This book is an innovative contribution to analytical jurisprudence. It is mainly based on the distinct premises of linguistic philosophy and Carnapian semantics, but also addresses the issues of institutional philosophy, social pragmatism, and legal principles as envisioned by Dworkin, among others. Wroblewskis three ideologies (bound/free/legal and rational) and Makkonens three situations (isomorphic/semantically vague/normative gap) of judicial decision-making are further developed by means of 10 frames of legal analysis as discerned by the author. With the philosophical theories of truth serving as a reference, the frames of legal analysis include the isomorphic theory of law (Wittgenstein, Makkonen), the coherence theory of law (Alexy, Peczenik, Dworkin), the new rhetoric and legal argumentation theory (Perelman, Aarnio), social consequentialism (Posner), natural law theory (Fuller, Finnis), and the sequential model of legal reasoning by Neil MacCormick and the Bielefelder Kreis. At the end, some key issues of legal metaphysics are addressed, like the notion of legal systematics and the future potential of the analytical approach in jurisprudence.

Striking a balance between the aspirations of individual freedom and the demands of organized society is a central quest of constitutional law. Germany and America provide different paths toward accomplishment of this equilibrium, revealing two paths to freedom and its relation to community. This work is addressed to philosophers of law, political theorists, constitutional lawyers, and everyone interested in protecting human rights and learning the meaning of human personality and freedom as expressed in democratic constitutional regimes. Eberle challenges current thinking in the field by setting out alternative visions of human freedom, dignity, personality and expression; demonstrating that use of comparative methodology has much to offer critical examination of major constitutional and public policy issues; and showing that different conceptions of fundamental ideas are possible. Exploring the nature of human personality as reflected in the constitutional law of two important constitutional democracies, Eberle inquires into human values and human freedom, across national borders, in pursuit of a better understanding of human potential and the nature and limit of freedom. The central personality traits examined comprise human dignity; autonomy; self-determination and identity, including privacy, computer privacy, control over personal information, and maintenance of one's image, words, and reputation; abortion; and freedom of expression, including defamation, offensive speech, hate speech, and burning of the flag. The book weaves between German and American law in examining these questions, providing a unique comparative perspective on the idea of human personality and freedom.

This book explores how the design, construction, and use of robotics technology may affect today's legal systems and, more particularly, matters of responsibility and agency in criminal law, contractual obligations, and torts. By distinguishing between the behaviour of robots as tools of human interaction, and robots as proper agents in the legal arena, jurists will have to address a new generation of "hard cases." General disagreement may concern immunity in criminal law ("e.g.," the employment of robot soldiers in battle), personal accountability for certain robots in contracts ("e.g.," robo-traders), much as clauses of strict liability and negligence-based responsibility in extra-contractual obligations ("e.g.," service robots in tort law). Since robots are here to stay, the aim of the law should be to wisely govern our mutual relationships.

This book describes the history, present status and possible future models of clinical legal education (CLE) in 12 Asian countries, with particular focus on the Asian character of CLE as it has evolved in different countries.

Herbert Lionel Adolphus Hart was born in Yorkshire in 1907 to second generation Jewish immigrants. Having won a scholarship to Oxford University, he went on to become the most famous legal philosopher of the twentieth century. From 1932-40 H.L.A Hart practised as a barrister in London. He was pronounced physically unfit for military service in 1940, and was recruited by MI5, where he worked until 1945. During his time at the Bar he had continued to study philosophy and at M15 his interest was further stimulated by his philosopher colleagues in M16, Stuart Hampshire and Gilbert Ryle. After the war, Hart returned to Oxford to take up a philosophy fellowship, later to become Professor of Jurisprudence. H.L.A Hart single-handedly reinvented the philosophy of law and influenced the nation's thinking in the 1960s on abortion, the legalization of homosexuality, and on capital punishment. Hart's approach to legal philosophy was at once disarmingly simple and breathtakingly ambitious, combining as it did the insights of Austin and Bentham and the new linguistic philosophy of J.L. Austin and Ludwig Wittgenstein. He sought to elucidate a concept of law which would be of relevance to all forms of law, wherever or whenever they arose: his bestselling book, The Concept of Law, has sold tens of thousands of copies worldwide. In 1941, he married Jenifer Williams (a high-ranking civil servant, later an Oxford academic) with whom he had four children. Their relationship was an enduring if unconventional one. In the early 1950s, Jenifer was rumoured to be having a long-standing affair with Isaiah Berlin, one of Hart's closest friends. She was also, falsely, accused by the Sunday Times of having been a Russian spy, an allegation which was all the more scandalous given Hart's position at MI5 during the War. Nicola Lacey draws on Hart's previously unpublished diaries and letters to reveal a complex inner life. Outwardly successful, Hart was in fact tormented by doubts about his intellectual abilities, his sexual identity and his capacity to form close relationships. Her biography also sheds fascinating light on the origins of his ideas, and assesses his overall contribution. Above all, it chronicles of a life which had a depth ands impact far greater than many of Hart's readers have realized.

