This book addresses one central question: if justice is to be done in the name of the community, how far do the decision-makers need to reflect the community, either in their profile or in the opinions they espouse? Each contributor provides an answer on the basis of a careful analysis of the rules, assumptions and practices relating to their own national judicial system and legal culture. Written by national experts, the essays illustrate a variety of institutional designs towards a better reflection of the community. The involvement of lay people is often most visible in judicial appointments at senior court level, with political representatives sometimes appointing judges. They consider the lay involvement in the judicial system more widely, from the role of juries to the role of specialist lay judges and lay assessors in lower courts and tribunals. This lay input into judicial appointments is explored in light of the principle of judicial independence. The contributors also critically discuss the extent to which judicial action is legitimised by any 'democratic pedigree' of the judges or their decisions. The book thus offers a range of perspectives, all shaped by distinctive constitutional and legal cultures, on the thorny relationship between the principle of judicial independence and the idea of democratic accountability of the judiciary.

This volume highlights important aspects of the complex relationship between common language and legal practice. It hosts an interdisciplinary discussion between cognitive science, philosophy of language and philosophy of law, in which an international group of authors aims to promote, enrich and refine this new debate. Philosophers of law have always shown a keen interest in cognitive science and philosophy of language in order to find tools to solve their problems: recently this interest was reciprocated and scholars from cognitive science and philosophy of language now look to the law as a testing ground for their theses. Using the most sophisticated tools available to pragmatics, sociolinguistics, cognitive sciences and legal theory, an interdisciplinary, international group of authors address questions like: Does legal interpretation differ from ordinary understanding? Is the common pragmatic apparatus appropriate to legal practice? What can pragmatics teach about the concept of law and pervasive legal phenomena such as testimony or legal disagreements?

This classic collection of essays, first published in 1979, has had an enduring influence on philosophical work on the nature of law and its relation to morality. Raz begins by presenting an analysis of the concept of authority and what is involved in law's claim to moral authority. He then develops a detailed explanation of the nature of law and legal systems, presenting a seminal argument for legal positivism. Within this framework Raz then examines the areas of legal thought that have been viewed as impregnated with moral values - namely the social functions of law, the ideal of the rule of law, and the adjudicative role of the courts.
The final part of the book is given to understanding the proper moral attitude of a citizen towards the law. Raz examines whether the citizen is under a moral obligation to obey the law and whether there is a right to dissent. Two appendices, added for the revised edition, develop Raz's views on the nature of law, offering a further dialogue with the work of Hans Kelsen, and a reply to Robert Alexy's criticisms of legal positivism.
This revised edition makes accessible one of the classic works of modern legal philosophy, and represents an ideal companion to Raz's new collection, Between Authority and Interpretation.

Governing Sexuality explores issues of sexual citizenship and law reform in the United Kingdom and Continental Europe today. Across western and eastern Europe,lesbians and gay men are increasingly making claims for equal status, grounded in the language of rights and citizenship, and using the language of international human rights and European law. This book uses same sex sexualities as a prism through which to explore broader questions of legal and political theory concerning democratic legitimacy; rights discourse; national sovereignty and identity; citizenship; transnationalism; and globalisation. Case studies are widely drawn: from New Labour's sexual politics in the UK to the decriminalisation of same-sex sexualities under pressure from the EU in Romania; to new civil solidarity laws in France.

One of the primary functions of law is to ensure that the legal structure governing all social relations is predictable, coherent, consistent and applicable. Taken together, these characteristics of law are referred to as legal certainty. In traditional approaches to legal certainty, law is regarded as a hierarchical system of rules characterized by stability, clarity, uniformity, calculable enforcement, publicity and predictability. However, the current reality is that national legal systems no longer operate in isolation, but within a multilevel legal order, wherein norms created at both the international and regional level are directly applicable to national legal systems. Also, norm creation is no longer the exclusive prerogative of public officials of the state: private actors have an increasing influence on norm creation as well. Social scientists have referred to this phenomenon of interacting and overlapping competences as multilevel governance. Only recently have legal scholars focused attention on the increasing interconnectedness (and therefore the concomitant loss of primacy of national legal orders) between the global, European and national regulatory spheres through the concept of multilevel regulation.

