This book discusses the question of whether legal interpretation is a scientific activity. The law's dependency on language, at least for the usual communication purposes, not only makes legal interpretation the main task performed by those whose work involves the law, but also an unavoidable step in the process of resolving a legal case. This task of decoding the words and sentences used by normative authorities while enacting norms, carried out in compliance with the principles and rules of the natural language adopted, is prone to all of the difficulties stemming from the uncertainty intrinsic to all linguistic conventions. In this context, seeking to determine whether legal interpretation can be scientific or, in other words, can comply with the requirements for scientific knowledge, becomes a central question. In fact, the coherent application of the law depends on a knowledge regarding the meaning of normative sentences that can be classified (at least) as being structured, systematically organized and tendentially objective. Accordingly, this book focuses on analyzing precisely these problems; its respective contributions offer a range of revealing perspectives on both the problems and their ramifications.

A philosophical system is not what one would expect to find in the work of a contemporary legal thinker. Robert Alexy's work counts as a striking exception. Over the past 28 years Alexy has been developing, with remarkable clarity and consistency, a systematic philosophy covering most of the key areas of legal philosophy. Kantian in its inspiration, his work admirably combines the rigour of analytical philosophy with a repertoire of humanitarian ideals reflecting the tradition of the Geisteswissenschaften, rendering it one of the most far-reaching and influential legal philosophies in our time. This volume has been designed with two foci in mind: the first is to reflect the breadth of Alexy's philosophical system, as well as the varieties of jurisprudential and philosophical scholarship in the last three decades on which his work has had an impact. The second objective is to provide for a critical exchange between Alexy and a number of specialists in the field, with an eye to identifying new areas of inquiry and offering a new impetus to the discourse theory of law. To that extent, it was thought that a critical exchange such as the one undertaken here would most appropriately reflect the discursive and critical character of Robert Alexy's work. The volume is divided into four parts, each dealing with a key area of Alexy's contribution. A final section brings together concise answers by Robert Alexy. In composing these, Alexy has tried to focus on points and criticisms that address new aspects of discourse theory or otherwise point the way to future developments and applications. With its range of topics of coverage, the number of specialists it engages and the originality of the answers it provides, this collection will become a standard work of reference for anyone working in legal theory in general and the discourse theory of law in particular.

This book describes the state of the art and future prospects of the most important bio-medicolegal subdisciplines in the post-genomic framework of personalized medicine. Focusing on the three main themes Innovation, Unitariness and Evidence, the book addresses a wide range of topics, including: Bio-Medicolegal and Criminological Sciences, Forensic Pathology and Anthropology, Clinical and Forensic Medicine in Living Persons (from Interpersonal Violence to Personal Injury and Damage, Malpractice, Personal Identification and Age Estimation), Forensic Genetics and Genomics, and Toxicology and Imaging. The unitariness of the "Bio-Medicolegal Sciences", historically founded on the accuracy and rigor of the methods of ascertainment and criteria of evaluation, should be re-established on the basis of molecular evidence, and used to promote Personalized Justice. Taken together, the book's conclusions and future perspectives outline a vision of transdisciplinary innovation and future evidence in the framework of personalized justice.

Gideon Yaffe presents a ground-breaking work which demonstrates the importance of philosophy of action for the law. Many people are serving sentences not for completing crimes, but for trying to. So the law governing attempted crimes is of practical as well as theoretical importance. Questions arising in the adjudication of attempts intersect with questions in the philosophy of action, such as what intention a person must have, if any, and what a person must do, if anything, to be trying to act. Yaffe offers solutions to the difficult problems courts face in the adjudication of attempted crimes. He argues that the problems courts face admit of principled solution through reflection either on what it is to try to do something; or on what evidence is required for someone to be shown to have tried to do something; or on what sentence for an attempt is fair given the close relation between attempts and completions. The book argues that to try to do something is to be committed by one's intention to each of the components of success and to be guided by those commitments. Recognizing the implications of this simple and plausible position helps us to identify principled grounds on which the courts ought to distinguish between defendants charged with attempted crimes.

