisoners in Russia; Ayisha Siddiqa, a shy Pakistani immigrant, discovering community in her new home while leading the 2019 youth climate strike in Manhattan; Greenpeace activist Kumi Naidoo on a rubber dinghy in stormy Arctic seas contemplating his mortality as he races to occupy an oil rig.

The stories in The Revolution Will Not Be Litigated capture the complex, and often-awkward dance between legal reform and social change. They are more than compelling portraits of fascinating lives and work, they are revelatory: of generational transitions; of epochal change and apocalyptic anxiety; of the ethical dilemmas that define our age; and of how one can make a positive impact when the odds are stacked against you in a harsh world of climate crisis and ruthless globalization.

The Public's Law is a theory and history of democracy in the American administrative state. The book describes how American Progressive thinkers - such as John Dewey, W.E.B. Du Bois, and Woodrow Wilson - developed a democratic understanding of the state from their study of Hegelian political thought. G.W.F. Hegel understood the state as an institution that regulated society in the interest of freedom. This normative account of the state distinguished his view from later German theorists, such as Max Weber, who adopted a technocratic conception of bureaucracy, and others, such as Carl Schmitt, who prioritized the will of the chief executive. The Progressives embraced Hegel's view of the connection between bureaucracy and freedom, but sought to democratize his concept of the state. They agreed that welfare services, economic regulation, and official discretion were needed to guarantee conditions for self-determination. But they stressed that the people should participate deeply in administrative policymaking. This Progressive ideal influenced administrative programs during the New Deal. It also sheds light on interventions in the War on Poverty and the Second Reconstruction, as well as on the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946. The book develops a normative theory of the state on the basis of this intellectual and institutional history, with implications for deliberative democratic theory, constitutional theory, and administrative law. On this view, the administrative state should provide regulation and social services through deliberative procedures, rather than hinge its legitimacy on presidential authority or economistic reasoning.

David Boonin presents a new account of the non-identity problem: a puzzle about our obligations to people who do not yet exist. Our actions sometimes have an effect not only on the quality of life that people will enjoy in the future, but on which particular people will exist in the future to enjoy it. In cases where this is so, the combination of certain assumptions that most people seem to accept can yield conclusions that most people seem to reject. The non-identity problem has important implications both for ethical theory and for a number of topics in applied ethics, including controversial issues in bioethics, environmental ethics and disability ethics. It has been the subject of a great deal of discussion for nearly four decades, but this is the first book-length study devoted exclusively to its examination. Boonin begins by explaining what the problem is, why the problem matters, and what criteria a solution to the problem must satisfy in order to count as a successful one. He then provides a critical survey of the solutions to the problem that have thus far been proposed in the sizeable literature that the problem has generated and concludes by developing and defending an unorthodox alternative solution, one that differs fundamentally from virtually every other available approach.

Italian Constitutional Justice in Global Context is the first book ever published in English to provide an international examination of the Italian Constitutional Court (ItCC), offering a comprehensive analysis of its principal lines of jurisprudence, historical origins, organization, procedures, and its current engagement with transnational European law. The ItCC represents one of the strongest and most successful examples of constitutional judicial review, and is distinctive in its structure, institutional dimensions, and well-developed jurisprudence. Moreover, the ItCC has developed a distinctive voice among global constitutional actors in its adjudication of a broad range of topics from fundamental rights and liberties to the allocations of governmental power and regionalism. Nevertheless, in global constitutional dialog, the voice of the ItCC has been almost entirely absent due to a relative lack of both English translations of its decisions and of focused scholarly commentary in English. This book describes the "Italian Style" in global constitutional adjudication, and aims to elevate Italian constitutional jurisprudence to an active participant role in global constitutional discourse. The authors have carefully structured the work to allow the ItCC's own voice to emerge. It presents broad syntheses of major areas of the Court's case law, provides excerpts from notable decisions in a narrative and analytical context, addresses the tension between the ItCC and the Court of Cassation, and positions the development, character, and importance of the ItCC's jurisprudence in the larger arc of global judicial dialog.