Preface International conferences are not organized overnight-especially not when high ranking personalities from politics, business and academia should be offered an adequate platform for addressing and discussing highly relevant contemporary issues. The conference on "The Role of Law and Ethics in the Globalized Economy," which took place on May 22 and 23, 2008 in the Bavarian Academy of Sciences and Humanities in Munich, was no exception. When the first preparations started at the end of 2006, neither the subprime crises nor the general crises of the global financial system, whose shock waves have rocked the financial businesses in subsequent months, were known; nor were they predictable or even imaginable. Based on our monitoring of the globalization process and its apparent impact-not only on the economic and technological environment, but also on the social en- ronment-it was appropriate for the conference to begin by serving as a platform for analysing the status quo of the process of globalization, as relevant to politics, business and academia, and for exploring how the interest groups in those domains cope with the challenges of globalization. In the end, however, the purpose of the conference was to produce proposals for conditions for "upwards" global compe- tion, meaning that minimum conditions should be worked out to enable people to live and labour humanely. Such conditions would be those which should help avoid otherwise inevitable frictions in society, both nationally and internationally.

Autonomy in the Law considers one of the most important benefits of the rule of law. Juxtaposing European and American conceptions of autonomy in the law of families, capital punishment and, criminal trials reveals the common values that justify all legal systems. Law protects the autonomy of individuals and associations by defending the boundaries of their own self-rule. This book illuminates the fundamental purpose of law by examining how European and American lawyers, judges and citizens do and should apply legal autonomy to the practical circumstances of litigation, legislation and the law.

Trace the roots of the concept of equal protection from the American Revolution and the formation of the Constitution through its application today using this collection of 177 primary documents from a variety of sources. Students can use this unique reference resource to examine the tension between the concept of equal protection and recognition of slavery in the constitutional order, to explore the devitalization and revitalization of the 14th and 15th Constitutional amendments from the era of Jim Crow through the Civil Rights movement, and to study current court rulings on equal protection of the law. Petitions, laws, court decisions, personal accounts, and a variety of other documents bring to life the experiences of African Americans in the American constitutional order. Five historical periods are explored with particular emphasis on the concept of equal protection of the law and its particular embodiment in the 14th Amendment. These include: the roots of the concept of equal protection in the Anglo-American experience, the lives of African Americans under a Constitution that incorporated equal protection yet recognized slavery, the 14th and 15th Amendments and the development of Jim Crow, 20th-century developments in the application of equal protection to race, and the accomplishments of the Civil Rights movement and developments since that time. The introductory and explanatory text helps readers understand the nature of the conflicts, the issues being litigated, and the social and cultural pressures that shaped each debate. This welcome resource will provide students with the opportunity to understand the various arguments put forth in different debates, encouraging readers to consider all sides when drawing their own conclusions.

The essays collected in this book address legislation from the viewpoint of legal theory and provide an overview of current research in legisprudence as a new scholarly approach to lawmaking. The overall focus of the volume is on the justification of legislation, with a special emphasis on the intricate notion of legislative rationality. With the rational justification of legislation as their central theme, the essays elaborate on the foundations and bounds of legislation and the search for a more principled lawmaking, discuss the role of legislation within the framework of democratic constitutionalism, analyze legislation as implementation of constitutional law, and explore how legislative argumentation in parliament can be construed as a source of justification of laws.