In this project the author uses multilevel regulation as a term to characterize a regulatory space in which the process of rule making, rule enforcement and rule adjudication (the regulatory lifecycle) is dispersed across more than one administrative or territorial level and amongst several different actors, both public and private. The author draws on the concept of a regulatory space, using it as a framing device to differentiate between specific aspects of policy fields. The relationship between actors in such a space is non-hierarchical and they may be independent of each other. The lack of central ordering of the regulatory lifecycle within this regulatory space is the most important feature of such a space. The implications of multilevel regulation for the notion of legal certainty have attracted limited attention from scholars and the demand for legal certainty in regulatory practice is still a puzzle. The book explores the idea of legal certainty in terms of the perceptions and expectations of regulatees in the context of medical products - specifically, pharmaceuticals and medical devices, which can be differentiated as two regulatory spaces and therefore form two case studies. As an exploratory project, the book necessarily explores new territory in terms of investigating legal certainty first in terms of regulatee perceptions and expectations and second, because it studies it in the context of multilevel regulation.

This volume features more than 25 papers that were presented at the 2014 Conference of the International Association for the Study of Controversies, IASC, held at the University of Salento, Lecce, Italy. It looks at conflict and conflict resolution from diverse perspectives, including philosophy, psychology, law, and history. Coverage explores the paradox of conflict and examines how discord, whether large or small, international or internal, can be both a source of chaos as well as a foundation for unity, a limitation of potential as well as an entryway to a greater depth of living. Inside, readers will discover thought-provoking answers to such questions as: What are the conditions to ensure that a conflict can be converted into cooperation? If the conflict between interests can be solved by a compromise, what happens when a conflict involves non-negotiable values ? In the management of a conflict, what role is played by argumentation? What are the latest perspectives in conflict management? How does the theory of controversies allows us to recognize and resolve conflicts? By the end of the book, readers will have a better understanding of how conflict can be transcended and how it's possible to redefine the conflicting situation so that what seemed incompatible and locked may, in fact, open a new perspective.

Following the successful publication of his first volume4 of essays intitled FOREIGN LAW AND COMPARATIVE METHODOLOGY professor Markesinis continues his quest for the best way of presenting foreign law to Common law readers. This second volume thus contains essays on methodology: the horizontal application of human rights; the tortious liability of statutory bodies; the growing impact of human rights law on our law of torts; the differing approaches to problems raised by action for wrongful life and wrongful birth; differing judicial styles and what they can tell us about a foreign system, as well as the growing use of foreign law by British judges in their judicial and extra judicial work. These essays, along with their rich bibliographical references, will provide much food for thought to practitioners in these above-mentioned areas of the law as well as teadhers and researchers in the fields of public law, foreign law and legal methodology.

In this translation of Saint Thomas Aquinas's The Treatise on Law, R. J. Henle, S.J., a well-known authority on philosophy and jurisprudence, fluently and accurately presents the Latin and English translation of this important work. Henle provides the necessary background for an informed reading of the Treatise, as well as the only in-depth commentary available in English on this text. The first section of the book contains an introduction to St. Thomas's life, work, writings, and jurisprudence. Henle discusses the structure of St. Thomas's magnum opus, Summa Theologiae, from which The Treatise on Law is excerpted. A brief section is included on Scholastic philosophy and also on St. Thomas's approach to the study of law. Henle then examines Thomas's definition of a law and the general doctrinal background for the Treatise. Finally Henle explores St. Thomas's sources, including his use of auctoritates, or authoritative quotations drawn primarily from the Bible, Aristotle, St. Augustine, and St. Isidore of Seville. The second part of the book contains the Latin text of the Treatise presented unit by unit, each followed by the English translation and, when appropriate, by a comment. The Treatise on Law will be of interest to law students, lawyers, judges, and legal scholars. It will also appeal to those interested in St. Thomas's legal philosophy, such as political scientists, theoretical sociologists, and cultural historians. For philosophers, especially beginners in medieval philosophy, it serves as a good introduction to the thought of St. Thomas.

This book develops an original and comprehensive theory of political liberalism. It defends bold new accounts of the nature of autonomy and individual liberty, the content of distributive justice, and the justification for the authority of the State. The theory that emerges integrates contemporary progressive and pluralistic liberalism into a broadly Aristotelian intellectual tradition. The early chapters of the book challenge the traditional conservative idea of individual liberty-the liberty to dispose of one's property as one wishes-and replace it with a new one, according to which liberty is of equal value to all persons, regardless of economic position. The middle chapters present an original theory of socio-economic justice, arguing that a society in which every citizen enjoys an equal share of liberty should be the distributive goal of the State. It is argued that this goal is incompatible with the existence of large disparities in wealth and economic power, and that (contra conservative and libertarian economic arguments) such disparities are harmful to the overall health of national and global economies. The final chapters provide an original argument that the State has both a moral duty and a moral right to pursue this program of socio-economic justice (contra conservative and libertarian moral arguments), and that only the measures necessary to implement this program lie within the morally justifiable limits on the State's authority. Though primarily a political work, it spans most areas of practical philosophy-including ethical, social, and legal theory; and meta-ethics, moral psychology, and action theory. And though fundamentally a philosophical work, it incorporates research from a number of fields-including decision theory, economics, political science, and jurisprudence; primatology, neuroscience, and psychology; and history, anthropology, sociology, and ecology-and is sure to be of interest to a wide range of scholars and students.

