Legal Philosophy offers an engaging introduction to the most important themes shared by law and philosophy. It examines the key concepts that characterise what law tries, or ought to try to do, providing analysis of what leading thinkers and theorists from varying, often conflicting, schools of thought have contributed to our understanding of them. It examines concepts central to law, such as "person," "good," "right," "rules," and "justice" and, by taking this approach, aims to develop your students' skills around questioning and reasoning.

Good governance, that is, effective government based on non-arbitrary decision-making, is central to a country's successful development or transition to a market-oriented economy. This Manual explores the critical relationship between law making and development. It aims to equip legislative drafters with the conceptual tools and specific techniques they need to draft laws likely to bring about the institutional transformation necessary for good governance. Designed as a practical aid for practitioners in the developing and transitional worlds, this work demonstrates how, within constitutional and other limits, a drafter should structure a bill, provides instruction in drafting amendments and subordinate legislation, and describes the skills required to write the clear, unambiguous and readily-interpreted provisions required to achieve a bill's policy objectives. It provides a model for a research report that, based on facts and logic, will justify the bill's detailed provisions and demonstrate that the responsible agency will implement them effectively. The final section focuses on drafting laws to facilitate government decision-making in accordance with the rule of law. In particular, it suggests devices for drafting defensively against corruption, thus providing the legislative environment essential for successful transition and development.

Inspired by Antonio Truyol Y Serra's classic work, Doctrines sur le fondement du Droit des gens, this book offers a fully revised and updated examination and discussion of the various doctrines forming the foundations of international law. It offers an accessible insight into the theoretical background of the various legal constructions that characterize the relationship between both international and national legal orders. Written in a clear style, the book's structured chapters provide a comprehensive analysis of the various foundations of obligation in international law: natural law, positivism and sociologism. Through this study, Robert Kolb illustrates how international law has been conceived and shaped over time in relation to its evolving historical and legal-political environment. Split into seven substantive parts, this text is one of the most detailed expositions of the doctrines of international law in the English language to date. Astute and engaging, Robert Kolb's take on Truyol y Serra's Doctrines sur le fondement du Droit des gens will appeal to students and scholars of international law, as well as to practitioners interested in gaining a further grounding with regards to the basis of obligation in international law.

This book describes the state of the art and future prospects of the most important bio-medicolegal subdisciplines in the post-genomic framework of personalized medicine. Focusing on the three main themes Innovation, Unitariness and Evidence, the book addresses a wide range of topics, including: Bio-Medicolegal and Criminological Sciences, Forensic Pathology and Anthropology, Clinical and Forensic Medicine in Living Persons (from Interpersonal Violence to Personal Injury and Damage, Malpractice, Personal Identification and Age Estimation), Forensic Genetics and Genomics, and Toxicology and Imaging. The unitariness of the "Bio-Medicolegal Sciences", historically founded on the accuracy and rigor of the methods of ascertainment and criteria of evaluation, should be re-established on the basis of molecular evidence, and used to promote Personalized Justice. Taken together, the book's conclusions and future perspectives outline a vision of transdisciplinary innovation and future evidence in the framework of personalized justice.

Property, or property rights, remains one of the most central elements in moral, legal, and political thought. It figures centrally in the work of figures as various as Grotius, Locke, Hume, Smith, Hegel and Kant. This collection of essays brings fresh perspective on property theory, from both legal and political theoretical perspectives, and is essential reading for anyone interested in the nature of property. Edited by two of the world's leading theorists of property, James Penner and Michael Otsuka, this volume brings together essays which consider, amongst other topics, property and public law, the importance of legal forms in property theory, whether use or exclusion are most essential to our understanding of property, distributive justice, Lockean and Grotian theories, the common ownership of the Earth, and Confucian ideas of property.