Philip Pettit has drawn together here a series of interconnected essays on three subjects to which he has made notable contributions. The first part of the book discusses the rule-following character of thought. The second considers how choice can be responsive to different sorts of factors, while still being under the control of thought and the reasons that thought marshals. The third examines the implications of this view of choice and rationality for the normative regulation of social behaviour.

Modern states claim rights of jurisdiction and control over particular geographical areas and their associated natural resources. Boundaries of Authority explores the possible moral bases for such territorial claims by states, in the process arguing that many of these territorial claims in fact lack any moral justification. The book maintains throughout that the requirement of states' justified authority over persons has normative priority over, and as a result severely restricts, the kinds of territorial rights that states can justifiably claim, and it argues that the mere effective administration of justice within a geographical area is insufficient to ground moral authority over residents of that area. The book argues that only a theory of territorial rights that takes seriously the morality of the actual history of states' acquisitions of power over land and the land's residents can adequately explain the nature and extent of states' moral rights over particular territories. Part I of the book examines the interconnections between states' claimed rights of authority over particular sets of subject persons and states' claimed authority to control particular territories. It contains an extended critique of the dominant "Kantian functionalist " approach to such issues. Part II organizes, explains, and criticizes the full range of extant theories of states' territorial rights, arguing that a little-appreciated Lockean approach to territorial rights is in fact far better able to meet the principal desiderata for such theories. Where the first two parts of the book concern primarily states' claims to jurisdiction over territories, Part III of the book looks closely at the more property-like territorial rights that states claim - in particular, their claimed rights to control over the natural resources on and beneath their territories and their claimed rights to control and restrict movement across (including immigration over) their territorial borders.

The close connection between philosophy of language and philosophy of law has been recognized for decades through the work of many influential legal philosophers. This volume brings recent advances in philosophy of language to bear on contemporary debates about the nature of law and legal interpretation. The book builds on recent work in pragmatics and speech-act theory to explain how, and to what extent, legal content is determined by linguistic considerations. At the same time, the analysis shows that some of the unique features of communication in the legal domain - in particular, its strategic nature - can be employed to put pressure on certain assumptions in philosophy of language. This enables a more nuanced picture of how semantic and pragmatic determinants of communication work in complex and large-scale systems such as law. Chapters build on explanations of key elements of statutory language, such as the distinction between what is said and what is implicated, the possibility of ascribing truth-values to legal prescriptions and the structure of legal inferences, the various forms of vagueness in the law, the distinctions between vagueness, ambiguity, and polysemy in legal language, and the distinction between concept and conceptions, mostly in the context of constitutional interpretation. The book demonstrates that paying close attention to the kind of speech acts legal directives are, and how they determine the content of the law, enables a better understanding of the boundaries between normative and linguistic determinants of legal content.

The most glamorous and even glorious moments in a legal system come when a high court recognizes an abstract principle involving, for example, human liberty or equality. Indeed, Americans, and not a few non-Americans, have been greatly stirred--and divided--by the opinions of the Supreme Court, especially in the area of race relations, where the Court has tried to revolutionize American society. But these stirring decisions are aberrations, says Cass R. Sunstein, and perhaps thankfully so. In Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict, Sunstein, one of America's best known commentators on our legal system, offers a bold, new thesis about how the law should work in America, arguing that the courts best enable people to live together, despite their diversity, by resolving particular cases without taking sides in broader, more abstract conflicts.
Sunstein offers a close analysis of the way the law can mediate disputes in a diverse society, examining how the law works in practical terms, and showing that, to arrive at workable, practical solutions, judges must avoid broad, abstract reasoning. Why? For one thing, critics and adversaries who would never agree on fundamental ideals are often willing to accept the concrete details of a particular decision. Likewise, a plea bargain for someone caught exceeding the speed limit need not--indeed, must not--delve into sweeping issues of government regulation and personal liberty. Thus judges purposely limit the scope of their decisions to avoid reopening large-scale controversies. Sunstein calls such actions incompletely theorized agreements. In identifying them as the core feature of legal reasoning--and as a central part of constitutional thinking in America, South Africa, and Eastern Europe-- he takes issue with advocates of comprehensive theories and systemization, from Robert Bork (who champions the original understanding of the Constitution) to Jeremy Bentham, the father of utilitarianism, and Ronald Dworkin, who defends an ambitious role for courts in the elaboration of rights. Equally important, Sunstein goes on to argue that it is the living practice of the nation's citizens that truly makes law. For example, he cites Griswold v. Connecticut, a groundbreaking case in which the Supreme Court struck down Connecticut's restrictions on the use of contraceptives by married couples--a law that was no longer enforced by prosecutors. In overturning the legislation, the Court invoked the abstract right of privacy; the author asserts that the justices should have appealed to the narrower principle that citizens need not comply with laws that lack real enforcement. By avoiding large-scale issues and values, such a decision could have led to a different outcome in Bowers v. Hardwick, the decision that upheld Georgia's rarely prosecuted ban on sodomy. And by pointing to the need for flexibility over time and circumstances, Sunstein offers a novel understanding of the old ideal of the rule of law.
Legal reasoning can seem impenetrable, mysterious, baroque. This book helps dissolve the mystery. Whether discussing the interpretation of the Constitution or the spell cast by the revolutionary Warren Court, Cass Sunstein writes with grace and power, offering a striking and original vision of the role of the law in a diverse society. In his flexible, practical approach to legal reasoning, he moves the debate over fundamental values and principles out of the courts and back to its rightful place in a democratic state: the legislatures elected by the people.