For most Americans, habeas corpus is the cornerstone of our legal system: the principal constitutional check on arbitrary government power, allowing an arrested person to challenge the legality of his detention. In a study that could not be more timely, Justin Wert reexamines this essential individual right and shows that habeas corpus is not necessarily the check that we've assumed. Habeas corpus, it emerges, is as much a tool of politics as it is of law.
In this first study of habeas corpus in an American political context, Wert shifts our collective emphasis from the judicial to the political-toward the changes in the writ influenced by Congress, the president, political parties, state governments, legal academics, and even interest groups. By doing so, he reveals how political regimes have used habeas corpus both to undo the legacies of their predecessors and to establish and enforce their own vision of constitutional governance.

Tracing the history of the writ from the Founding to Hamdi v. Rumsfeld and Boumediene v. Bush, Wert illuminates crucial developmental moments in its evolution. He demonstrates that during the antebellum period, Reconstruction, Gilded Age, Great Society, and the ongoing war on terrorism, habeas corpus has waxed and waned in harmony with the interests of majoritarian politics. Along the way, Wert identifies and explains the political context of fine points of law that many political scientists and historians may not be aware of-such as the exhaustion rule requiring that a federal habeas participant must first exhaust all possible claims for relief in state court, a maneuver by which the post-Reconstruction Court abandoned supervision of race relations in the South.

Especially in light of the new scrutiny of habeas corpus prompted by the Guantnamo detainees, Wert's book is essential for broadening our understanding of how law and politics continue to intersect after 9/11. Brimming with fresh insights into constitutional development and regime theory, it shows that the Great Writ of Liberty may not be so great as we have supposed--because while it has the potential to enforce conceptions of rights that are consistent with the best ideals of American politics, it also has the potential to enforce its worst aspects as well.

The rule of law paradigm has long operated on the premise that independent judges disregard extralegal influences and impartially uphold the law. A political transformation several generations in the making, however, has imperiled this premise. Social science learning, the lessons of which have been widely internalized by court critics and the general public, has shown that judicial decision-making is subject to ideological and other extralegal influences. In recent decades, challenges to the assumptions underlying the rule of law paradigm have proliferated across a growing array of venues, as critics agitate for greater political control of judges and courts. With the future of the rule of law paradigm in jeopardy, this book proposes a new way of looking at how the role of the American judiciary should be conceptualized and regulated. This new, "legal culture paradigm" defends the need for an independent judiciary that is acculturated to take law seriously but is subject to political and other extralegal influences. The book argues that these extralegal influences cannot be eliminated but can be managed, by balancing the needs for judicial independence and accountability across competing perspectives, to the end of enabling judges to follow the "law" (less rigidly conceived), respect established legal process, and administer justice.

The two sections of this volume present theoretical developments and practical applicative papers respectively. Theoretical papers cover topics such as intercultural pragmatics, evolutionism, argumentation theory, pragmatics and law, the semantics/pragmatics debate, slurs, and more. The applied papers focus on topics such as pragmatic disorders, mapping places of origin, stance-taking, societal pragmatics, and cultural linguistics. This is the second volume of invited papers that were presented at the inaugural Pragmasofia conference in Palermo in 2016, and like its predecessor presents papers by well-known philosophers, linguists, and a semiotician. The papers present a wide variety of perspectives independent from any one school of thought.

This volume is the second part of a project which hosts an interdisciplinary discussion about the relationship among law and language, legal practice and ordinary conversation, legal philosophy and the linguistics sciences. An international group of authors, from cognitive science, philosophy of language and philosophy of law question about how legal theory and pragmatics can enrich each other. In particular, the first part is devoted to the analysis of how pragmatics can solve problems related to legal theory: What can pragmatics teach about the concept of law and its relationship with moral, and, in particular, about the eternal dispute between legal positivism and legal naturalism? What can pragmatics teach about the concept of law and/or legal disagreements? The second part is focused on legal adjudication: it aims to construct a pragmatic apparatus appropriate to legal trial and/or to test the tenure of the traditional pragmatics tools in the field. The authors face questions such as: Which interesting pragmatic features emerge from legal adjudication? What pragmatic theories are better suited to account for the practice of judgment or its particular aspects (such as the testimony or the binding force of legal precedents)? Which pragmatic and socio-linguistic problems are highlighted by this practice?