This book examines social aspects of humour relating to the judiciary, judicial behaviour, and judicial work across different cultures and eras, identifying how traditionally recorded wit and humorous portrayals of judges reflect social attitudes to the judiciary over time. It contributes to cultural studies and social science/socio-legal studies of both humour and the role of emotions in the judiciary and in judging. It explores the surprisingly varied intersections between humour and the judiciary in several legal systems: judges as the target of humour; legal decisions regulating humour; the use of humour to manage aspects of judicial work and courtroom procedure; and judicial/legal figures and customs featuring in comic and satiric entertainment through the ages. Delving into the multi-layered connections between the seriousness of the work of the judiciary on the one hand, and the lightness of humour on the other hand, this fascinating collection will be of particular interest to scholars of the legal system, the criminal justice system, humour studies, and cultural studies.

Several books have been written on the Rwandan Genocide and the Sierra Leonean civil war. None has yet examined in its own right the various contexts and foundations on which the jurisprudence of tribunals set up by the international community to try perpetrators of the international crimes committed in the territories of the two countries was developed. This book fills that void. The two tribunals have had their successes and failures, with the international tribunal for Rwanda singled out for the most poignant criticism for prosecuting only perpetrators from one side only of the conflict. In this context, the criticism that it is victors' justice can hardly be shaken off. The jurisprudence developed in trials that are tainted with an accusation as serious as this may be read with jaundiced eyes. Yet it has contributed to the development of international law generally although the judgment of history on it will almost always be harsh because of its discriminatory and selective foundation. Obviously, most of the jurisprudence will not be stare decisis because of the complex nature of the cases and the political motivations that sometimes influenced the proceedings. There can hardly be any gainsaying that although the nature of the crimes may be similar, no two conflicts can be the same. Each comes with its specificity. This specificity and several political economic and socio-cultural factors significantly influence the course of the judicial proceedings before the courts set up to prosecute crimes perpetrated in the confl icts and the jurisprudence developed in those proceedings. This book brings to the attention of the reader some of the evidentiary and contextual foundations on which the jurisprudence in the two courts was established. The jurisprudence without doubt will shape the course of the human history in ways unimagined as it is cited in cases that will come for determination before other international tribunals. Understanding the contextual foundations on which the jurisprudence was established will greatly contribute to the certainty of its application and with it that of the law. The author's is a modest yet noble and salutary contribution to international criminal jurisprudence coming at the heels of the scaling down of the tribunals and the start of the residual mechanisms for both the ICTR and the SCSL. The book is highly recommended to all persons from all walks of life; including victims who sometime wondered how these tribunals worked and the legal and factual foundations underlying established jurisprudence.

An examination of the language of law in the area of political representation, this book considers the development and recognition of group claims brought pursuant to the Voting Rights Act and the Equal Protection Clause in Supreme Court opinions. In his analysis, Burke highlights the different, discursive strategies, broadly identified as liberal and communitarian, used by the Supreme Court to justify the outcomes of various cases, and he argues that no particular strategy of justification is inherently politically conservative or liberal and that no conception of political representation is unassailable. Therefore, it is unlikely that the Supreme Court will articulate a stable measure of fair representation.

The Supreme Court offers one more forum in the deliberation over what is fair representation; however, it is not likely to provide minority communities with a legal answer to the problem of political underrepresentation. As such, this book tells the uncertain story of the creation of political fairness by the Supreme Court. The language used to characterize what is fair and representative, and the theoretical designs which the rhetoric reflects, allows us to formulate concepts of fair representation as legal standards evolve. By placing the debate over fair representation in not only political and legal but also philosophical terms, we are better able to understand the inevitable tensions that drive the concept of representation into new, ill-defined, and contentious areas.