Among the most prominent and significant political and legal developments since the end of the Cold War is the proliferation of mechanisms for addressing the complex challenges of transition from authoritarian rule to human rights-based democratic constitutionalism, particularly with regards to the demands for accountability in relation to conflicts and abuses of the past. Whether one thinks of the Middle East, South Africa, the Balkans, Latin America, or Cambodia, an extraordinary amount of knowledge has been gained and processes instituted through transitional justice. No longer a byproduct or afterthought, transitional justice is unquestionably the driver of political change. In Globalizing Transitional Justice, Ruti G. Teitel provides a collection of her own essays that embody her evolving reflections on the practice and discourse of transitional justice since her book Transitional Justice published back in 2000. In this new book, Teitel focuses on the ways in which transitional justice concepts have found legal expression, especially through human rights law and jurisprudence, and international criminal law. These essays shed light on some of the difficult choices encountered in the design of transitional justice: criminal trials vs. amnesties, or truth commissions; domestic or international processes; peace and reconciliation vs. accountability and punishment. Transitional justice is considered not only in relation to political events and legal developments, but also in relation to the broader social and cultural tendencies of our times.

In his collection George extends the critique of liberalism he expounded in Making Men Moral and also goes beyond it to show how contemporary natural law theory provides a superior way of thinking about basic problems of justice and political morality. It is written with the same combination of stylistic elegance and analytical rigour that distinguished his critical work. Not content merely to defend natural law from its cultural despisers, he deftly turns the tables and deploys the idea to mount a stunning attack on regnant liberal beliefs about such issues as abortion, sexuality, and the place of religion in public life.

Theorizing Legal Personhood in Late Medieval England is a collection of eleven essays that explore what might be distinctly medieval and particularly English about legal personhood vis-a-vis the jurisdictional pluralism of late medieval England. Spanning the mid-thirteenth to the mid-sixteenth centuries, the essays in this volume draw on common law, statute law, canon law and natural law in order to investigate emerging and shifting definitions of personhood at the confluence of legal and literary imaginations. These essays contribute new insights into the workings of specific literary texts and provide us with a better grasp of the cultural work of legal argument within the histories of ethics, of the self, and of Eurocentrism. Contributors are Valerie Allen, Candace Barrington, Conrad van Dijk, Toy Fung Tung, Helen Hickey, Andrew Hope, Jana Mathews, Anthony Musson, Eve Salisbury, Jamie Taylor and R.F. Yeager.

This book examines the concept of meaning and our general understanding of reality in a legal and philosophical context. Starting from the premise that meaning is a matter of linguistic and other forms of articulation, it considers the inherent philosophical consequences. Part I presents Klages', Derrida's, Von Hofmannsthal's and Wittgenstein's explorations of silence as a source of articulation and meaning. Debates about 20th century psychologism gave the attitude concept a pivotal role; it illustrates the importance of the discovery that a word is globally qualified as 'the basic unit of language'. This is mirrored in the fact that we understand reality as a matter of particles and thus interpret the real as a component of an all-embracing 'particle story'. Each chapter of the book focuses on an aspect of legal semiotics related to the chapter's theme: for instance on the meaning of a Judge's 'Saying for Law', on law students training in varying attitudes or on the ties between law and language. Part II of the book illustrates our general understanding of reality as a matter of particles and partitioning, and examines texts that prove that particle thinking is basic for our meaning concept. It shows that physics, quantum theory, holism, and modern brain research focusing on human linguistic capabilities, confirm their ties to the particle story. In contrast, the book concludes that partitions and particles are neither a fact in the history of the cosmos nor a determinant of knowledge and the sciences, and that meaning is a process: a constellation rather than a fixation. This is manifest once one understands meaning as the result of continuously changing attitudes, which create our narratives on cosmos and creation. The book proposes a new key for meaning: a linguistic occurrence anchored in dimensions of human narrativity.

Law is generally understood to be a mirror of society that functions to maintain social order. Focusing on this general understanding, this book conducts a survey of Western legal and social theories about law and its relationship within society. It then engages in a theoretical and empirical critique of this common understanding, covering such subjects as the impact of legal transplantation and globalization of law, and it proposes an alternative way to understand the relationship between law and society.

