This book sets out a possible trajectory for the co-development of legal responsibility on the one hand and artificial intelligence and the machines and systems driven by it on the other. As autonomous technologies become more sophisticated it will be harder to attribute harms caused by them to the humans who design or work with them. This will put pressure on legal responsibility and autonomous technologies to co-evolve. Mark Chinen illustrates how these factors strengthen incentives to develop even more advanced systems, which in turn inspire nascent calls to grant legal and moral status to autonomous machines. This book is a valuable resource for scholars and practitioners of legal doctrine, ethics and autonomous technologies, as well as legislators and policy makers, and engineers and designers who are interested in the broader implications of their work.

This monograph makes a seminal contribution to existing literature on the importance of Roman law in the development of political thought in Europe. In particular it examines the expression 'dominus mundi', following it through the texts of the medieval jurists - the Glossators and Post-Glossators - up to the political thought of Hobbes. Understanding the concept of dominus mundi sheds light on how medieval jurists understood ownership of individual things; it is more complex than it might seem; and this book investigates these complexities. The book also offers important new insights into Thomas Hobbes, especially with regard to the end of dominus mundi and the replacement by Leviathan. Finally, the book has important relevance for contemporary political theory. With fading of political diversity Monateri argues "that the actual setting of globalisation represents the reappearance of the Ghost of the Dominus Mundi, a political refoule - repressed - a reappearance of its sublime nature, and a struggle to restore its universal legitimacy, and take its place." In making this argument, the book adds an important original vision to current debates in legal and political philosophy.

Malcolm Feeley, one of the founding giants of the law and society field, is also one of its most exciting, diverse, and contemporary scholars. His works have examined criminal courts, prison reform, the legal profession, legal professionalism, and a variety of other important topics of enduring theoretical interest with a keen eye for the practical implications. In this volume, The Legal Process and the Promise of Justice, an eminent group of contemporary law and society scholars offer fresh and original analyzes of his work. They asses the legacy of Feeley's theoretical innovations, put his findings to the test of time, and provide provocative historical and international perspectives for his insights. This collection of original essays not only draws attention to Professor Feeley's seminal writings but also to the theories and ideas of others who, inspired by Feeley, have explored how courts and the legal process really work to provide a promise of justice.

This book examines why laws fail and provides strategies for making laws that work. Why do some laws fail? And how can we make laws that actually work? This helpful guide, written by a leading jurist, provides answers to these questions and gives practical strategies for law-making. It looks at a range of laws which have failed; the 'damp squibs' that achieve little or nothing in practice; laws that overshoot their policy goals; laws that produce nasty surprises; and laws that backfire, undermining the very goals they were intended to advance. It goes on to examine some of the reasons why such failures occur, drawing on insights from psychology and economics, including the work of Kahneman and others on how humans develop narratives about the ways in which the world works and make predictions about the future. It provides strategies to reduce the risk of failure of legislative projects, including adopting a more structured and systematic approach to analysing the likely effects of the legislation; ensuring we identify the limits of our knowledge and the uncertainties of our predictions; and framing laws in a way that enables us to adjust the way they operate as new information becomes available or circumstances change. Key themes include the importance of the institutions that administer the legislation, of default outcomes, and of the 'stickiness' of those defaults. The book concludes with helpful checklists of questions to ask and issues to consider, which will be of benefit to anyone involved in designing legislation.

Judging Positivism is a critical exploration of the method and substance of legal positivism. Author Margaret Martin is primarily concerned with the manner in which theorists who adopt the dominant positivist paradigm ask a limited set of questions and offer an equally limited set of answers, artificially circumscribing the field of legal philosophy in the process. The book focuses primarily, but not exclusively, on the writings of prominent legal positivist Joseph Raz. Martin argues that Raz's theory has changed over time and that these changes have led to deep inconsistencies and incoherencies in his account. One reoccurring theme in the book is that Razian positivism collapses from within. In the process of defending his own position, Raz is led to support the views of many of his main rivals, namely Ronald Dworkin, the legal realists, and the normative positivists. The internal collapse of Razian positivism proves to be instructive. Promising paths of inquiry come into view and questions that have been suppressed or marginalized by positivists re-emerge, ready for curious minds to reflect on anew. The broader vision of jurisprudential inquiry defended in this book re-connects philosophy with the work of practitioners and the worries of law's subjects, bringing into focus the relevance of legal philosophy for lawyers and laymen alike.

The first volume of the Vienna Lectures on Legal Philosophy illustrates the remarkable scope of contemporary legal philosophy. It introduces methodological questions rooted in national academic discourses, discusses the origin of legal systems, and contrasts constitutionalist and monist approaches to the rule of law with the institutionalist approach most prominently and vigorously defended by Carl Schmitt. The issue at the core of these topics is which of these perspectives is more plausible in an age defined both by a 'postnational constellation' and the re-emergence of nationalist tendencies; an age in which the law increasingly cancels out borders only to see new frontiers erected.