In the collected essays here, Schlag established himself as one of the most creative thinkers in the contemporary legal academy. To read them one after another is exhilarating; Schlag's sophistication shines through. In chapter after chapter he tackles the most vexing problems of law and legal thinking, but at the heart of his concern is the questions of normativity and the normative claims made by legal scholars. He revisits legal realism, eenergizes it, and brings readers face-to-face with the central issues confronting law at the end of the 20th century.
--"Choice, May 1997"

Pierre Schlag is the great iconoclast of the American legal academy. Few law professors today are so consistently original, funny, and provocative. But behind his playful manner is a serious goal: bringing the study of law into the late modern/ postmodern age. Reading these essays is like watching a one-man truth squad taking on all of the trends and movements of contemporary jurisprudence. All one can say to the latter is, better take cover.
--J. M. Balkin, Lafayette S. Foster Professor, Yale Law School

At a time when complaints are heard everywhere about the excesses of lawyers, judges, and law itself, Pierre Schlag focuses attention on the American legal mind and its urge to lay down the law. For Schlag, legalism is a way of thinking that extends far beyond the customary official precincts of the law.

His work prompts us to move beyond the facile self- congratulatory self-representations of the law so that we might think critically about its identity, effects, and limitations. In this way, Schlag leads us to rethink the identities and character of moral and political values in contemporary discourse. The book brings into question the dominant normative orientation that shapes so much academic thought in law and in the humanities and social sciences. By pulling the curtain on the rhetorical techniques by which the law represents itself as coherent, rational, and stable, Laying Down the Law discloses the grandiose (and largely futile) attempts of American academics to control social and political meaning by means of scholarly missives.

The book focuses on Robert Alexy's theory of constitutional rights. Alexy systematically presented the theory in his seminal book "Theorie der Grundrechte" (1985; Engl. translation "Theory of Constitutional Rights, 2002) and continued to develop it in numerous subsequent articles. Arguably still the most influential theory of constitutional rights, it has found widespread academic support, as well as recognition in several constitutional jurisdictions. On the other hand, it has also been the object of considerable criticism. The aim of this book is to outline the central aspects of Alexy's theory as he sees them, and to further develop the principles of constitutional, fundamental, and human rights by applying a constructive criticism of his theory.

This book investigates whether legal reforms intended to create a market-friendly regulatory business environment have a positive impact on economic and financial outcomes. After conducting a critical review of the legal origins literature, the authors first analyze the evolution of legal rules and regulations during the last decade (2006-2014). For that purpose, the book uses legal/regulatory indicators from the World Bank's Doing Business Project (2015). The findings indicate that countries have actively reformed their legal systems during this period, particularly French civil law countries. A process of convergence in the evolution of legal rules and regulations is observed: countries starting in 2006 in a lower position have improved more than countries with better initial scores. Also, French civil law countries have reformed their legal systems to a larger extent than common law countries and, consequently, have improved more in the majority of the Doing Business indicators used. Second, the authors estimate fixed-effects panel regressions to analyze the relationship between changes in legal rules and regulations and changes in the real economy. The findings point to a lack of systematic effects of legal rules and regulations on economic and financial outcomes. This result stands in contrast to the widespread belief that reforms aiming to strengthen investor and creditor rights (and other market-friendly policies) systematically lead to better economic and financial outcomes.

This book offers a comprehensive investigation of privacy in the modern world. It collects 16 papers that look at this essential topic from many facets, from the personal to the technological, from the philosophical to the legal. The contributors examine such issues as the value of privacy protection, the violation of spreading personal falsehoods, the digital rights of children, an individual's right to be forgotten from internet search engines, and more. The organization of the volume helps provide a nuanced understanding of this often controversial topic. Coverage starts with key concepts before moving on to explore personal information privacy and the impact of new technologies. Next, the papers consider privacy in different contexts. These include work, sex, family, crime, and religion. This structure enables greater engagement with the difficult questions about privacy. Readers will gain deep insight into the core concepts of privacy as well as its application to everyday life. This interdisciplinary volume brings together an international team of scholars. They provide a broad combination of expertise in law, philosophy, and political science. Overall, this thought-provoking examination will appeal to interested readers in both academia and practice.