This book is based on an international project conducted by the Institute for European Studies of the University CEU San Pablo in Madrid and a seminar on Vitoria and International Law which took place on July 2nd 2015 in the convent of San Esteban, the place where Vitoria spent his most productive years as Chair of Theology at the University of Salamanca. It argues that Vitoria not only lived at a time bridging the Middle Ages and Modernity, but also that his thoughts went beyond the times he lived in, giving us inspiration for meeting current challenges that could also be described as "modern" or even post-modern. There has been renewed interest in Francisco de Vitoria in the last few years, and he is now at the centre of a debate on such central international topics as political modernity, colonialism, the discovery of the "Other" and the legitimation of military interventions. All these subjects include Vitoria's contributions to the formation of the idea of modernity and modern international law. The book explores two concepts of modernity: one referring to the post-medieval ages and the other to our times. It discusses the connections between the challenges that the New World posed for XVIth century thinkers and those that we are currently facing, for example those related to the cyberworld. It also addresses the idea of international law and the legitimation of the use of force, two concepts that are at the core of Vitoria's texts, in the context of "modern" problems related to a multipolar world and the war against terrorism. This is not a historical book on Vitoria, but a very current one that argues the value of Vitoria's reflections for contemporary issues of international law.

Gideon Yaffe presents a ground-breaking work which demonstrates the importance of philosophy of action for the law. Many people are serving sentences not for completing crimes, but for trying to. So the law governing attempted crimes is of practical as well as theoretical importance. Questions arising in the adjudication of attempts intersect with questions in the philosophy of action, such as what intention a person must have, if any, and what a person must do, if anything, to be trying to act. Yaffe offers solutions to the difficult problems courts face in the adjudication of attempted crimes. He argues that the problems courts face admit of principled solution through reflection either on what it is to try to do something; or on what evidence is required for someone to be shown to have tried to do something; or on what sentence for an attempt is fair given the close relation between attempts and completions. The book argues that to try to do something is to be committed by one's intention to each of the components of success and to be guided by those commitments. Recognizing the implications of this simple and plausible position helps us to identify principled grounds on which the courts ought to distinguish between defendants charged with attempted crimes.

AN IMPORTANT BRANCH OF EUROPEAN CIVIL LAW. Origianlly published: Grahamstown, Cape Colony: African Book Co., 1908. iv (new introduction), xv, 791 pp. With a New Introduction by Michael Hoeflich, John H. & John M. Kane Professor of Law, University of Kansas School of Law. Roman-Dutch law is a hybrid of medieval Dutch law, mainly Germanic in origin, and Roman law as defined by the Corpus Juris Civilis and its later reception. It was developed in Holland during the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Bynkershoek, Damhouder, Grotius and other Roman-Dutch jurists had a profound influence on the development of European civil law and were the primary source of civil-law study in America. The Dutch brought it to their colonies, most notably South Africa and Indonesia, and it became the basis of their post-colonial legal systems. This engagingly written history offers a thorough analysis of Roman-Dutch jurisprudence and its intellectual background. Wessels devotes a great deal of attention to its literature, and he analyzes several treatises at length. Valuable as an introduction to one of the most important legal systems in history, it is equally useful as a reference.
"On the whole, the work is deserving of high praise, both for its learning and its literary quality. It will prove a most illuminating adjunct to the standard authorities on this system of law." --JAMES MACKINTOSH, Juridical Review 20 (1908-1909) 370.
JOHANNES WILHELMUS WESSELS 1862-1936] was a judge of the Transvaal Supreme Court. His works include The Status of the Uitlander (1894), Codification of Law in South Africa (1927) and The Law of Contract in South Africa (1937).
MICHAEL H. HOEFLICH is the John H. & John M. Kane Professor of Law at the University of Kansas School of Law. He is the author of numerous books including Roman and Civil Law and the Development of Anglo-American Jurisprudence (1997), Legal Publishing in Antebellum America (2010), Sources of the History of the American Law of Lawyering (2007) and The Law in Postcards and Ephemera 1890-1962 (2012), the latter two published by The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd.

