In a departure from the mainstream methodology of a positivist-oriented jurisprudence, Collective Rights provides the first legal-theoretical treatment of this area. It advances a normative-moral standpoint of 'value collectivism' which goes against the traditional political philosophy of liberalism and the dominant ideas of liberal multiculturalism. Moreover, it places a theoretical account of collective rights within the larger debate between proponents of different rights theories. By exploring why 'collective rights' should be differentiated from similar legal concepts, the relationship between collective and individual rights and why groups should be recognised as the third distinctive type of right-holders, it presents the topic as connected to the larger philosophical debate about international law of human rights, most notably to the problem of universality of rights.

The present collection represents an attempt to bring together several contributions to the ongoing debate pertaining to supervenience of the normative in law and morals and strives to be the first work that addresses the topic comprehensively. It addresses the controversies surrounding the idea of normative supervenience and the philosophical conceptions they generated, deserve a recapitulation, as well as a new impulse for further development. Recently, there has been renewed interest in the concepts of normativity and supervenience. The research on normativity - a term introduced to the philosophical jargon by Edmund Husserl almost one hundred years ago - gained impetus in the 1990s through the works of such philosophers as Robert Audi, Christine Korsgaard, Robert Brandom, Paul Boghossian or Joseph Raz. The problem of the nature and sources of normativity has been investigated not only in morals and in relation to language, but also in other domains, e.g. in law or in the c ontext of the theories of rationality. Supervenience, understood as a special kind of relation between properties and weaker than entailment, has become analytic philosophers' favorite formal tool since 1980s. It features in the theories pertaining to mental properties, but also in aesthetics or the law. In recent years, the 'marriage' of normativity and supervenience has become an object of many philosophical theories as well as heated debates. It seems that the conceptual apparatus of the supervenience theory makes it possible to state precisely some claims pertaining to normativity, as well as illuminate the problems surrounding it.

This collection of the papers of Tony Honore, is taken from his work in the field of legal philosophy over the last quarter century. The introductory essay is followed by three chapters describing the building blocks of legal systems - groups or societies, laws, and the motives to obey or conform. Succeeding papers discuss norms and obligations, rights and justice, analysing such fundamentals as ownership, property rights and the assertion of rights. The book concludes with an essay arguing for the use of law to encourage or reinforce morality.

The history of European expansion overseas also includes the history of the expansion of concepts and principles of European law into the non-European world. The values and ideas it expressed have, to this day, deeply influenced indigenous societies and governments. At the same time indigenous concepts of law were 'discovered' and codified by European scholars. The outcome of this was a complex and intense interaction between European and local concepts of law, which resulted in many dual legal systems in the African and Asian colonies and which is examined in this volume by prominent historians, lawyers and legal anthropologists.

Criminal Law raises hard questions concerning such issues as what acts should be prohibited, and in what circumstances should persons who perpetrate those acts be held responsible for them? Issues of harm and culpability pervade the criminal law, challenging all who seek a principled rather than an ad hoc understanding of the rules that constitute it. Harm and Culpability contains a collection of original papers delivered at Gonville and Caius College, in Cambridge, during a seminar series devoted to the discussion of philosophical issues generated by the criminal law. Papers were presented by some of the leading Anglo-American philosophers, criminall lawyers, and legal theorists and later revised in the light of seminar discussion and editorial guidance. The result is a connected group of essays whose subject matter is topical, and in each case of both theoretical and practical significance.

The Sovereignty of Human Rights advances a legal theory of international human rights that defines their nature and purpose in relation to the structure and operation of international law. Professor Macklem argues that the mission of international human rights law is to mitigate adverse consequences produced by the international legal deployment of sovereignty to structure global politics into an international legal order. The book contrasts this legal conception of international human rights with moral conceptions that conceive of human rights as instruments that protect universal features of what it means to be a human being. The book also takes issue with political conceptions of international human rights that focus on the function or role that human rights plays in global political discourse. It demonstrates that human rights traditionally thought to lie at the margins of international human rights law - minority rights, indigenous rights, the right of self-determination, social rights, labor rights, and the right to development - are central to the normative architecture of the field.