Many Christians ignore most Old Testament laws as obsolete or irrelevant. Others claim to honor them but in fact pick and choose among them very selectively in support of specific agendas, like opposition to homosexual rights. Yet it is a basic tenet of Christian doctrine that the faith is contained in both the Old and the New Testament. If the law is ignored, an important aspect of the faith tradition is denied. In this book Cheryl Anderson tackles this problem head on, attempting to answer the question whether the laws of the Old Testament are authoritative for Christians today. This question is crucial, because some Christians actually believe that the New Testament abolishes the law, or that the major Protestant reformers (Luther, Calvin, Wesley) rejected the law. Anderson acknowledges the deeply problematic nature of some Old Testament law, especially as it applies to women. For example, Exodus 22:16-17 and Deuteronomy 22:28-29 both deem the rape of an unmarried female to have injured her father rather than the female herself. Deuteronomy requires the victim to marry her rapist. Anderson argues that biblical laws nevertheless teach us foundational values. They also, however, remind us of the differences between their ancient context and our own. She suggests that we approach biblical law in much the same way that Americans regard the Constitution. The nation's founding fathers were privileged white males who did not have the poor, women, or people of color in mind when they agreed that "all men are created equal." The Constitution has subsequently been amended and court decisions have extended its protections to those who were previously excluded. Although the biblical documents cannot be modified, the manner in which they are interpreted in later settings can and should be altered. In addition to her work as a scholar of the Old Testament, Anderson has been a practicing attorney, and has worked extensively in critical, legal, feminist and womanist theory. This background uniquely qualifies her to apply insights from contemporary law and legal theory to the interpretive history of biblical law, and to draw out their implications for issues of gender, class, and ethnicity.

Forgiveness and Remembrance examines the complex moral psychology of forgiving, remembering, and forgetting in personal and political contexts. It challenges a number of entrenched ideas that pervade standard philosophical approaches to interpersonal forgiveness and offers an original account of its moral psychology and the emotions involved in it. The volume also uses this account to illuminate the relationship of forgiveness to political reconciliation and restorative political practices in post-conflict societies. Memory is another central concern that flows from this, since forgiveness is tied to memory and to emotions associated with the memory of injury and injustice. In its political function, memory of wrongdoing - and of its victims - is embodied in processes of memorialization, such as the creation of monuments, commemorative ceremonies, and museums. The book casts light on the underexplored relationship of memorialization to transitional justice and politically consequential interpersonal forgiveness. It examines the symbolism and the symbolic moral significance of memorialization as a political practice, reflects on its relationship to forgiveness, and, finally, argues that there are moral responsibilities associated with memorialization that belong to international actors as well as to states.