If Raz and Dworkin disagree over how law should be characterised,how are we, their jurisprudential public, supposed to go about adjudicating between the rival theories which they offer us? To what considerations would those theorists themselves appeal in order to convince us that their accounts of law are accurate and successful? Moreover, what is it that makes an account of law successful? Evaluation and Legal Theory tackles methodological or meta-theoretical issues such as these, and does so via attempting to answer the question: to what extent, and in what sense, must a legal theorist make value judgements about his data in order to construct a successful theory of law? Dispelling the obfuscatory myth that legal positivism seeks a 'value-free' account of law, the author attempts to explain and defend Joseph Raz's position that evaluation is essential to successful legal theory, whilst refuting John Finnis and Ronald Dworkin's contentions that the legal theorist must morally evaluate and morally justify the law in order to properly explain its nature. The book does not claim to solve the many mysteries of meta-legal theory but does seek to contribute to and engender rigorous and focused debate on this topic.

The first attempt to address comparative property law in a common integrative framework, this study discusses German, Italian, French, American, and British property law as mere variations based upon a few fundamental themes through which these nations developed legal systems to provide responses to common economic problems and to set legal foundations for working markets. "Basic Principles of Property LaW" was produced to offer a common framework for the discussion of the law of property within countries in transition, thus it has its basis, not on just one legal system, but on the institutional commonalties that make western property law a working market institution. It offers a major challenge to conventional thinking that in property law the differences between common law and civil law are so important that common core research is impossible.

Mattei hopes to guide the reader to think comparatively about property by shedding many preconceived formalistic abstractions. The substance of property law, he argues, is much more common throughout the Western legal tradition than legal scholars would have us believe. Through a set format and accessible writing, this book looks at national legal traditions as responses to common economic problems. It sets the foundations for further much needed integrative comparative legal research in the domain of property law.

This book defines the characteristics of a new discipline that is both legal and scientific: user-friendly legal science.Focusing on how legal tools and practices can be used to achieve objectives in different contexts, it offers an alternative to doctrinal research, law-and-something disciplines, and the traditional interdisciplinary approach.The book not only defines the new discipline's research approach, point of view, theory-building, and research methods, it also shows how it relates to other scientific disciplines and how existing doctrinal legal disciplines can be upgraded into scientific disciplines.

John Austin was a towering presence in nineteenth-century English jurisprudence. He lived at the centre of the utilitarian movement in London during the 1820s and 1830s, and became its leading philosopher of law after Bentham's death (1832). Wilfrid E. Rumble's book analyzes Austin's work in its historical context, and shows how much of it remains viable today -- including his conception of analytical jurisprudence, his sharp distinction between law and morality, and his utilitarian theory of resistance to government. The end result is a richer, more nuanced portrait of Austin's legal philosophy than his twentieth-century critics have painted. Doing Austin Justice thus fills a large gap in the literature about this important figure. It will be of substantial interest to jurists, historians of political philosophy, and of the nineteenth century more generally.

It has become increasingly difficult to speak or even think social or legal justice in an age when words have left their moorings. Perhaps images are more stable than words; maybe images and imagery possess a certain viscosity,even a sensory quality, which prevents them from evaporating. This 'maybe' is what this book is about. The contributors to this collection explore the issue of how the Imaginary (images, imagery, imagination) has a role in the production and reproduction of 'visions' of legal and social justice. It argues that 'visions' of justice are inevitably bounded. Boundaries of 'visions' of justice, however, are also 'imaginary'. They emerge within imaginary spaces, and, as they are 'imaginary', they are inherently unstable. The book captures an emerging interest (in the humanities and social sciences) in images and the visual, or the Imaginary more broadly. This collection will appeal to scholars and students of social and legal theory, visual culture, justice and governance studies, media studies, and criminology.

This collection is the multifaceted result of an effort to learn from those who have been educated in an American law school and who then returned to their home countries to apply the lessons of that experience in nations experiencing social, economic, governmental, and legal transition. Written by an international group of scholars and practitioners, this work provides a unique insight into the ways in which legal education impacts the legal system in the recipient's home country, addressing such topics as efforts to influence the current style of legal education in a country and the resistance faced from entrenched senior faculty and the use of U.S. legal education methods in government and private legal practice. This book will be of significant interest not only to legal educators in the United States and internationally, and to administrators of legal education policy and reform, but also to scholars seeking a more in-depth understanding of the connections between legal education and socio-political change.

