On the Commonwealth represents Cicero's first serious attempt to bring Greek theories of political life to the circumstances of the Roman Republic. While some passages have been lost or reduced to fragments, it remains an important work of political philosophy and essential reading for political science students.

How should feminist theories conceive of the subject? What is it to be a legal person? What part does embodiment play in subjectivity? Can there be a conception of rights which does justice to the social contexts in which rights claims are embedded? Is the way the law constitutes legal subjects a form of violence? These questions lie at the heart of contemporary feminist theory, and in this collection they are addressed by a group of distinguished international scholars working in law, philosophy and politics. The volume, in which the concerns of one author are taken up by others, advances current debate on two interconnected levels. First, it contains original and ground-breaking discussions of the questions raised above. At the same time, it contains a more reflexive strand of argument about the intellectual resources available to feminist thinkers, and the advantages and dangers of borrowing from non-feminist traditions of thought. It thus provides an exceptionally rich examination of contemporary legal and political feminist theory.

A succinct, clear, and accessible introduction to the role and place of law in modern society, this addition to the 'Clarendon Law Series' explores the idea that the legal system is a highly developed social system, which has a distinct character and structure, and which shapes and influences behaviour.

In almost every field of law,from tort and contract to environmental law and criminal justice, issues about 'risk' are increasingly of interest to lawyers. At the same time, there has been little general enquiry into the nature of the contact between law and risks. This book argues that ideas about risk have not traditionally been absent from law, as is sometimes supposed. Lawyers and legal theorists have used and conceptualised risk in particular ways, and ideas of risk have had significant influence in key elements of legal theory including questions of justice and responsibility. The book explores the conceptual place of risk across a number of fields of law; and identifies some significant challenges for law and legal theory arising from broader debates about risk. It therefore sheds light on areas that are under-explored despite current interest among lawyers, and aims to provide an accessible guide to emerging controversies and challenges for law in this area while explaining their significance.

The importance of the rule of law is universally recognised and of fundamental value for most societies. Establishing and promoting the rule of law in the Muslim world, particularly in the Middle East, North Africa, and Central Asia, has become a pressing but complicated issue. These states have Muslim majority populations, and the religion of Islam has an important role in the traditional structures of their societies. While the Muslim world is taking gradual steps towards the establishment of rule of law systems, most Muslim majority countries may not yet have effective legal systems with independent judiciaries, which would allow the state and institutions to be controlled by an effective rule of law system. One important aspect of the rule of law is freedom of expression. Given the sensitivity of Muslim societies in relation to their sacred beliefs, freedom of expression, as an international human rights issue, has raised some controversial cases. This book, drawing on both International and Islamic Law, explores the rule of law, and freedom of expression and its practical application in the Muslim world.

Clarence Thomas is one of the most vilified public figures of our day. To date, however, his legal philosophy has received only cursory treatment. First Principles provides a portrait of Thomas based not on the justice's caricatured reputation, but on his judicial opinions and votes, his scholarly writings, and his public speeches.

The paperback edition includes a provocative new Afterword by the author bringing the book up to date by assessing Justice Thomas's performance, and the reaction to his decisions, during the last five years.

Should judges in United States courts be permitted to cite foreign laws in their rulings? In this book Jeremy Waldron explores some ideas in jurisprudence and legal theory that could underlie the Supreme Court's occasional recourse to foreign law, especially in constitutional cases. He argues that every society is governed not only by its own laws but partly also by laws common to all mankind (ius gentium). But he takes the unique step of arguing that this common law is not natural law but a grounded consensus among all nations. The idea of such a consensus will become increasingly important in jurisprudence and public affairs as the world becomes more globalized.

The essays in this volume are all concerned with the arguments about law as a system of rule-based decision-making,particularly the ideas advanced by legal philosopher Frederick Schauer. Schauer's work has not only helped revive interest in legal formalism but has also helped relocate arguments about the relationship between posited rules and morality. The contributors to this volume, themselves distinguished theorists, have concentrated on three aspects of Schauer's work: the nature of jurisprudential description; his theory of presumptive positivism; and the application of his theory of rule-based decision-making to other areas of legal and moral thought. Contributors: Larry Alexander, Brian Bix, Philip Bobbitt, Marianne Constable, Michael C. Dorf, Jeremy Elkins, Claire Oakes Finkelstein, Leo Katz, Jason Johnston, Dennis Patterson.