This book delves into the legal traditions that relegated women to an inferior social and legal status worldwide. Winnie Hazou probes the nature of law, changes in legislation, and the trend of modern law toward a social engineering that effects gender equality. Hazou analyzes changes in major areas of women's lives, such as family, employment, and the acquisition of social power. She presents a global perspective of women's status and discusses international law aimed at eliminating the exploitation and abuse of women. The book highlights five countries, exploring the cultural basis for and social attitudes toward the position of women in each country. Students and scholars of women's studies will find this book a valuable resource.

The book concludes that both national and international law are slowly evolving into an effective tool for the elimination of discrimination against women. In spite of residual traditions, and beliefs across all cultures concerning gender roles, there is great institutional support in governments as well as the United Nations to elevate the status of women. This book combines the sociology of women and the sociology of law to give a global perspective on not only the current position of women but the changes that are occurring in their lives.

H.L.A. Hart once argued that a theory suppressing the normative component of law "fails to mark and explain the crucial distinction between mere regularities of human behavior and rule-governed behavior." This is a serious drawback for a theory of law, since an important part of the legal domain is concerned with rule-governed conduct and may be expressed only by use of such notions as norm, obligation, duty, and right. These notions require us to acknowledge the existence of a normative dimension in the legal domain. This collection of essays contributes to the study of normativity in law by staging a thorough discussion of the notion, approached from three directions: the theory of planning agency, legal conventionalism, and the constitutivist approach. Though not offering an exhaustive picture of the current debate on the normativity of law, the book is meant rather to provide the reader with some authoritative statements of some widely-discussed families of views of legal normativity. Thus, the volume encourages a dialogue between different traditions of study and stimulates those who would not otherwise look outside their tradition of thought to engage with new ideas. The underlying idea of the collection is that no general theory of normativity can be put forward unless it addresses distinct - albeit interrelated - disciplines, such as the philosophy of mind, metaphysics, theory of action, meta-ethics, social philosophy, political theory, ethical theory, and jurisprudence. (Series: Law and Practical Reason)

During the last decades, legal theory has focused almost completely on norms, rules and arguments as the constitutive elements of law. Concepts were mostly neglected. The contributions to this volume try to remedy this neglect by elucidating the role concepts play in law from different perspectives. A main aim of this volume is to initiate a debate about concepts in law. Ake Frandberg gives an overview of the many different uses of concepts in law and shows amongst others that concepts in the law should not be confused with the role of concepts in descriptions of the law. Dietmar von der Pfordten criticizes the restriction to norms as parts of the law in contemporary legal theory by questioning what concepts are and what their function is, both in general and in legal conceptual schemes. Giovanni Sartor assumes the inferential analysis of meaning proposed by Alf Ross in his ground breaking paper Tu-tu and addresses the question how possession of a concept, including the rules defining it, is possible without endorsing these rules. Jaap Hage argues that 1. legal status words such as 'owner' have a meaning because they denote things or relations in institutional reality, 2. the meaning of these words consists in this denotation relation, 3. knowledge of this meaning presupposes knowledge of the rules governing these words. Torben Spaak contributes to this volume with an exemplary analysis of one of the most central concepts of the law, namely that of a legal power. Lorenz Kahler discusses the role of concepts in determining the scope of application of legal rules and raises from this perspective the question to what extent legal concept formation can be arbitrary. Ralf Poscher argues that as soon as a concept is used in stating the law, the precise scope of application of this concept has become a legal matter. This means that the use of 'moral' concepts in the law does not automatically lead to a moral import into the law. Dennis Patterson holds that Hart's concept of law can be understood as a so-called 'practice theory' and provides an overview of such a theory."

This book brings together twelve of the most important legal philosophers in the Anglo-American and Civil Law traditions. The book is a collection of the papers these philosophers presented at the Conference on Neutrality and Theory of Law, held at the University of Girona, in May 2010. The central question that the conference and this collection seek to answer is: Can a theory of law be neutral? The book covers most of the main jurisprudential debates. It presents an overall discussion of the connection between law and morals, and the possibility of determining the content of law without appealing to any normative argument. It examines the type of project currently being held by jurisprudential scholarship. It studies the different approaches to theorizing about the nature or concept of law, the role of conceptual analysis and the essential features of law. Moreover, it sheds some light on what can be learned from studying the non-essential features of law. Finally, it analyzes the nature of legal statements and their truth values. This book takes the reader a step further to understanding law.