This is a concise and accessible introduction to fundamental rights in Europe from the perspectives of history, theory and an analysis of European jurisprudence. Taking a multidisciplinary approach, the book equips readers with the tools to understand the foundations and the functioning of this complex and multi-layered topic. Key Features: A combination of historical and philosophical approaches with analysis of significant legal cases A multidisciplinary outlook, in contrast to the strict legal approach of most textbooks on the subject A European perspective which refers throughout to central European values such as freedom, equality, solidarity and dignity A specific focus on fundamental rights, which have received less attention in the fields of legal history and theory in comparison to human rights This textbook will be an important resource for both undergraduate and postgraduate students in law, philosophy and political science. It will be particularly useful to those studying the law of fundamental rights or human rights as a complement to more traditional legal approaches.

Americans have a deeply ambivalent relationship to guns. The United States leads all nations in rates of private gun ownership, yet stories of gun tragedies frequent the news, spurring calls for tighter gun regulations. The debate tends to be acrimonious and is frequently misinformed and illogical. The central question is the extent to which federal or state governments should regulate gun ownership and use in the interest of public safety. In this volume, David DeGrazia and Lester Hunt examine this policy question primarily from the standpoint of ethics: What would morally defensible gun policy in the United States look like? Hunt's contribution argues that the U.S. Constitution is right to frame the right to possess a firearm as a fundamental human right. The right to arms is in this way like the right to free speech. More precisely, it is like the right to own and possess a cell phone or an internet connection. A government that banned such weapons would be violating the right of citizens to protect themselves. This is a function that governments do not perform: warding off attacks is not the same thing as punishing perpetrators after an attack has happened. Self-protection is a function that citizens must carry out themselves, either by taking passive steps (such as better locks on one's doors) or active ones (such as acquiring a gun and learning to use it safely and effectively). DeGrazia's contribution features a discussion of the Supreme Court cases asserting a constitutional right to bear arms, an analysis of moral rights, and a critique of the strongest arguments for a moral right to private gun ownership. He follows with both a consequentialist case and a rights-based case for moderately extensive gun control, before discussing gun politics and advancing policy suggestions. In debating this important topic, the authors elevate the quality of discussion from the levels that usually prevail in the public arena. DeGrazia and Hunt work in the discipline of academic philosophy, which prizes intellectual honesty, respect for opposing views, command of relevant facts, and rigorous reasoning. They bring the advantages of philosophical analysis to this highly-charged issue in the service of illuminating the strongest possible cases for and against (relatively extensive) gun regulations and whatever common ground may exist between these positions.

The essays in this volume answer to anxieties that the pragmatist tradition has had little to say about justice. While both the classical and neo-pragmatist traditions have produced a conspicuously small body of writing about the idea of justice, a common subtext of the essays in this volume is that there is in pragmatist thought a set of valuable resources for developing pragmatist theories of justice, for responding profitably to concrete injustices, and for engaging with contemporary, prevailing, liberal theories of justice. Despite the absence of conventionally philosophical theories of justice in the pragmatist canon, the writings of many pragmatists demonstrate an obvious sensitivity and responsiveness to injustice. Many pragmatists were and are moved by a deep sense of justice-by an awareness of the suffering of people, by the need to build just institutions, and a search for a tolerant and non-discriminatory culture that regards all people as equals. Three related and mutually reinforcing ideas to which virtually all pragmatists are committed can be discerned: a prioritization of concrete problems and real-world injustices ahead of abstract precepts; a distrust of a priori theorizing (along with a corresponding fallibilism and methodological experimentalism); and a deep and persistent pluralism, both in respect to what justice is and requires, and in respect to how real-world injustices are best recognized and remedied. Ultimately, Pragmatism and Justice asserts that pragmatism gives us powerful resources for understanding the idea of justice more clearly and responding more efficaciously to a world rife with injustice.

In the Shade of an African Baobab: Tom Bennett's Legacy is a collection of essays published to honour and thank Tom Bennett for his generous contribution to scholarly work over the years in the field of legal pluralism and African jurisprudence, as well as for his mentorship and friendship. The book brings together a collection of work by esteemed scholars from multidisciplinary fields, though the work is focused on aspects of law, culture and religion. The common thread through all the contributions is Tom. His scholarly influence, visible in each of the contributions, can be compared to the mighty Baobab tree: a large iconic, culturally important and majestic tree indigenous to Africa.