Good governance, that is, effective government based on non-arbitrary decision-making, is central to a country's successful development or transition to a market-oriented economy. This Manual explores the critical relationship between law making and development. It aims to equip legislative drafters with the conceptual tools and specific techniques they need to draft laws likely to bring about the institutional transformation necessary for good governance. Designed as a practical aid for practitioners in the developing and transitional worlds, this work demonstrates how, within constitutional and other limits, a drafter should structure a bill, provides instruction in drafting amendments and subordinate legislation, and describes the skills required to write the clear, unambiguous and readily-interpreted provisions required to achieve a bill's policy objectives. It provides a model for a research report that, based on facts and logic, will justify the bill's detailed provisions and demonstrate that the responsible agency will implement them effectively. The final section focuses on drafting laws to facilitate government decision-making in accordance with the rule of law. In particular, it suggests devices for drafting defensively against corruption, thus providing the legislative environment essential for successful transition and development.

This book examines how the nation - and its (fundamental) law - are 'sensed' by way of various aesthetic forms from the age of revolution up until our age of contested democratic legitimacy. Contemporary democratic legitimacy is tied, among other things, to consent, to representation, to the identity of ruler and ruled, and, of course, to legality and the legal forms through which democracy is structured. This book expands the ways in which we can understand and appreciate democratic legitimacy. If (democratic) communities are "imagined" this book suggests that their "rightfulness" must be "sensed" - analogously to the need for justice not only to be done, but to be seen to be done. This book brings together legal, historical and philosophical perspectives on the representation and iconography of the nation in the European, North American and Australian contexts from contributors in law, political science, history, art history and philosophy.

This book is based on an international project conducted by the Institute for European Studies of the University CEU San Pablo in Madrid and a seminar on Vitoria and International Law which took place on July 2nd 2015 in the convent of San Esteban, the place where Vitoria spent his most productive years as Chair of Theology at the University of Salamanca. It argues that Vitoria not only lived at a time bridging the Middle Ages and Modernity, but also that his thoughts went beyond the times he lived in, giving us inspiration for meeting current challenges that could also be described as "modern" or even post-modern. There has been renewed interest in Francisco de Vitoria in the last few years, and he is now at the centre of a debate on such central international topics as political modernity, colonialism, the discovery of the "Other" and the legitimation of military interventions. All these subjects include Vitoria's contributions to the formation of the idea of modernity and modern international law. The book explores two concepts of modernity: one referring to the post-medieval ages and the other to our times. It discusses the connections between the challenges that the New World posed for XVIth century thinkers and those that we are currently facing, for example those related to the cyberworld. It also addresses the idea of international law and the legitimation of the use of force, two concepts that are at the core of Vitoria's texts, in the context of "modern" problems related to a multipolar world and the war against terrorism. This is not a historical book on Vitoria, but a very current one that argues the value of Vitoria's reflections for contemporary issues of international law.

This book discusses the question of whether legal interpretation is a scientific activity. The law's dependency on language, at least for the usual communication purposes, not only makes legal interpretation the main task performed by those whose work involves the law, but also an unavoidable step in the process of resolving a legal case. This task of decoding the words and sentences used by normative authorities while enacting norms, carried out in compliance with the principles and rules of the natural language adopted, is prone to all of the difficulties stemming from the uncertainty intrinsic to all linguistic conventions. In this context, seeking to determine whether legal interpretation can be scientific or, in other words, can comply with the requirements for scientific knowledge, becomes a central question. In fact, the coherent application of the law depends on a knowledge regarding the meaning of normative sentences that can be classified (at least) as being structured, systematically organized and tendentially objective. Accordingly, this book focuses on analyzing precisely these problems; its respective contributions offer a range of revealing perspectives on both the problems and their ramifications.

A philosophical system is not what one would expect to find in the work of a contemporary legal thinker. Robert Alexy's work counts as a striking exception. Over the past 28 years Alexy has been developing, with remarkable clarity and consistency, a systematic philosophy covering most of the key areas of legal philosophy. Kantian in its inspiration, his work admirably combines the rigour of analytical philosophy with a repertoire of humanitarian ideals reflecting the tradition of the Geisteswissenschaften, rendering it one of the most far-reaching and influential legal philosophies in our time. This volume has been designed with two foci in mind: the first is to reflect the breadth of Alexy's philosophical system, as well as the varieties of jurisprudential and philosophical scholarship in the last three decades on which his work has had an impact. The second objective is to provide for a critical exchange between Alexy and a number of specialists in the field, with an eye to identifying new areas of inquiry and offering a new impetus to the discourse theory of law. To that extent, it was thought that a critical exchange such as the one undertaken here would most appropriately reflect the discursive and critical character of Robert Alexy's work. The volume is divided into four parts, each dealing with a key area of Alexy's contribution. A final section brings together concise answers by Robert Alexy. In composing these, Alexy has tried to focus on points and criticisms that address new aspects of discourse theory or otherwise point the way to future developments and applications. With its range of topics of coverage, the number of specialists it engages and the originality of the answers it provides, this collection will become a standard work of reference for anyone working in legal theory in general and the discourse theory of law in particular.