The fact that aspects of witnesses and evidence put them in the centre of the institutional and cultural (e.g. religious, literary) construction of ancient societies indicates that it is important to keep offering nuanced approaches to the topic of this volume. To advance knowledge of the processes of presenting witnesses and gathering, or constructing, evidence is, in fact, to better and more fully understand the ways in which deliberative Athenian democracy functions, what the core elements of political life and civic identity are, and how they relate to the system of using logos to make decisions. For, witnesses and evidence were important prerequisites of getting the Athenian citizenship and exerting the civic/political identity as a member of the community. It is important, therefore, all the matters that relate to information-gathering and decision-making to be examined anew. Emphasis can be placed on a variety of genres to allow scholars recreate the fullest and clearest possible image about the witnessing and evidencing in antiquity. Chapters in this volume include considerations of social, political, literary, and moral theory, alongside studies of the impact of information-gathering and decision-making in oratory and drama, with a steady focus on the application of key ideas and values in social and political justice to issues of pressing ethical concern.

For more than a century Western democracies have struggled to keep faith with both economic efficiency and social justice. Yet reconciliation of these factors remains as baffling as ever. Among the many voices clamoring today for a theory of collective action, we hear most often of the great chasm between "legitimacy" and "efficiency." It is the contention of the authors of this ground-breaking book that these antinomies can be seen as distinct "moments of application" in the operation of normative judgment, and that a reflexive treatment of norms of collective action, by clarifying limitations in rules and beliefs, allows us to develop mechanisms to correct the limiting effects of such judgments and act accordingly. Drawing on and developing recent trends in the social sciences, The Action of Norms presents a powerful new theory of governance with far-reaching implications for the future of law, the judiciary, and justice itself. Among the contributing modern ideas that are explained and developed as pillars of the authors' thesis are the following: critiques of the "political theory of interest groups; " the economic theory of efficiency; deliberative democracy; rational choice theory; the evolutionist debate; learning process theory; and the theory of risk.

This book addresses fundamental aspects of the concept of public international law in both theory and practice. The argument developed by the author is that, underlying the traditional, horizontal, structure of public international law, a vertical structure of the concept of law may be discerned. This vertical structure is seen unfolding into two, mutually exclusive, frameworks: a framework of obligation, accounting for obligations, and a framework of authorization, accounting for rights. The problem then arising is that a concept of public international law which only admits either rights or obligations cannot be regarded as coherent. The author, however, takes and substantiates the position that coherence can be achieved by suppressing the mutual exclusivity of both frameworks. This move paves the way to formulating the function of public international law in terms of the constituting of international society. Since in public international law the theoretical aspects profoundly affect practice, this book is not only of interest to academics, but also for practitioners, such as officials of foreign offices and international institutions.

Once dismissed as plodding and superfluous, legal scholarship is increasingly challenging the liberal white male establishment that currently dominates legal education and practice. The most significant development since the emergence of the casebook, at the turn of the century, this trend has unleashed a fierce political struggle. At stake is nothing less than the entire enterprise of law and education, and thus a powerful platform from which to shape society.

The result, here vividly recounted by Arthur Austin, has been an uncompromising, take-no-prisoners fight for dominance. The challenge comes from Outsiders, a collection of feminists, critical race theorists, and critical legal studies scholars who rely on unconventional methods such as storytelling to give voice to the underrepresented. In the other, demographically larger camp resides the monolithic Empire, consisting of traditionalists who, having developed an effective form of scholarship, now circle the wagons against the outsider heathens.

Neither partisan nor objective, Austin is both respectful and critical of each faction. The Empire, he believes, is imperious, closed-minded, and self-perpetuating; the Outsiders are too often paranoid, anti-pragmatic, and overly tolerant of fringe work. Is the new scholarship a vacuous, overpoliticized, soon-to-be-vanquished trend or the harbinger of an important new paradigm? Is reconciliation possible? Anyone with a vested interest in the answer to these questions, and in the future of law, cannot afford to miss Arthur Austin's invaluable volume.

Arthur Austin is the Edgar A. Hahn Professor of Jurisprudence at Case Western Reserve University.