This book discusses the question of whether legal interpretation is a scientific activity. The law's dependency on language, at least for the usual communication purposes, not only makes legal interpretation the main task performed by those whose work involves the law, but also an unavoidable step in the process of resolving a legal case. This task of decoding the words and sentences used by normative authorities while enacting norms, carried out in compliance with the principles and rules of the natural language adopted, is prone to all of the difficulties stemming from the uncertainty intrinsic to all linguistic conventions. In this context, seeking to determine whether legal interpretation can be scientific or, in other words, can comply with the requirements for scientific knowledge, becomes a central question. In fact, the coherent application of the law depends on a knowledge regarding the meaning of normative sentences that can be classified (at least) as being structured, systematically organized and tendentially objective. Accordingly, this book focuses on analyzing precisely these problems; its respective contributions offer a range of revealing perspectives on both the problems and their ramifications.

Christopher Bennett presents a theory of punishment grounded in the practice of apology, and in particular in reactions such as feeling sorry and making amends. He argues that offenders have a 'right to be punished' - that it is part of taking an offender seriously as a member of a normatively demanding relationship (such as friendship or collegiality or citizenship) that she is subject to retributive attitudes when she violates the demands of that relationship. However, while he claims that punishment and the retributive attitudes are the necessary expression of moral condemnation, his account of these reactions has more in common with restorative justice than traditional retributivism. He argues that the most appropriate way to react to crime is to require the offender to make proportionate amends. His book is a rich and intriguing contribution to the debate over punishment and restorative justice.

This volume is a new chapter in the future history of law. Its general perspective could not be more original and its critical ethical edge on the state of international law could not be timelier. It explores a compassionate philosophical approach to the genuine substance of law, criminal procedure, international criminal law and international criminal justice. It divides law into three interrelated disciplines, i.e. legality, morality and love. The norm love is derived from human reason for man's advancement and the securing of natural law. It is more than a mere mandatory norm. Its goal is to generate a normative and positive, powerful result, therefore avoiding any impurity that may exist in the application of other norms because of political or juridical pressures - a one-eyed justice. The norm love also renders justice with the principles of legal accountability, transparency and the high moral, authentic values of humanity. The notion of justice cannot be trusted in the absence of the norm love. The volume indicates the conditions of its efficiency by proving the reasons for its existence in the context of fairness, objectivity and concern for all individuals and entities. The concept of the norm love should be the core academic corpus for lecturing law in all faculties of law. It is simply the enlightenment of the 21st century. A lawyer with requisite knowledge and skill is not a lawyer if he cannot understand that the law does not need a lawyer with ethical competence in its provisions for income purposes but one with knowledge of its essence for the advanced morality of justice and the sheer essence of love for justice.

This book discusses the impact of war on the complex interactions between various actors involved in justice: individuals and social groups on the one hand and 'the justice system' (police, judiciary and professionals working in the prison service) on the other. It also highlights the emergence of new expectations of justice among these actors as a result of war. Furthermore, the book addresses justice practices, strategies for coping with the changing circumstances, new forms of negotiation, interactions, relationships between populations and the formal justice system in this specific context, and the long-term effects of this renegotiation. Ten out of the eleven chapters focus on Belgian issues, covering the two world wars in equal measure. Belgium's diverse war experiences in the twentieth century mean that a study of the country provides fascinating insights into the impact of war on the dynamics of 'doing justice'. The Belgian army fought in both world wars, and the vast majority of the population experienced military occupation. The latter led to various forms of collaboration with the enemy, which required the newly reinstalled Belgian government to implement large-scale judicial processes to repress these 'antipatriotic' behaviours, in order to restore both its authority and legitimacy and to re-establish social peace.