This collection brings together the best contemporary philosophical work in the area of intersection between philosophy of language and the law. Some of the contributors are philosophers of language who are interested in applying advances in philosophy of language to legal issues, and some of the participants are philosophers of law who are interested in applying insights and theories from philosophy of language to their work on the nature of law and legal interpretation. By making this body of recent work available in a single volume, readers will gain both a general overview of the various interactions between language and law, and also detailed analyses of particular areas in which this interaction is manifest.
The contributions to this volume are grouped under three main general areas: The first area concerns a critical assessment, in light of recent advances in philosophy of language, of the foundational role of language in understanding the nature of law itself. The second main area concerns a number of ways in which an understanding of language can resolve some of the issues prevalent in legal interpretation, such as the various ways in which semantic content can differ from law's assertive content; the contribution of presuppositions and pragmatic implicatures in understanding what the law conveys; the role of vagueness in legal language, for example. The third general topic concerns the role of language in the context of particular legal doctrines and legal solutions to practical problems, such as the legal definitions of inchoate crimes, the legal definition of torture, or the contractual doctrines concerning default rules.
Together, these three key issues cover a wide range of philosophical interests in law that can be elucidated by a better understanding of language and linguistic communication.

This book is an innovative contribution to analytical jurisprudence. It is mainly based on the distinct premises of linguistic philosophy and Carnapian semantics, but also addresses the issues of institutional philosophy, social pragmatism, and legal principles as envisioned by Dworkin, among others. Wroblewskis three ideologies (bound/free/legal and rational) and Makkonens three situations (isomorphic/semantically vague/normative gap) of judicial decision-making are further developed by means of 10 frames of legal analysis as discerned by the author. With the philosophical theories of truth serving as a reference, the frames of legal analysis include the isomorphic theory of law (Wittgenstein, Makkonen), the coherence theory of law (Alexy, Peczenik, Dworkin), the new rhetoric and legal argumentation theory (Perelman, Aarnio), social consequentialism (Posner), natural law theory (Fuller, Finnis), and the sequential model of legal reasoning by Neil MacCormick and the Bielefelder Kreis. At the end, some key issues of legal metaphysics are addressed, like the notion of legal systematics and the future potential of the analytical approach in jurisprudence.

How do we know when one person or society is `freer' than another? Can freedom be measured? Is more freedom better than less? This book provides the first full-length treatment of these fundamental yet neglected issues, throwing new light both on the notion of freedom and on contemporary liberalism.

This short and accessible book provides a provocative re-assessment of the various tangled relationships between law and politics and in so doing examines legal and political thinking on such critical areas as justice,the state, constitutionalism and rights. It introduces lawyers especially to certain important themes in some of the key texts in political thought and introduces political scientists to the legal dimensions of a number of central themes of political studies. Written by one of the leading theorists in constitutional law, the book should prove to be an indispensable companion for any student or teacher interested in law and politics. Contents I. Law and Politics in the Conversation of Mankind II. Justice III. The State IV. Constitutionalism V. Conclusions

The law is a symbolic construction and therefore rests on a variety of undertakings. What gives law its meaning is,for some, ideology, for others, the welfare of the majority. However, what is manifest is a conception of the law as a material structure that carries symbols of everyday life. The analyses that are made in the law and semiotics movements show that the laws symbolism cannot be understood by reference only to itself, a strictly legal meaning. It is a symbol that conveys life, a symbol that in itself is contaminated with life, politics, morality and so on. Law and Semiotics is an obvious meeting point between traditions, because it is the place where all the discussions about the law can find a common language. This is a collection of different papers where the institution of the law is investigated, in combination with, and as part of, a multiplicity of sign systems. Firstly, law can be understood as part of a global system of meaning (Part I); and, secondly, that despite the homogenising threat of globalisation, the play of legal meaning retains a socio-historical specificity (Part II). The global issues of human migration, human rights, colonisation and transnational power are played out in local spaces, in the public discourses through which they are given localised representation, in moments of activism, and as a tool of subversion. The law is a rhetorical device which at once constitutes these global and local truths but which is also constituted by them.

This very first analysis of Spinoza's philosophy of law from the viewpoint of his deterministic ontology shows that he revolutionized modern philosophy from within by developing an entirely new natural law theory connecting his ontology to radically democratic political views. The book forms a balanced structure in which the three conceptual pillars of Spinoza's natural law theory (individuality, natural laws, and power) are first analyzed from the viewpoint of his ontology and then from the viewpoint of his political theory. Spinoza's revolutionary equivalence of law to power is regarded as the core simultaneously of an ethical individualistic project, of a democratic alternative to modern State politics, and of an amoral naturalistic philosophy of law. The author concludes that Spinoza develops a new type of progressive individualism still left to explore that revolutionizes both modern natural law and contemporary radical democratic studies.