Morality and the Nature of Law explores the conceptual relationship between morality and the criteria that determine what counts as law in a given societythe criteria of legal validity. Is it necessary condition for a legal system to include moral criteria of legal validity? Is it even possible for a legal system to have moral criteria of legal validity? The book considers the views of natural law theorists ranging from Blackstone to Dworkin and rejects them, arguing that it is not conceptually necessary that the criteria of legal validity include moral norms. Further, it rejects the exclusive positivist view, arguing instead that it is conceptually possible for the criteria of validity to include moral norms. In the process of considering such questions, this book considers Raz's views concerning the nature of authority and Shapiro's views about the guidance function of law, which have been thought to repudiate the conceptual possibility of moral criteria of legal validity. The book, then, articulates a thought experiment that shows that it is possible for a legal system to have such criteria and concludes with a chapter that argues that any legal system, like that of the United States, which affords final authority over the content of the law to judges who are fallible with respect to the requirements of morality is a legal system with purely source-based criteria of validity.

This book has two aims. First, to provide a critical legal examination of the liberal state and liberal rights in the law, and secondly, to present a systematic alternative to liberal approaches to both the law and rights, grounded in a left wing conception of human dignity. At the opening of the 21st century a remarkable thing happened. Liberalism, once considered the only doctrine left standing at the end of history, began to face renewed competition from both the political left and the post-modern conservative right. This book argues that the way forward is not to abandon, but to radicalize, the potential of the liberal project. Analysing major theoretical positions in order to build a critical genealogy of liberal rights, McManus lucidly develops a left wing alternative to the classic liberal approach to rights drawing on the traditions of liberal egalitarians and deliberative democracy theory. Societies, he argues, should be committed to advancing the human dignity of all through the enshrinement of certain rights into positive state law, the expansion of democracy and a resolute commitment to economic equality.

This book offers a comparative analysis of traditional Asian legal systems. It combines methods from legal history, legal anthropology, legal philosophy, and substantive law, pursuing a comprehensive approach that offers readers a broad perspective on the topic. The geographic regions covered include the Near East, Middle East, Central Asia, India, China, Japan, and Southeast Asia. For each region, the book first provides historical and political context. Next, it discusses major milestones in the region's legal history and political institutions, as well as its forms of government. Readers are then presented with fundamental principles and terms needed to understand the legal arguments discussed. The book begins with the Ancient Near East and important topics such as Jewish law. The next part considers Islamic law, while also exploring modern issues. The third part focuses on Hindu and Buddhist law, while the fourth part covers China and Japan. The book's closing section examines tribal societies, e.g. Mongols, Pashtuns and Malays. Topics covered include the interaction of legal systems within a legal circle, inter-systemic interactions, reasons for the failure and success of legal modernization, legal pluralism, and its effects on Asian societies. Family law, law of obligation, criminal law, and procedural law are also explored.

The view that persons are entitled to respect because of their moral agency is commonplace in contemporary moral theory. What exactly this respect entails, however, is far less uncontroversial. In this book, Van der Rijt argues powerfully that this respect for persons' moral agency must also encompass respect for their subjective moral judgments - even when these judgments can be shown to be fundamentally flawed. Van der Rijt scrutinises the role persons' subjective moral judgments play within the context of coercion and domination. His fresh, original analysis of Kant's third formulation of the Categorical Imperative reveals how these judgments are intimately connected to a person's dignity. The result is an insightful new account of coercion, a novel Kantian reformulation of the republican notion of non-domination and a compelling, innovative argument in favour of retributive justice. "In this admirably clear and insightful work, Van der Rijt develops an original account of coercion and dignity. On the basis of his analysis of the relation between these two concepts, he also provides an intriguing new angle on the nature of republicanism. I recommend this book to anyone interested in freedom and power and their roles in normative political theory." Ian Carter - University of Pavia "In this carefully argued and original study Jan-Willem van der Rijt offers an analysis of coercion, a broadly Kantian argument that coercion is an affront to dignity, and an illuminating contrast with Philip Pettit's republicanism. A most welcome contribution." Thomas E. Hill, Jr. - University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill "Jan-Willem van der Rijt has written a well argued, original book that will prove to be extremely helpful for the philosophical inquiry of the relationship between coercion and human dignity as well as for the assessment of republicanism and its consequences." Ralf Stoecker - University of Potsdam