This volume is the second part of a project which hosts an interdisciplinary discussion about the relationship among law and language, legal practice and ordinary conversation, legal philosophy and the linguistics sciences. An international group of authors, from cognitive science, philosophy of language and philosophy of law question about how legal theory and pragmatics can enrich each other. In particular, the first part is devoted to the analysis of how pragmatics can solve problems related to legal theory: What can pragmatics teach about the concept of law and its relationship with moral, and, in particular, about the eternal dispute between legal positivism and legal naturalism? What can pragmatics teach about the concept of law and/or legal disagreements? The second part is focused on legal adjudication: it aims to construct a pragmatic apparatus appropriate to legal trial and/or to test the tenure of the traditional pragmatics tools in the field. The authors face questions such as: Which interesting pragmatic features emerge from legal adjudication? What pragmatic theories are better suited to account for the practice of judgment or its particular aspects (such as the testimony or the binding force of legal precedents)? Which pragmatic and socio-linguistic problems are highlighted by this practice?

For most Americans, habeas corpus is the cornerstone of our legal system: the principal constitutional check on arbitrary government power, allowing an arrested person to challenge the legality of his detention. In a study that could not be more timely, Justin Wert reexamines this essential individual right and shows that habeas corpus is not necessarily the check that we've assumed. Habeas corpus, it emerges, is as much a tool of politics as it is of law.
In this first study of habeas corpus in an American political context, Wert shifts our collective emphasis from the judicial to the political-toward the changes in the writ influenced by Congress, the president, political parties, state governments, legal academics, and even interest groups. By doing so, he reveals how political regimes have used habeas corpus both to undo the legacies of their predecessors and to establish and enforce their own vision of constitutional governance.

Tracing the history of the writ from the Founding to Hamdi v. Rumsfeld and Boumediene v. Bush, Wert illuminates crucial developmental moments in its evolution. He demonstrates that during the antebellum period, Reconstruction, Gilded Age, Great Society, and the ongoing war on terrorism, habeas corpus has waxed and waned in harmony with the interests of majoritarian politics. Along the way, Wert identifies and explains the political context of fine points of law that many political scientists and historians may not be aware of-such as the exhaustion rule requiring that a federal habeas participant must first exhaust all possible claims for relief in state court, a maneuver by which the post-Reconstruction Court abandoned supervision of race relations in the South.

Especially in light of the new scrutiny of habeas corpus prompted by the Guantnamo detainees, Wert's book is essential for broadening our understanding of how law and politics continue to intersect after 9/11. Brimming with fresh insights into constitutional development and regime theory, it shows that the Great Writ of Liberty may not be so great as we have supposed--because while it has the potential to enforce conceptions of rights that are consistent with the best ideals of American politics, it also has the potential to enforce its worst aspects as well.

Dyzenhaus deals with the urgent question of how governments should respond to emergencies and terrorism by exploring the idea that there is an unwritten constitution of law, exemplified in the common law constitution of Commonwealth countries. He looks mainly to cases decided in the United Kingdom, Australia and Canada to demonstrate that even in the absence of an entrenched bill of rights, the law provides a moral resource that can inform a rule-of-law project capable of responding to situations which place legal and political order under great stress. Those cases are discussed against a backdrop of recent writing and judicial decisions in the United States of America in order to show that the issues are not confined to the Commonwealth. The author argues that the rule-of-law project is one in which judges play an important role, but which also requires the participation of the legislature and the executive.

This book investigates whether treaty interpretation at the ECtHR and WTO, which are sometimes perceived as promoting 'self-contained' regimes, could constitute a means for unifying international law, or, conversely, might exacerbate the fragmentation of international law. In this regard, the practice of the ICJ on treaty interpretation is used for comparison, since the ICJ has made the greatest contribution to the development and clarification of international law rules and principles. Providing a critical analysis of cases at the ICJ, ECtHR and WTO, both prior to and since the adoption of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the book reveals how the ECtHR and WTO apply the general rules of treaty interpretation in patterns which are similar to those used by the ICJ to address difficulties in interpreting the text of treaties. Viewed in the light of the ECtHR's and WTO's interpretative practices, both the VCLT's general rules of interpretation and the ICJ's interpretative practice serve to counteract the fragmentation of international law.