This book describes the state of the art and future prospects of the most important bio-medicolegal subdisciplines in the post-genomic framework of personalized medicine. Focusing on the three main themes Innovation, Unitariness and Evidence, the book addresses a wide range of topics, including: Bio-Medicolegal and Criminological Sciences, Forensic Pathology and Anthropology, Clinical and Forensic Medicine in Living Persons (from Interpersonal Violence to Personal Injury and Damage, Malpractice, Personal Identification and Age Estimation), Forensic Genetics and Genomics, and Toxicology and Imaging. The unitariness of the "Bio-Medicolegal Sciences", historically founded on the accuracy and rigor of the methods of ascertainment and criteria of evaluation, should be re-established on the basis of molecular evidence, and used to promote Personalized Justice. Taken together, the book's conclusions and future perspectives outline a vision of transdisciplinary innovation and future evidence in the framework of personalized justice.

Gideon Yaffe presents a ground-breaking work which demonstrates the importance of philosophy of action for the law. Many people are serving sentences not for completing crimes, but for trying to. So the law governing attempted crimes is of practical as well as theoretical importance. Questions arising in the adjudication of attempts intersect with questions in the philosophy of action, such as what intention a person must have, if any, and what a person must do, if anything, to be trying to act. Yaffe offers solutions to the difficult problems courts face in the adjudication of attempted crimes. He argues that the problems courts face admit of principled solution through reflection either on what it is to try to do something; or on what evidence is required for someone to be shown to have tried to do something; or on what sentence for an attempt is fair given the close relation between attempts and completions. The book argues that to try to do something is to be committed by one's intention to each of the components of success and to be guided by those commitments. Recognizing the implications of this simple and plausible position helps us to identify principled grounds on which the courts ought to distinguish between defendants charged with attempted crimes.

AN IMPORTANT BRANCH OF EUROPEAN CIVIL LAW. Origianlly published: Grahamstown, Cape Colony: African Book Co., 1908. iv (new introduction), xv, 791 pp. With a New Introduction by Michael Hoeflich, John H. & John M. Kane Professor of Law, University of Kansas School of Law. Roman-Dutch law is a hybrid of medieval Dutch law, mainly Germanic in origin, and Roman law as defined by the Corpus Juris Civilis and its later reception. It was developed in Holland during the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Bynkershoek, Damhouder, Grotius and other Roman-Dutch jurists had a profound influence on the development of European civil law and were the primary source of civil-law study in America. The Dutch brought it to their colonies, most notably South Africa and Indonesia, and it became the basis of their post-colonial legal systems. This engagingly written history offers a thorough analysis of Roman-Dutch jurisprudence and its intellectual background. Wessels devotes a great deal of attention to its literature, and he analyzes several treatises at length. Valuable as an introduction to one of the most important legal systems in history, it is equally useful as a reference.
"On the whole, the work is deserving of high praise, both for its learning and its literary quality. It will prove a most illuminating adjunct to the standard authorities on this system of law." --JAMES MACKINTOSH, Juridical Review 20 (1908-1909) 370.
JOHANNES WILHELMUS WESSELS 1862-1936] was a judge of the Transvaal Supreme Court. His works include The Status of the Uitlander (1894), Codification of Law in South Africa (1927) and The Law of Contract in South Africa (1937).
MICHAEL H. HOEFLICH is the John H. & John M. Kane Professor of Law at the University of Kansas School of Law. He is the author of numerous books including Roman and Civil Law and the Development of Anglo-American Jurisprudence (1997), Legal Publishing in Antebellum America (2010), Sources of the History of the American Law of Lawyering (2007) and The Law in Postcards and Ephemera 1890-1962 (2012), the latter two published by The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd.

For most Americans, habeas corpus is the cornerstone of our legal system: the principal constitutional check on arbitrary government power, allowing an arrested person to challenge the legality of his detention. In a study that could not be more timely, Justin Wert reexamines this essential individual right and shows that habeas corpus is not necessarily the check that we've assumed. Habeas corpus, it emerges, is as much a tool of politics as it is of law.
In this first study of habeas corpus in an American political context, Wert shifts our collective emphasis from the judicial to the political-toward the changes in the writ influenced by Congress, the president, political parties, state governments, legal academics, and even interest groups. By doing so, he reveals how political regimes have used habeas corpus both to undo the legacies of their predecessors and to establish and enforce their own vision of constitutional governance.