Through critical analysis of key concepts and measures of the rule of law, this book shows that the choice of definitions and measures affects descriptive and explanatory findings about nomocracy. It argues a constitutionalist legacy from centuries ago and explains why European civilisations display higher adherence to rule of law than other countries.

Striking a balance between the aspirations of individual freedom and the demands of organized society is a central quest of constitutional law. Germany and America provide different paths toward accomplishment of this equilibrium, revealing two paths to freedom and its relation to community. This work is addressed to philosophers of law, political theorists, constitutional lawyers, and everyone interested in protecting human rights and learning the meaning of human personality and freedom as expressed in democratic constitutional regimes. Eberle challenges current thinking in the field by setting out alternative visions of human freedom, dignity, personality and expression; demonstrating that use of comparative methodology has much to offer critical examination of major constitutional and public policy issues; and showing that different conceptions of fundamental ideas are possible. Exploring the nature of human personality as reflected in the constitutional law of two important constitutional democracies, Eberle inquires into human values and human freedom, across national borders, in pursuit of a better understanding of human potential and the nature and limit of freedom. The central personality traits examined comprise human dignity; autonomy; self-determination and identity, including privacy, computer privacy, control over personal information, and maintenance of one's image, words, and reputation; abortion; and freedom of expression, including defamation, offensive speech, hate speech, and burning of the flag. The book weaves between German and American law in examining these questions, providing a unique comparative perspective on the idea of human personality and freedom.

With industrialization and globalization, corporations acquired the capacity to influence social life for good or for ill. Yet, corporations are not traditional objects of criminal law. Justified by notions of personal moral guilt, criminal norms have been judged inapplicable to fictional persons, who 'think' and 'act' through human beings. The expansion of new corporate criminal liability (CCL) laws since the mid-1990s challenges this assumption. Our volume surveys current practice on CCL in 15 civil and common law jurisdictions, exploring the legal conditions for liability, the principles and options for sanctioning, and the procedures for investigating, charging and trying corporate offenders. It considers whether municipal CCL laws are converging around the notion of 'corporate culture', and, in any case, the implications of CCL for those charged with keeping corporations, and other legal entities, out of trouble.

Trace the roots of the concept of equal protection from the American Revolution and the formation of the Constitution through its application today using this collection of 177 primary documents from a variety of sources. Students can use this unique reference resource to examine the tension between the concept of equal protection and recognition of slavery in the constitutional order, to explore the devitalization and revitalization of the 14th and 15th Constitutional amendments from the era of Jim Crow through the Civil Rights movement, and to study current court rulings on equal protection of the law. Petitions, laws, court decisions, personal accounts, and a variety of other documents bring to life the experiences of African Americans in the American constitutional order. Five historical periods are explored with particular emphasis on the concept of equal protection of the law and its particular embodiment in the 14th Amendment. These include: the roots of the concept of equal protection in the Anglo-American experience, the lives of African Americans under a Constitution that incorporated equal protection yet recognized slavery, the 14th and 15th Amendments and the development of Jim Crow, 20th-century developments in the application of equal protection to race, and the accomplishments of the Civil Rights movement and developments since that time. The introductory and explanatory text helps readers understand the nature of the conflicts, the issues being litigated, and the social and cultural pressures that shaped each debate. This welcome resource will provide students with the opportunity to understand the various arguments put forth in different debates, encouraging readers to consider all sides when drawing their own conclusions.

The essays collected in this book address legislation from the viewpoint of legal theory and provide an overview of current research in legisprudence as a new scholarly approach to lawmaking. The overall focus of the volume is on the justification of legislation, with a special emphasis on the intricate notion of legislative rationality. With the rational justification of legislation as their central theme, the essays elaborate on the foundations and bounds of legislation and the search for a more principled lawmaking, discuss the role of legislation within the framework of democratic constitutionalism, analyze legislation as implementation of constitutional law, and explore how legislative argumentation in parliament can be construed as a source of justification of laws.