What is 'intellectual property'? This book examines the way in which this important area of law is constructed by the legal system. It argues that intellectual property is a body of rules, created by the legal system, that regulate the documented forms of abstract objects, which are also defined into existence by the legal system. Intellectual property law thus constructs its own objects of regulation and it does so through the application of a collection of core concepts. By analyzing the metaphysical structure of intellectual property law and the concepts the legal system uses to construct 'intellectual property', the book sheds new light on the nature of this fascinating area of law. It explains anomalies between social and intellectual property uses of concepts such as authorship - here dubbed 'creatorship' - and originality and it helps to explain the role of intellectual property from a structural (rather than the traditional normative) perspective.

This book addresses theoretical problems concerning legal evidence. The concept of evidence is expected to fulfill a number of distinct roles in science and philosophy, but also in legal theory and law, some of which are complementary, while others are conflicting. In their profession, lawyers have to deal with evidence and proof. Yet the legal concept of evidence is constantly changing, and the debate concerning the distinction between a legal concept of evidence, the ordinary concept of evidence and the concept of evidence in science is far from being settled. What is more, the problem of evidence is central to both epistemology and the philosophy of science, and by extension to our academic thinking on law. In short, legal theorists' interest in evidence may include such diverse objects as a bloody knife, sensory data, linguistic entities or psychologically recognized beliefs. The book surveys selected theoretical roles that the concept of evidence plays and explores their relations and interconnections. The content is divided into three parts, investigating: (1) evidence in epistemology and the philosophy of science, which focuses on evidence methodologies and the problem of proof in legal scholarship; (2) evidence in legal theory and legal philosophy, where particular attention is paid to the interplay between evidence, legal reasoning and the binding force of such reasoning; and (3) evidence in law, where theoretical problems pertaining to witnesses, expert opinions, explanations of the accused, statistical evidence and neuroscientific evidence are examined.

This book intends to contribute to the consolidation of the new approach to lawmaking that has taken place in the last 20 years in legal philosophy and legal theory, spreading to other legal fields, especially criminal law. This new legislation science focusing on criminal problems has triggered a growing interest in the field, a dynamic which has led to a long-needed convergence of disciplines such as administrative law, criminal law, criminology, political science, sociology and, of course, legal philosophy to contribute to a more rational decision-making process for the construct of criminal laws. With the intention to continue on with the building of a solid "Criminal Legislation Science", this work presents scholars, lawmakers and students various emblematic approaches to enrich the discussion about different and promising tools and theoretical frameworks.

This book focuses on Jurgen Habermas' theorising on law, rights and democracy in light of the modern critique of law. The latter tradition, which goes back to Hegel and Marx, has addressed the limitations of rights as vocabulary of emancipation and law as language of autonomy. Since Habermas claims that his reconstruction of private and public autonomy has an emancipatory aim, the author has chosen to discuss it in the context of the modern critique of law. More specifically, the study addresses the need to consider the dialectic of law, in which law is both a condition for emancipation and domination, when discussing what law and rights permit. It will appeal to students and scholars across the fields of political theory, law and legal criticism, as well as sociology and sociology of law.

Tackling important philosophical questions on modernity - what it is, where it begins and when it ends - Przemyslaw Tacik challenges the idea that modernity marks a particular epoch, and historicises its conception to offer a radical critique of it. His deconstruction-informed critique collects and assesses reflections on modernity from major philosophers including Hegel, Heidegger, Lacan, Arendt, Agamben, and Zizek. This analysis progresses a new understanding of modernity intrinsically connected to the growth of sovereignty as an organising principle of contemporary life. He argues that it is the idea of 'modernity', as a taken-for-granted era, which is positioned as the essential condition for making linear history possible, when it should instead be history, in and of itself, which dictates the existence of a particular period. Using Hegel's notion of 'spirit' to trace the importance of sovereignty to the conception of the modern epoch within German idealism, Tacik traces Hegel's influence on Heidegger through reference to the 'star' in his late philosophy which represents the hope of overcoming the metaphysical poverty of modernity. This line of thought reveals the necessity of a paradigm shift in our understanding of modernity that speaks to contemporary continental philosophy, theories of modernity, political theory, and critical re-assessments of Marxism.