This book presents an analysis of global legal history in Modern times, questioning the effect of political revolutions since the 17th century on the legal field. Readers will discover a non-linear approach to legal history as this work investigates the ways in which law is created. These chapters look at factors in legal revolution such as the role of agents, the policy of applying and publicising legal norms, codification and the orientations of legal writing, and there is a focus on the publicization of law.

The author uses Herbert Hart s schemes to conceive law as a human artefact or convention, being the union between primary rules of obligations and secondary rules conferring powers. Here we learn about those secondary rules and the legal construction of the Modern state and we question the extent to which codification and law reporting were likely to revolutionize the legal field.

These chapters examine the hypothesis of a legal revolution that could have concerned many countries in modern times. To begin with, the book considers the legal aspect of the construction of Modern States in the 17th and 18th centuries. It goes on to examine the consequences of the codification movement as a legal revolution before looking at the so-called constitutional revolution, linked with the extension of judicial review in many countries after World War II. Finally, the book enquires into the construction of an EU legal order and international law.

In each of these chapters, the author measures the scope of the change, how the secondary rules are concerned, the role of the professional lawyers and what are the characters of the new configuration of the legal field. This book provokes new debates in legal philosophy about the rule of change and will be of particular interest to researchers in the fields of law, theories of law, legal history, philosophy of law and historians more broadly."

Autonomy is the central idea of modern practical philosophy. Understood as self-legislation, autonomy seems to require that the validity of norms depends on recognition, namely, that their addressees, being autonomous agents, recognize these norms to be valid. But, how can one be bound by norms whose validity depends on their being recognized as valid by their addressees? The questions of how autonomous morality and, on this basis, the authoritative character of law can be understood present persistent puzzles that have been widely discussed, but still await a satisfactory solution. This book presents an analysis of the idea of autonomy as self-legislation and its consequences for law and morality. The book links the idea of autonomy with the idea of the balancing of normative arguments. It develops a notion of normative arguments as distinct from normative judgments and statements, and it explains claims to correctness and objectivity that are found in normative discourse. Thus, a 'logic of autonomy' emerges, and it is pervasive in normative reasoning. The book connects theses regarding the logic of norms, the structure of balancing, human and fundamental rights, legal validity, legal interpretation, and the relations among legal systems, offering a theory of central elements of normative argumentation, a theory that is undergirded by the mutual relations that exist between and among its parts, as well as through the relations that it bears to other theories. Moreover, it offers an alternative to Kantian notions of autonomy and provides solutions to problems that other theories have not been able to cope with. (Series: Law and Practical Reason - Vol. 5)

Even in our most casual encounters with strangers -- when we are looking at each other, talking, or standing in line -- legal systems with elaborate codes, authorized exceptions, and procedures for sanctioning deviance operate with a remarkable degree of success. In this pathbreaking book, Michael Reisman describes how law is an integral and indispensable part of every social interaction. The private sphere or civic order that the liberal state is committed to preserving and in which it tries to refrain from legislating, says Reisman, is not a legal vacuum but the zone of microlaw -- some of it just, some unsatisfactory, and some tyrannical.

Interweaving numerous real-life examples with a detailed review of the scientific literature of many disciplines, Reisman shows the extent to which microlegal systems function in our own lives. More important, he draws on the criteria of ethics and legal philosophy to demonstrate that, paradoxically, efforts to improve microlaw may threaten the very autonomy of the private sphere that central is to the liberal state.

The nature and purpose of legal education has become a topic of intense debate in recent years. This timely book calls for a critical re-evaluation of university legal education, with the particular aim of strengthening its academic nature. The contributors emphasise lecturers' responsibility to challenge the assumptions students have about law, and the importance of putting law in a theoretical and social context that allows for critical reflection and sceptical detachment. In addition, the book reports upon teaching experiences and innovations, offering tools for teachers to strengthen the academic nature of legal education, and concludes with concrete proposals for change. Students and scholars engaged in the debate regarding the re-evaluation of academic legal education will find this book invaluable to their work. It will also be of interest to practitioners, such as educational experts and administrators looking to understand the role of law schools in creating responsible citizens. Contributors include: T. Bleeker, A. Boening, L. Corrias, U. de Vries, M. Del Mar, L. Francot, S. Germain, T. Hutchinson, B. Oomen, C. Schwoebel-Patel, B. Sokhi-Bulley, G. Uygur, B. van Klink, W. van Rossum