The Continuity of Legal Systems in Theory and Practice examines a persistent and fascinating question about the continuity of legal systems: when is a legal system existing at one time the same legal system that exists at another time? The book's distinctive approach to this question is to combine abstract critical analysis of two of the most developed theories of legal systems, those of Hans Kelsen and Joseph Raz, with an evaluation of their capacity, in practice, to explain the facts, attitudes and normative standards for which they purport to account. That evaluation is undertaken by reference to Australian constitutional law and history, whose diverse and complex phenomena make it particularly apt for evaluating the theories' explanatory power. In testing whether the depiction of Australian law presented by each theory achieves an adequate 'fit' with historical facts, the book also contributes to the understanding of Australian law and legal systems between 1788 and 2001. By collating the relevant Australian materials systematically for the first time, it presents the case for reconceptualising the role of Imperial laws and institutions during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and clarifies the interrelationship between Colonial, State, Commonwealth and Imperial legal systems, both before and after Federation.

This new book advances a fresh philosophical account of the relationship between the legislature and courts, opposing the common conception of law, in which it is legislatures that primarily create the law, and courts that primarily apply it. This conception has eclectic affinities with legal positivism, and although it may have been a helpful intellectual tool in the past, it now increasingly generates more problems than it solves. For this reason, the author argues, legal philosophers are better off abandoning it. At the same time they are asked to dismantle the philosophical and doctrinal infrastructure that has been based on it and which has been hitherto largely unquestioned. In its place the book offers an alternative framework for understanding the role of courts and the legislature; a framework which is distinctly anti-positivist and which builds on Ronald Dworkin's interpretive theory of law. But, contrary to Dworkin, it insists that legal duty is sensitive to the position one occupies in the project of governing; legal interpretation is not the solitary task of one super-judge, but a collaborative task structured by principles of institutional morality such as separation of powers which impose a moral duty on participants to respect each other's contributions. Moreover this collaborative task will often involve citizens taking an active role in their interaction with the law.

The first-ever multivolume treatment of the issues in legal philosophy and general jurisprudence, from both a theoretical and a historical perspective. The work is aimed at jurists as well as legal and practical philosophers. Edited by the renowned theorist Enrico Pattaro and his team, this book is a classical reference work that would be of great interest to legal and practical philosophers as well as to jurists and legal scholar at all levels. The work is divided in two parts. The theoretical part (published in 2005), consisting of five volumes, covers the main topics of the contemporary debate; the historical part, consisting of six volumes (Volumes 6-8 published in 2007; Volumes 9 and 10, published in 2009; Volume 11 published in 2011 and Volume 12 forthcoming in 2015), accounts for the development of legal thought from ancient Greek times through the twentieth century. The entire set will be completed with an index. Volume 6: A History of the Philosophy of Law from the Ancient Greeks to the Scholastics 2nd revised edition, edited by Fred D. Miller, Jr. and Carrie-Ann Biondi Volume 6 is the first of the Treatise's historical volumes (following the five theoretical ones) and is dedicated to the philosophers' philosophy of law from ancient Greece to the 16th century. The volume thus begins with the dawning of legal philosophy in Greek and Roman philosophical thought and then covers the birth and development of European medieval legal philosophy, the influence of Judaism and the Islamic philosophers, the revival of Roman and Christian canon law, and the rise of scholastic philosophy in the late Middle Ages, which paved the way for early-modern Western legal philosophy. This second, revised edition comes with an entirely new chapter devoted to the later Scholastics (Chapter 14, by Annabel Brett) and an epilogue (by Carrie-Ann Biondi) on the legacy of ancient and medieval thought for modern legal philosophy, as well as with updated references and indexes.

Language ideology is a concept developed in linguistic anthropology to explain the ways in which ideas about the definition and functions of language can become linked with social discourses and identities. In Entextualizing Domestic Violence, Jennifer Andrus demonstrates how language ideologies that are circulated in the Anglo-American law of evidence draw on and create indexical links to social discourses, affecting speakers whose utterances are used as evidence in legal situations. Andrus addresses more specifically the tendency of such a language ideology to create the potential to speak for, appropriate, and ignore the speech of women who have been victims of domestic violence. In addition to identifying specific linguistic strategies employed in legal situations, she analyzes assumptions about language circulated and animated in the legal text and talk used to evaluate spoken evidence, and describes the consequences of the language ideology when it is co-articulated with discourses about gender and domestic violence. The book focuses on the pair of rules concerning hearsay and its exceptions in the Anglo-American law of evidence. Andrus considers legal discourses, including statutes, precedents, their application in trials, and the relationship between such legal discourses and social discourses about domestic violence. Using discourse analysis, she demonstrates the ways legal metadiscourses about hearsay are articulated with social discourses about domestic violence, and the impact of this powerful co-articulation on the individual whose speech is legally appropriated. Andrus approaches legal rules and language ideology both diachronically and synchronically in this book, which will be an important addition to ongoing research and discussion on the role legal appropriation of speech may have in perpetuating the voicelessness of victims in the legal treatment of domestic violence.