If Raz and Dworkin disagree over how law should be characterised,how are we, their jurisprudential public, supposed to go about adjudicating between the rival theories which they offer us? To what considerations would those theorists themselves appeal in order to convince us that their accounts of law are accurate and successful? Moreover, what is it that makes an account of law successful? Evaluation and Legal Theory tackles methodological or meta-theoretical issues such as these, and does so via attempting to answer the question: to what extent, and in what sense, must a legal theorist make value judgements about his data in order to construct a successful theory of law? Dispelling the obfuscatory myth that legal positivism seeks a 'value-free' account of law, the author attempts to explain and defend Joseph Raz's position that evaluation is essential to successful legal theory, whilst refuting John Finnis and Ronald Dworkin's contentions that the legal theorist must morally evaluate and morally justify the law in order to properly explain its nature. The book does not claim to solve the many mysteries of meta-legal theory but does seek to contribute to and engender rigorous and focused debate on this topic.

The two sections of this volume present theoretical developments and practical applicative papers respectively. Theoretical papers cover topics such as intercultural pragmatics, evolutionism, argumentation theory, pragmatics and law, the semantics/pragmatics debate, slurs, and more. The applied papers focus on topics such as pragmatic disorders, mapping places of origin, stance-taking, societal pragmatics, and cultural linguistics. This is the second volume of invited papers that were presented at the inaugural Pragmasofia conference in Palermo in 2016, and like its predecessor presents papers by well-known philosophers, linguists, and a semiotician. The papers present a wide variety of perspectives independent from any one school of thought.

In this book I argue for an approach that conceives human rights as both moral and legal rights. The merit of such an approach is its capacity to understand human rights more in terms of the kind of world free and reasonable beings would like to live in rather than simply in terms of what each individual is legally entitled to. While I acknowledge that every human being has the moral entitlement to be granted living conditions that are conducive to a dignified life, I maintain, at the same time, that the moral and legal aspects of human rights are complementary and should be given equal weight. The legal aspect compensates for the limitations of moral human rights the observance of which depends on the conscience of the individual, and the moral aspect tempers the mechanical and inhumane application of the law. Unlike the traditional or orthodox approach, which conceives human rights as rights that individuals have by virtue of their humanity, and the political or practical approach, which understands human rights as legal rights that are meant to limit the sovereignty of the state, the moral-legal approach reconciles law and morality in human rights discourse and underlines the importance of a legal framework that compensates for the deficiencies in the implementation of moral human rights. It not only challenges the exclusively negative approach to fundamental liberties but also emphasizes the necessity of an enforcement mechanism that helps those who are not morally motivated to refrain from violating the rights of others. Without the legal mechanism of enforcement, the understanding of human rights would be reduced to simply framing moral claims against injustices. From the moral-legal approach, the protection of human rights is understood as a common and shared responsibility. Such a responsibility goes beyond the boundaries of nation-states and requires the establishment of a cosmopolitan human rights regime based on the conviction that all human beings are members of a community of fate and that they share common values which transcend the limits of their individual states. In a cosmopolitan human rights regime, people are protected as persons and not as citizens of a particular state.

This book brings together disparate views which attempt to locate India in the contemporary international legal order. The essays endeavour to explore critically India's role and attitude towards international law in various fields and its influence and contribution in the development of the latter. The contributions are also of historical value, as they analyse the present as part of a historical trajectory. Drawing upon the current and historical practices from their respective fields, the authors attempt to highlight some critical aspects involving India and international law. These aspects broadly underline India's drift from its traditional role as an ally and proponent of the third world towards the pragmatism of self-interest, behaviour that is often compelled by internal political and economic conditions, as well as the dictates of external forces.