Does justice require that individuals get what they deserve? Serena Olsaretti brings together new essays by leading moral and political philosophers examining the relation between desert and justice; they also illuminate the nature of distributive justice, and the relationship between desert and other values, such as equality and responsibility.

This book offers a first rate selection of academic articles on Latin American bioethics. It covers different issues, such as vulnerability, abortion, biomedical research with human subjects, environment, exploitation, commodification, reproductive medicine, among others. Latin American bioethics has been, to an important extent, parochial and unable to meet stringent international standards of rational philosophical discussion. The new generations of bioethicists are changing this situation, and this book demonstrates that change. All articles are written from the perspective of Latin American scholars from several disciplines such as philosophy and law. Working with the tools of analytical philosophy and jurisprudence, this book defends views with rational argument, and opening for pluralistic discussion.

Tackling important philosophical questions on modernity - what it is, where it begins and when it ends - Przemyslaw Tacik challenges the idea that modernity marks a particular epoch, and historicises its conception to offer a radical critique of it. His deconstruction-informed critique collects and assesses reflections on modernity from major philosophers including Hegel, Heidegger, Lacan, Arendt, Agamben, and Zizek. This analysis progresses a new understanding of modernity intrinsically connected to the growth of sovereignty as an organising principle of contemporary life. He argues that it is the idea of 'modernity', as a taken-for-granted era, which is positioned as the essential condition for making linear history possible, when it should instead be history, in and of itself, which dictates the existence of a particular period. Using Hegel's notion of 'spirit' to trace the importance of sovereignty to the conception of the modern epoch within German idealism, Tacik traces Hegel's influence on Heidegger through reference to the 'star' in his late philosophy which represents the hope of overcoming the metaphysical poverty of modernity. This line of thought reveals the necessity of a paradigm shift in our understanding of modernity that speaks to contemporary continental philosophy, theories of modernity, political theory, and critical re-assessments of Marxism.

This book adds impetus to the nexus between human rights, human rights education and material reality. The dissonance between these aspects is of growing concern for most human rights educators in various social contexts. The first part of the book opens up new discourses and presents new ontologies and epistemologies from scholars in human rights, human rights education and human rights literacies to critique and/or justify the understandings of human rights' complex applications. Today's rapidly changing social contexts and new languages attempting to understand ongoing dehumanization and violations, put enormous pressure on higher education, educators, individuals working in social sciences, policy makers and scholars engaged in curricula making.The second part demonstrates how global interactions between citizens from different countries with diverse understandings of human rights (from developed and developing democracies) question the link between human rights and it's in(ex)clusive Western philosophies. Continuing inhumane actions around the globe reflect the failure of human rights law and human rights education in schools, higher education and society at large. The book shows that human rights education is no longer a blueprint for understanding human rights and its universal or contextual values presented for multicomplexial societies. The final chapters argue for new ontologies and epistemologies of human rights, human rights education and human rights literacies to open-up difficult conversations and to give space to dissonant and disruptive discourses. The many opportunities for human rights education and literacies lies in these conversations.

As society struggles to cope with the many repercussions of assisted life and death, the evening news is filled with stories of legal battles over frozen embryos and the possible prosecution of doctors for their patients' suicide. Using an "institutional" approach as an alternative to the prevailing "rights" based analysis of problems in law and medicine, this study explains why society should resist the tendency to look to science and law for a resolution of intimate matters, such as how our children are born and how we die. Palmer's institutional approach demonstrates that legislative analysis is often more important than judicial analysis when it comes to issues raised by new reproductive technologies and physician-assisted suicide. A reliance on individual rights alone for answers to the complex ethical questions that result from society's faith in scientific progress and science's close alliance with medicine will be insufficient and ill-advised. Palmer predicts that the key role of the family as a societal institution will mean that questions of assisted reproduction will be resolved more in response to market forces than through legal intervention. However, he does support a strong role for legislatures in decisions involving the physicians' role in our deaths. These findings are based on the differing views of the Supreme Court justices in these matters: a tendency to protect family formation from state interference (as in abortion decisions), but support of a legislative obligation to control medicine (assisted suicide). According to Palmer, recent Supreme Court decisions on physician assisted suicide usher in a new era in how legal institutions will resolve biomedical dilemmas.