AN IMPORTANT BRANCH OF EUROPEAN CIVIL LAW. Origianlly published: Grahamstown, Cape Colony: African Book Co., 1908. iv (new introduction), xv, 791 pp. With a New Introduction by Michael Hoeflich, John H. & John M. Kane Professor of Law, University of Kansas School of Law. Roman-Dutch law is a hybrid of medieval Dutch law, mainly Germanic in origin, and Roman law as defined by the Corpus Juris Civilis and its later reception. It was developed in Holland during the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Bynkershoek, Damhouder, Grotius and other Roman-Dutch jurists had a profound influence on the development of European civil law and were the primary source of civil-law study in America. The Dutch brought it to their colonies, most notably South Africa and Indonesia, and it became the basis of their post-colonial legal systems. This engagingly written history offers a thorough analysis of Roman-Dutch jurisprudence and its intellectual background. Wessels devotes a great deal of attention to its literature, and he analyzes several treatises at length. Valuable as an introduction to one of the most important legal systems in history, it is equally useful as a reference.
"On the whole, the work is deserving of high praise, both for its learning and its literary quality. It will prove a most illuminating adjunct to the standard authorities on this system of law." --JAMES MACKINTOSH, Juridical Review 20 (1908-1909) 370.
JOHANNES WILHELMUS WESSELS 1862-1936] was a judge of the Transvaal Supreme Court. His works include The Status of the Uitlander (1894), Codification of Law in South Africa (1927) and The Law of Contract in South Africa (1937).
MICHAEL H. HOEFLICH is the John H. & John M. Kane Professor of Law at the University of Kansas School of Law. He is the author of numerous books including Roman and Civil Law and the Development of Anglo-American Jurisprudence (1997), Legal Publishing in Antebellum America (2010), Sources of the History of the American Law of Lawyering (2007) and The Law in Postcards and Ephemera 1890-1962 (2012), the latter two published by The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd.

Foundations of Jurisprudence: An Introduction to Imami Shi'i Legal Theory is a critical edition of the Arabic text with a parallel English translation of Mabadi' al-wusul ila 'ilm al-usul by al-'Allamah al-Hilli, introduced, edited and translated by Sayyid Amjad H. Shah Naqavi. Al-'Allamah al-Hilli participated in the leading debates of his day and applied his vast erudition in philosophy, logic, and theology to the paramount subject of jurisprudence. This text presents an exemplar of the rich revival of Shi'i scholarship in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries of the Common Era. Concise, yet comprehensive, this work sets the standard for the subsequent development and discussion of Imami Shi'i legal theory, such that its influence can be traced through to modern times. This dual-text edition is indispensable for students and scholars of Imami Shi'i jurisprudence.

Promises and agreements are everywhere; we make, receive, keep, and break them on a daily basis. The quest to understand these social practices is integral to understanding ourselves as social creatures. The study of promises and agreements is enjoying a renaissance in many areas of social philosophy, including philosophy of language, action theory, normative ethics, value theory, and legal philosophy. This volume is the first collection of philosophical papers on promises and agreements, bringing together sixteen original self-standing contributions to the philosophical literature. The contributors highlight some of the more interesting aspects of the ubiquitous social phenomena of promises and agreements from different philosophical perspectives.

According to many Islamic jurists, the world is divided between dar al-Islam (the abode of Islam) and dar al-harb (the abode of war). This dual division of the world has led to a great amount of juridical discussion concerning what makes a territory part of dar al-Islam, what the status of Muslims living outside of this is, and whether they are obliged to obey Islamic jurisprudence. Susanne Olsson examines the differing understandings of dar al-Islam and dar al-harb, as well as related concepts, such as jihad and takfir. She thereby is able to explore how these concepts have been utilised, transformed and negotiated throughout history. As the subject of Muslims living in Europe is such a topical and sometimes controversial one, this book will appeal to researchers of modern Islam as integral to the Western experience.