This thoroughly engaging book uses empirical analysis to illustrate that the response of individuals to global terror events, via social media, provokes an opportunity to interpret the ways in which individuals view their place in the world and their relation to law and justice. It is through analysing these responses that Cassandra Sharp demonstrates that a 'hashtag jurisprudence' can be constructed. Sharp offers a theory of law that combines narratives, the experience of terror and the expression of emotion through social media engagement. Using thought-provoking case studies of terrorist attacks between 2014 and 2018 from around the world, the book examines how social media has quickly become the new forum for members of the public to express their opinions on current law and justice. It further demonstrates the significant impact that comments on social media platforms can have on social justice issues and activism. This timely book will be required reading for academics in law, social sciences and humanities. Scholars with an interest in legal theory, philosophy, and law and emotion will find the case study findings insightful and informative.

Contract as Promise is a study of the philosophical foundations of contract law in which Professor Fried effectively answers some of the most common assumptions about contract law and strongly proposes a moral basis for it while defending the classical theory of contract. This book provides two purposes regarding the complex legal institution of the contract. The first is the theoretical purpose to demonstrate how contract law can be traced to and is determined by a small number of basic moral principles. At the theory level the author shows that contract law does have an underlying, and unifying structure. The second is a pedagogic purpose to provide for students the underlying structure of contract law. At this level of doctrinal exposition the author shows that structure can be referred to moral principles. Together the two purposes support each other in an effective and comprehensive study of contract law. This second edition retains the original text, and includes a new Preface. It also includes a substantial new essay entitled Contract as Promise in the Light of Subsequent Scholarship-Especially Law and Economics which serves as a retrospective of the work accomplished in the last thirty years, while responding to present and future work in the field.

Inspiring and distinctive, After Meaning provides a radical challenge to the way in which international law is thought and practised. Jean d'Aspremont asserts that the words and texts of international law, as forms, never carry or deliver meaning but, instead, perpetually defer meaning and ensure it is nowhere found within international legal discourse. In challenging the dominant meaning-centrism of the international legal discourse and shedding light on the sovereignty of forms, this book promotes a radical new attitude towards textuality in international law. The author offers new perspectives on interpretation, critique, history, comparison, translation and referencing, inviting international lawyers to reinvent their engagement with these discourses. Chapters define meaning and form in international law, explore deferral of meaning and make an unprecedented use of post-structuralist theory to rethink international law. After Meaning will be an essential reference point for legal scholars, researchers and students who seek to understand a different way of thinking about meaning in international law. The book's engagement with post-structuralism will also prove beneficial to anyone interested in the philosophy of language and literary theory.

Elgar Advanced Introductions are stimulating and thoughtful introductions to major fields in the social sciences, business and law, expertly written by the world's leading scholars. Designed to be accessible yet rigorous, they offer concise and lucid surveys of the substantive and policy issues associated with discrete subject areas. Herbert Kritzer presents a clear introduction to the history, methods and substance of empirical legal research (ELR). Quantitative methods dominate in empirical legal research, but an important segment of the field draws on qualitative methods, such as semi-structured interviews and observation. In this book both methodologies are explored alongside systematic data analysis. Offering an overview of the broad ELR literature, the institutions of the law, the central actors of the law, and the subjects of the law are each addressed in this highly readable account that will be essential reading for legal researchers. Key features include: Summaries of the history of empirical legal research A clear introduction to methods in empirical legal research Coverage of both quantitative and qualitative methods and research A readable guide to the impact and rationale of different methodologies. This relatively short book provides an invaluable quick introduction for students, scholars, legal professionals and policy professionals.