The received view on the nature of legal authority contains the idea that a sound account of legitimate authority will explain how a legal authority has a right to command and the addressee a duty to obey. The received view fails to explain, however, how legal authority truly operates upon human beings as rational creatures with specific psychological makeups. This book takes a bottom-up approach, beginning at the microscopic level of agency and practical reason and leading to the justificatory framework of authority. The book argues that an understanding of the nature of legal normativity involves an understanding of the nature and structure of practical reason in the context of the law, and advances the idea that legal authority and normativity are intertwined. This point can be summarised thus: if we are able to understand both how the agent exercises his or her practical reason under legal directives and commands and how the agent engages his or her practical reason by following legal rules grounded on reasons for actions as good-making characteristics, then we can fully grasp the nature of legal authority and legal normativity. Using the philosophies of action enshrined in the works of Elisabeth Anscombe, Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, the study explains practical reason as diachronic future-directed intention in action and argues that this conception illuminates the structure of practical reason of the legal rules' addressees. The account is comprehensive and enables us to distinguish authoritative and normative legal rules in just and good legal systems from 'apparent' authoritative and normative legal rules of evil legal systems. At the heart of the book is the methodological view of a 'practical turn' to elucidate the nature of legal normativity and authority.

Read the Introduction.

Culture is the lens through which we make sense of the world. In any conflict, from petty disputes to wars between nation-states, the players invariably view that conflict through the filter of their own cultural experiences. This innovative volume prompts us to pause and think through our most fundamental assumptions about how conflict arises and how it is resolved.

Even as certain culturally based disputes, such as the high-profile cases in which an immigrant engages in conduct considered normal in the homeland but which is explicitly illegal in his/her new country, enter public consciousness, many of the most basic intersections of culture and conflict remain unexamined. How are some processes cultured, gendered, or racialized? In what ways do certain groups and cultures define such concepts as "justice" and "fairness" differently? Do women and men perceive events in similar fashion, use different reasoning, or emphasize disparate values and goals?

Spanning a wide array of disciplines, from anthropology and psychology to law and business, and culling dozens of intriguing essays, The Culture and Conflict Reader is edited for maximum pedagogical usefulness and represents a bedrock text for anyone interested in conflict and dispute resolution.

Contributors include: Kevin Avruch, Peter W. Black, Jeffrey Z. Rubin, Frank E. A. Sander, John Paul Lederach, Heather Forest,"" Sara Cobb, Janet Rifkin, Ryunosuke Akutagawa, Laura Nader, Pat Chew, Stella Ting-Toomey, Harry C. Triandis, Christopher McCusker, C. Harry Hui, Anita Taylor, Judi Beinstein Miller, Carol Gilligan, Trina Grillo, James W. Grosch, Karen G. Duffy, Paul V. Olczak, Michele Hermann, MarthaChamallas, Loraleigh Keashly, Phil Zuckerman, Tracy E. Higgins, Howard Gadlin, Janie Victoria Ward, Kyeyoung Park, Taunya Lovell Banks, Margaret Read MacDonald, Mary Patrice Erdmans, Manu Aluli Meyer, Doriane Lambelet Coleman, Bruce D. Bonta, Paul E. Salem, Mohammed Abu-Nimer, Marc H. Ross, Z.D. Gurevitch, Mari J. Matsuda, Charles R. Lawrence III, Hsien Chin Hu, Glenn R. Butterton, Walter Otto Weyrauch, Maureen Anne Bell, Martti Gronfors, Thomas Donaldson, Marjorie Shostak, and Heather Forest.

This insightful research review provides analysis of the most important contemporary work by experts in the economic analysis of legal reasoning and interpretation. It explores a wide range of topics in the field, from constitutional to statutory interpretation, precedent and the interpretation of contracts. The articles discussed raise key questions concerning the optimal construction of institutions, the best approach to judicial decision-making, and the best strategies for statutory and contract drafting. This fascinating review will be valuable to academics interested in legal reasoning, economic analysis and legal philosophy.