In this book the author investigates what is common to the German idea of the "Rechtsstaat "and the Anglo-American idea of the Rule of Law. He argues that, although dressed up in rather different garb, these two concepts are in fact based on the same fundamental idea and stand for the same values ( the law-state values ) all ideas that are in the European tradition older than their British and German variants. The fundamental idea is that the individual shall enjoy legal protection against infringements brought about by the exercise of power on the part of the state. In the book basic concepts such as legality, legal equality, legal certainty, legal accessibility and legal security are investigated. Also explored are their mutual relations, in particular, conflicts between them. Furthermore, the book offers practical advice on realising and sustaining these values in practice. Finally, it is argued that the characteristic law-state values can only be justified by reference to an even more fundamental humanistic idea, namely, what the author calls a life of human dignity ."

Reprint complete in one volume that contains "an English translation of five sections of the fourth volume of Otto von Gierke's magisterial treatise on the history of the German law of associations. When this edition was published, all competent students of the history of jurisprudence and political thought at once recognized that Professor Barker had made a very important contribution to the literature of these fields, none the less so because of the elaborate and learned Introduction which he himself had contributed." C.J. Friedrich, Harv. L. Rev. 49:677-680 cited in Marke, Catalogue of the Law Collection at New York University 938. Gierke [1841-1921], an important German jurist, is widely considered to be a founder of modern German constitutional law.

From the sex-free paradise of the Shakers to the worker's paradise of Marx, utopian ideas seem to have two things in common--they all are wonderfully plausible at the start and they all end up as disasters. In Visions of Utopia, three leading cultural critics--Edward Rothstein, Martin Marty, and Herbert Muschamp--look at the history of utopian thinking, exploring why they fail and why they are still worth pursuing.

Edward Rothstein, New York Times cultural critic, contends that every utopia is really a dystopia--a disaster in the making--one that overlooks the nature of humanity and the impossibilities of paradise. He traces the ideal in politics and technology and suggests that only in art--and especially in music--does the desire for utopia find satisfaction. Martin Marty examines several models of utopia--from Thomas More's to a 1960s experimental city that he helped to plan--to show that, even though utopias can never be realized, we should not be too quick to condemn them. They can express dimensions of the human spirit that might otherwise be stifled and can plant ideas that may germinate in more realistic and practical soil. And Herbert Muschamp, the New York Times architectural critic, looks at Utopianism as exemplified in two different ways: the Buddhist tradition and the work of visionary Viennese architect Adolph Loos.

Utopian thinking embodies humanity's noblest impulses, yet it can lead to horrors such as Nazi Germany and the Soviet Regime. In Visions of Utopia, these leading thinkers offer an intriguing look at the paradoxes of paradise.

This book presents the current state of the art regarding the application of logical tools to the problems of theory and practice of lawmaking. It shows how contemporary logic may be useful in the analysis of legislation, legislative drafting and legal reasoning concerning different contexts of law making. Elaborations of the process of law making have variously emphasised its political, social or economic aspects. Yet despite strong interest in logical analyses of law, questions remains about the role of logical tools in law making. This volume attempts to bridge that gap, or at least to narrow it, drawing together some important research problems-and some possible solutions-as seen through the work of leading contemporary academics. The volume encompasses 20 chapters written by authors from 16 countries and it presents diversified views on the understanding of logic (from strict mathematical approaches to the informal, argumentative ones) and differentiated choices concerning the aspects of law making taken into account. The book presents a broad set of perspectives, insights and results into the emerging field of research devoted to the logical analysis of the area of creation of law. How does logic inform lawmaking? Are legal systems consistent and complete? How can legal rules be represented by means of formal calculi and visualization techniques? Does the structure of statutes or of legal systems resemble the structure of deductive systems? What are the logical relations between the basic concepts of jurisprudence that constitute the system of law? How are theories of legal interpretation relevant to the process of legislation? How might the statutory text be analysed by means of contemporary computer programs? These and other questions, ranging from the theoretical to the immediately practical, are addressed in this definitive collection.

This book presents the theory of the validity of legal norms, aimed at the practice of law, in particular the jurisdiction of the constitutional courts. The postpositivist concept of the validity of statutory law, grounded on a critical analysis of the basic theories of legal validity elaborated up to now, is introduced. In the first part of the book a contemporary German nonpositivist conception of law developed by Ralf Dreier and Robert Alexy is analysed in order to answer the question whether the juristic concept of legal validity should include moral standards or criteria. In the second part, a postpositivist concept of legal validity and an innovative model of validity discourse, based on the juristic presumption of the validity of legal norms, are proposed. The book is a work on analytical legal theory, written from a postpositivist, detached point of view.