Tracing the history of the writ from the Founding to Hamdi v. Rumsfeld and Boumediene v. Bush, Wert illuminates crucial developmental moments in its evolution. He demonstrates that during the antebellum period, Reconstruction, Gilded Age, Great Society, and the ongoing war on terrorism, habeas corpus has waxed and waned in harmony with the interests of majoritarian politics. Along the way, Wert identifies and explains the political context of fine points of law that many political scientists and historians may not be aware of-such as the exhaustion rule requiring that a federal habeas participant must first exhaust all possible claims for relief in state court, a maneuver by which the post-Reconstruction Court abandoned supervision of race relations in the South.

Especially in light of the new scrutiny of habeas corpus prompted by the Guantnamo detainees, Wert's book is essential for broadening our understanding of how law and politics continue to intersect after 9/11. Brimming with fresh insights into constitutional development and regime theory, it shows that the Great Writ of Liberty may not be so great as we have supposed--because while it has the potential to enforce conceptions of rights that are consistent with the best ideals of American politics, it also has the potential to enforce its worst aspects as well.

The rule of law paradigm has long operated on the premise that independent judges disregard extralegal influences and impartially uphold the law. A political transformation several generations in the making, however, has imperiled this premise. Social science learning, the lessons of which have been widely internalized by court critics and the general public, has shown that judicial decision-making is subject to ideological and other extralegal influences. In recent decades, challenges to the assumptions underlying the rule of law paradigm have proliferated across a growing array of venues, as critics agitate for greater political control of judges and courts. With the future of the rule of law paradigm in jeopardy, this book proposes a new way of looking at how the role of the American judiciary should be conceptualized and regulated. This new, "legal culture paradigm" defends the need for an independent judiciary that is acculturated to take law seriously but is subject to political and other extralegal influences. The book argues that these extralegal influences cannot be eliminated but can be managed, by balancing the needs for judicial independence and accountability across competing perspectives, to the end of enabling judges to follow the "law" (less rigidly conceived), respect established legal process, and administer justice.

The two sections of this volume present theoretical developments and practical applicative papers respectively. Theoretical papers cover topics such as intercultural pragmatics, evolutionism, argumentation theory, pragmatics and law, the semantics/pragmatics debate, slurs, and more. The applied papers focus on topics such as pragmatic disorders, mapping places of origin, stance-taking, societal pragmatics, and cultural linguistics. This is the second volume of invited papers that were presented at the inaugural Pragmasofia conference in Palermo in 2016, and like its predecessor presents papers by well-known philosophers, linguists, and a semiotician. The papers present a wide variety of perspectives independent from any one school of thought.

This volume is the second part of a project which hosts an interdisciplinary discussion about the relationship among law and language, legal practice and ordinary conversation, legal philosophy and the linguistics sciences. An international group of authors, from cognitive science, philosophy of language and philosophy of law question about how legal theory and pragmatics can enrich each other. In particular, the first part is devoted to the analysis of how pragmatics can solve problems related to legal theory: What can pragmatics teach about the concept of law and its relationship with moral, and, in particular, about the eternal dispute between legal positivism and legal naturalism? What can pragmatics teach about the concept of law and/or legal disagreements? The second part is focused on legal adjudication: it aims to construct a pragmatic apparatus appropriate to legal trial and/or to test the tenure of the traditional pragmatics tools in the field. The authors face questions such as: Which interesting pragmatic features emerge from legal adjudication? What pragmatic theories are better suited to account for the practice of judgment or its particular aspects (such as the testimony or the binding force of legal precedents)? Which pragmatic and socio-linguistic problems are highlighted by this practice?

If Raz and Dworkin disagree over how law should be characterised,how are we, their jurisprudential public, supposed to go about adjudicating between the rival theories which they offer us? To what considerations would those theorists themselves appeal in order to convince us that their accounts of law are accurate and successful? Moreover, what is it that makes an account of law successful? Evaluation and Legal Theory tackles methodological or meta-theoretical issues such as these, and does so via attempting to answer the question: to what extent, and in what sense, must a legal theorist make value judgements about his data in order to construct a successful theory of law? Dispelling the obfuscatory myth that legal positivism seeks a 'value-free' account of law, the author attempts to explain and defend Joseph Raz's position that evaluation is essential to successful legal theory, whilst refuting John Finnis and Ronald Dworkin's contentions that the legal theorist must morally evaluate and morally justify the law in order to properly explain its nature. The book does not claim to solve the many mysteries of meta-legal theory but does seek to contribute to and engender rigorous and focused debate on this topic.