This forward-thinking book illustrates the complexities of the morality of human rights. Emphasising the role of human rights as the only true global political morality to arise since the Second World War, chapters explore its role as applied to often controversial issues, such as capital punishment, the exclusion of same-sex couples from civil marriage and criminal abortion bans. Clarifying and cross-examining the morality of human rights, Michael J. Perry discusses their connection to moral equality and moral freedom, as well as exploring the significance of anti-poverty human rights. This illuminating book concludes with an explanation as to why the morality of human rights is acutely relevant to challenges faced by humanity in the modern era. In particular, the challenges of growing economic inequality and climate change are emphasised as having profound relevance to the morality of human rights. Interrogating the Morality of Human Rights will be of great benefit to both undergraduate and graduate students who are contemplating the idea of human rights and their morality within their studies. Professors and academics with cause to study and research human rights would also find it to be of interest, particularly those in the field of legal scholarship.

In this incisive and thought-provoking book, Francois Venter illuminates the issues arising from the fact that the current language of constitutional law is strongly premised on a particular worldview rooted in the history of the states around the North Atlantic Ocean. Highlighting how this terminological hegemony is being challenged from various directions, Venter explores the problem that all constitutional comparatists face: that they all must use the same words to express different meanings. Offering a compact but comprehensive constitutional history, Venter investigates the ways in which the standard vocabulary does not fit comfortably in many contemporary constitutional orders, as well as examining how its cogency is increasingly being questioned. Chapters contextualize comparative constitutional methods to demonstrate how the language choices made by comparatists are shaped by their own perspectives, arguing that careful explanation of the meanings attached to constitutional terms is imperative in order to be persuasive or even understood. Tackling the foundational elements of the field, this book will be a critical read for constitutional scholars across the globe. It will also be of interest to high-level practitioners of constitutional law and political scientists for its investigation of terminology that is crucial to their work.

This thought-provoking book develops and elaborates on the artifact theory of law, covering a wide range of related theoretical and practical topics. Offering a range of perspectives that flesh out the artifact theory of law, it also introduces criticisms of previous formulations of the theory and inquires into its potential payoffs. Featuring international contributions from both noted and up-and-coming scholars in law and philosophy, the book is divided into two parts. The first part further explores and evaluates the concept of law as an artifact and analyses the background and theoretical basis of the theory. The second part comprises three sections on legal ontology, semantics and legal normativity, specifically in relation to law's artifactual nature. Providing cutting-edge insights at the intersection of law and philosophy, this book will appeal to scholars and students in philosophy of law, empirical legal studies, social ontology and the philosophy of society.

This Research Handbook offers unparalleled insights into the large-scale resurgence of interest in Marx and Marxism in recent years, with contributions devoted specifically to Marxist critiques of law, rights, and the state. The Research Handbook brings together thirty-three scholars of Marx, Marxism, and law from around the world to offer theoretically informed introductions to the Marxist tradition of social critique, contemporary Marxist analyses of law and rights, and future orientations of Marxist legal analysis. Chapters testify to the strength of Marxist critical tools for understanding the role of law, rights, and the state in capitalist societies. Exploring Marxist critique across an extraordinarily wide range of scholarly disciplines, this Research Handbook is a must-read for scholars of law, politics, sociology, philosophy, and political economy who are interested in Marxism. Graduate and advanced undergraduate students in these and related disciplines will also benefit from the Research Handbook.

The first-person plural - 'we, ourselves' - is the hallmark of a democracy under the rule of law in the modern age. Exploring the roots of this 'rule of recognition', Bert van Roermund offers an in-depth reading of Rousseau's work, focusing on its most fundamental leitmotif: the sovereignty of the people. Providing an innovative understanding of Rousseau's politico-legal philosophy, this book illustrates the legal significance of plural agency and what it means for a people to act together: What do people share when using the word 'we'? What makes a people's actions political? And what exactly is 'bodily' about their joint commitment? Testing these ideas in three controversial modern debates - bio-technology, immigrant rights and populism - Van Roermund offers a critical assessment of 'political theology' in contemporary legal environments and establishes a new interpretation of joint action as bodily entrenched. Incisive and cutting-edge, this book is crucial reading for scholars of jurisprudence and legal and political philosophy, particularly those with a focus on Rousseauian theory. Students of jurisprudence and constitutional theory will also benefit from its philosophical and political insights, as well as its discussions of pressing real-world issues.