Since his death Hohfeld's essays on the concepts of right and duty have been increasingly recognized for their significance as a foundation of thought on analytical jurisprudence. Posthumously collected and published by Yale University Press in 1964, the essays were originally published as two articles in the Yale Law Journal in 1913 and 1917 and are ..".now a standard part of legal thinking." Walker, Oxford Companion to Law 575.This edition is distinguished by the foreword by Arthur L. Corbin, author of the renowned Corbin on Contracts.Wesley Hohfeld [1879-1918] was a professor of law at Stanford Law School and Yale Law School.

This book argues that ignorance of law should usually be a complete excuse from criminal liability. It defends this conclusion by invoking two presumptions: first, the content of criminal law should conform to morality; second, mistakes of fact and mistakes of law should be treated symmetrically. The author grounds his position in an underlying theory of moral and criminal responsibility according to which blameworthiness consists in a defective response to the moral reasons one has. Since persons cannot be faulted for failing to respond to reasons for criminal liability they do not believe they have, then ignorance should almost always excuse. But persons are somewhat responsible for their wrongs when their mistakes of law are reckless, that is, when they consciously disregard a substantial and unjustifiable risk that their conduct might be wrong. This book illustrates this with examples and critiques the arguments to the contrary offered by criminal theorists and moral philosophers. It assesses the real-world implications for the U.S. system of criminal justice. The author describes connections between the problem of ignorance of law and other topics in moral and legal theory.

An Influential Study by a Leading Exponent of Legal RealismIn this influential and oft-cited study Ross discounted the theories of natural law, positivism and legal realism. In their stead, he proposed the abandonment of "ought-propositions" for the "is-propositions" employed by other empirical sciences, thereby envisioning lawyers that serve merely as "rational technologists." Less bound by tradition, and traditional notions of justice, jurisprudence then becomes "not only a beautiful mental activity per se, but also an instrument which may benefit any lawyer who wants to understand what he is doing and why" (Preface).Alf Niels Christian Ross 1899-1979] was Professor of Law at the University of Copenhagen. In 1956 he was a visiting professor at the University of Illinois. He served for seven years on the constitutional committee that laid the groundwork for the Danish constitution of 1953. His many books, which have been translated extensively, include Towards a Realistic Jurisprudence (1946), A Textbook of International Law (1947), Constitution of the United Nations: Analysis of Structure and Function (1950), Why Democracy? (1952), Directives and Norms (1968) and On Guilt, Responsibility and Punishment (1975).

What role does empirical data play in law? How can we draw normative conclusions from empirical legal research? New insights in philosophy, the social sciences and the humanities have forced the relationship between facts and norms on to the agenda. This book presents an innovative set of perspectives on the relationship between descriptive and normative elements in legal inquiry and practice. The contributors provide critical insights from a range of different disciplinary traditions and theoretical positions. They discuss topics such as the epistemic dependence of judicial decision-makers, legal doctrine as a non-normative discipline, systems-theory critique and law, and exploring the boundaries of law. This book will benefit legal academics and graduate students looking to explore issues of methodology. It will also be of great interest to researchers in law and related topics interested in discussions of multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary research. Contributors include: R. Cotterrell, P. Cserne, W. de Been, M. Del Mar, L. Francot, J. Hage, R. Herdy, O.W. Lembcke, A.R. Mackor, A.M. Pacces, G. Samuel, S. Taekema, B. van Klin, W. van der Burg

The recent proliferation of international courts and jurisdictions raises a number of important issues ranging from the redefinition of the role of the International Court of Justice to the recent emergence of domestic courts as international jurisdictions. Towards a Universal Justice? Putting International Courts and Jurisdictions into Perspective, containing edited articles presented at the International Law Association's Regional Conference held in Lisbon, offers a comprehensive overview of those issues and outlines challenges ahead for every branch of international law.

The Book That Launched the German Historical School of Jurisprudence. Written in the wake of the Napoleonic Wars and the Congress of Vienna, the Vocation proposed a common legal code for the newly liberated German states and attacked Thibaut's advocacy of a code based on natural law. Though he aimed in part to improve the administration of justice, Savigny hoped that a common legal system would promote a larger goal: a spirit of unity among Germans. Frederick Carl von Savigny 1779-1861] was an important German jurist and scholar of Roman law. A principal member of the historical school of jurisprudence, he had a keen interest in its role in the subsequent development of European law. He is known for the influential Von Savigny's Treatise on Possession; Or the Jus Possessionis of the Civil Law (1803) and his System of Modern Roman Law (1840-1849), an eight-volume study of contemporary legal systems derived on Roman law. CONTENTS I. Introduction II. Origin of Positive Law III. Legislative Provisions and Law Books IV. Roman Law V. Civil Law in Germany VI. Our Vocation for Legislation VII. The Three New Codes VIII. What we are to do where there are no Codes IX. What is to be done where Codes exist already X. General Observations XI. Thibaut's Proposal XII. Conclusion Appendix I Appendix II