In an age of widespread cutbacks on social spending, the prospects of social policy generally appear to be grim. If noticeable progress has been recently made in the European Union, then it is in regard to rooting out discrimination. Indeed, anti-discrimination law and policy appears to be the one sphere of social policy whose success is causally connected to the European Union.
But how successful can anti-discrimination law be? This book uses legal analysis in order to expose the intrinsic shortcomings of common approaches. Anti-discrimination law fails to provide adequate legal guidance and therefore invites constant supplementation by pedagogical projects of social engineering.
This book offers a genuinely leftist critique on anti-discrimination law, and concludes with a discussion of alternative models of solidarity in the Union.

Herbert Lionel Adolphus Hart was born in Yorkshire in 1907 to second generation Jewish immigrants. Having won a scholarship to Oxford University, he went on to become the most famous legal philosopher of the twentieth century. From 1932-40 H.L.A Hart practised as a barrister in London. He was pronounced physically unfit for military service in 1940, and was recruited by MI5, where he worked until 1945. During his time at the Bar he had continued to study philosophy and at M15 his interest was further stimulated by his philosopher colleagues in M16, Stuart Hampshire and Gilbert Ryle. After the war, Hart returned to Oxford to take up a philosophy fellowship, later to become Professor of Jurisprudence. H.L.A Hart single-handedly reinvented the philosophy of law and influenced the nation's thinking in the 1960s on abortion, the legalization of homosexuality, and on capital punishment. Hart's approach to legal philosophy was at once disarmingly simple and breathtakingly ambitious, combining as it did the insights of Austin and Bentham and the new linguistic philosophy of J.L. Austin and Ludwig Wittgenstein. He sought to elucidate a concept of law which would be of relevance to all forms of law, wherever or whenever they arose: his bestselling book, The Concept of Law, has sold tens of thousands of copies worldwide. In 1941, he married Jenifer Williams (a high-ranking civil servant, later an Oxford academic) with whom he had four children. Their relationship was an enduring if unconventional one. In the early 1950s, Jenifer was rumoured to be having a long-standing affair with Isaiah Berlin, one of Hart's closest friends. She was also, falsely, accused by the Sunday Times of having been a Russian spy, an allegation which was all the more scandalous given Hart's position at MI5 during the War. Nicola Lacey draws on Hart's previously unpublished diaries and letters to reveal a complex inner life. Outwardly successful, Hart was in fact tormented by doubts about his intellectual abilities, his sexual identity and his capacity to form close relationships. Her biography also sheds fascinating light on the origins of his ideas, and assesses his overall contribution. Above all, it chronicles of a life which had a depth ands impact far greater than many of Hart's readers have realized.

Preface International conferences are not organized overnight-especially not when high ranking personalities from politics, business and academia should be offered an adequate platform for addressing and discussing highly relevant contemporary issues. The conference on "The Role of Law and Ethics in the Globalized Economy," which took place on May 22 and 23, 2008 in the Bavarian Academy of Sciences and Humanities in Munich, was no exception. When the first preparations started at the end of 2006, neither the subprime crises nor the general crises of the global financial system, whose shock waves have rocked the financial businesses in subsequent months, were known; nor were they predictable or even imaginable. Based on our monitoring of the globalization process and its apparent impact-not only on the economic and technological environment, but also on the social en- ronment-it was appropriate for the conference to begin by serving as a platform for analysing the status quo of the process of globalization, as relevant to politics, business and academia, and for exploring how the interest groups in those domains cope with the challenges of globalization. In the end, however, the purpose of the conference was to produce proposals for conditions for "upwards" global compe- tion, meaning that minimum conditions should be worked out to enable people to live and labour humanely. Such conditions would be those which should help avoid otherwise inevitable frictions in society, both nationally and internationally.

This book argues that critics of consequentialism have not been able to make a successful and comprehensive case against all versions of consequentialism because they have been using the wrong methodology. This methodology relies on the crucial assumption that consequentialist theories share a defining characteristic. This text interprets consequentialism, instead, as a family resemblance term. On that basis, it argues quite an ambitions claim, viz. that all versions of consequentialism should be rejected, including those that have been created in response to conventional criticisms. The book covers a number of classic themes in normative ethics, metaethics and, particularly, ethical methodology and also touches upon certain aspects of experimental moral philosophy. It is written in clear language and is analytic in its argumentative style. As such, the book should appeal to students, graduate students as well as professional academics with an interest in analytic moral philosophy.