During the last half of the twentieth century, legal philosophy (or legal theory or jurisprudence) has grown significantly. It is no longer the domain of a few isolated scholars in law and philosophy. Hundreds of scholars from diverse fields attend international meetings on the subject. In some universities, large lecture courses of five hundred students or more study it. The primary aim of the Law and Philosophy Library is to present some of the best original work on legal philosophy from both the Anglo-American and European traditions. Not only does it help make some of the best work avail able to an international audience, but it also encourages increased awareness of, and interaction between, the two major traditions. The primary focus is on full-length scholarly monographs, although some edited volumes of original papers are also included. The Library editors are assisted by an Editorial Advisory Board of internationally renowned scholars. Legal philosophy should not be considered a narrowly circumscribed field. Insights into law and legal institutions can come from diverse disciplines on a wide range of topics. Among the relevant disciplines or perspectives con tributing to legal philosophy, besides law and philosophy, are anthropology, economics, political science, and sociology. Among the topics included in legal philosophy are theories of law; the concepts of law and legal institutions; legal reasoning and adjudication; epistemological issues of evidence and pro cedure; law and justice, economics, politics, or morality; legal ethics; and theories oflegal fields such as criminal law, contracts, and property."

This volume presents a diverse array of articles by an interdisciplinary and international group of scholars. Their work spans the social sciences, humanities, and law. It examines the many ways citizens learn about law, law beyond the nation-state and the relationship of law and labour.

It is a sine qua non of legal practice that lawyers should not allow themselves to act for two clients whose interests may,potentially, conflict. However, this principle is being placed under increasing pressure, the main reasons for this being increased demand for specialist legal services, the globalisation of commerce, a dramatic growth in the size of leading law firms, and significantly greater mobility within the legal profession. As a result, there is a growing trend, especially within the commercial legal environment, for solicitors to face conflicts of interest which have no easy solution. Increasingly, conflicts are being 'managed', rather than avoided altogether. This is a field within which the Law Society's own rules are flouted on a daily basis, and in which these rules appear increasingly at odds with the common law. Based on extensive interviews with lawyers and their clients, this book provides the first thorough consideration of how conflicts of interest are handled within law firms. It will be essential reading to all those who have an interest in professional legal ethics, including law students, legal scholars, practitioners, and regulators.

This volume explores new interfaces between linguistics and jurisprudence. Its theoretical and methodological importance lies in showing that many questions asked within the field of language and law receive satisfactory answers from formal linguistics. The book starts with a paper by the two editors in which they explain why the volume - as a whole and with its individual papers - is an innovation in the field of language and law. In addition, an overview about the most important research projects on language and law is given. The first chapter of the book is on understanding the law. Jurists and laypersons always ask for the precise meaning of a certain piece of the law. In linguistics, the discipline investigating 'meaning' is semantics; thus, it is to be expected that semantics can contribute to a correct understanding of the law. Chapter 1 also investigates the alleged incomprehensibility of legal language with the help of psycholinguistics. Chapter 2 is on identifying the criminal. To find the author of a blackmailer's letter, text/ corpus linguistics is instrumental. If the blackmailer uses the telephone instead of the letter, speaker identification and phonetics are necessary. The BKA stores all blackmailing letters in a database, but databases are only one possibility of organizing legal systems; another possibility is the application of tools from computational linguistics and artificial intelligence. These tools can be useful to handle terminology, to retrieve information, or to model legal theorizing in a formal system. Chapter 3 demonstrates a variety of examples of organizing legal systems. The topic of chapter 4 is multilingualism and the law. The European legislation is a product of legal and linguistic diversity, as the member states do not only differ in languages but also in their legal systems. One paper shows how Switzerland handles its multilingualism in legal drafting. The input of translation studies is of course vital in this field of research. An index for both subjects and persons complements the volume.

Based on papers given at a conference at King's College, London, in 1998, Foundations of Charity brings together established scholars in the fields of charity law, public law, and trusts law, and internationally recognized writers on social policy and legal philosophy, from England and Wales, Scotland, Australia, Canada and the United States. The contributors take an iconoclastic approach to the legal definition of charitable status, and provide an in-depth analysis of key concepts in charity law and administration, such as 'public benefit' and 'political activity'. The combination of their different perspectives on 'charity' produces a varied, stimulating, and challenging collection. It should be useful reading for academics, practising lawyers and voluntary sector managers who are looking for a sustained critique of 'charity'.

This collection of essays on the rule of law focuses on the traditional question whether the rule of law is necessarily the rule of moral principles, the question of the legitimacy of law. Essays by lawyers, philosophers, and political theorists illuminate and take forward both that question and debate about issues to do with the reach of the rule of law which complicate its answer. The essays are divided into sections which deal, first, with legal orders where the rule of law is under severe stress, second, with the question of the value of the rule of law as a conceptual problem, and, third, with the question of the limits of legal order. Contributors: Richard Abel, Jody Freeman, Robert Alexy, Neil MacCormick, Kenneth Winston, Andras Sajo, Alon Harel, Anton Fagan, Anthony Sebok, Christine Sypnowich, Allan Hutchinson, Bill Scheuerman, John MacCormick, Julian Rivers, Henry Richardson, David Dyzenhaus.

This book defends an event-causal theory of libertarian free will and argues that the belief in such free will plays an important, if not essential, role in supporting certain important values. In the first part of the book, the author argues that possession of libertarian free will is necessary for deserved praise and blame and reward and punishment. He contends that his version of libertarian free will-the indeterministic weightings view- is coherent and can fit with a scientific, naturalistic understanding of human nature. However, the author also notes that we don't have sufficient evidentiary grounds to believe that human beings have this kind of free will. Despite this, he argues there are sufficiently strong value-based/axiological reasons to believe we have such free will and to live an act as if we have it. In the second part of the book, the author makes the case that the belief in such libertarian, desert-grounding free will is very important to defending human dignity in the context of criminal justice, making sense of justified pride and its value, and adding value to our relationships. Free Will's Value will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in metaphysics, philosophy of mind, action theory, ethics, and the philosophy of law.

The present study which I have subtitled A Study in Law and Logic was prompted by the question of whether an investigation into law and legal systems could lead to the discovery of unrevealed fundamental patterns common to all such systems. This question was further stimulated by two interrelated problems. Firstly, could an inquiry be rooted in specifically legal matters, as distinct from the more usual writings on deontic logic? Secondly, could such inquiry yield a theory which would nevertheless embrace a strict and simple logical structure, permitting substantive conclusions in legal matters to be deduced from simple rules governing some basic concepts? Before the development of deontic logic, W. N. Hohfeld devoted his efforts to this question at the beginning of this century. However, with this exception, few jurists have studied the interrelation between law and logic projected in this way. Nevertheless, two great names are to be found, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz and Jeremy Bentham-both philo sophers with legal as weIl as logical training. Bentham's investigations of logical patterns in law have only recently attracted attention; and as for Leibniz, his achievements are still almost totally unexplored (his most important writings on law and logic have not even been translated from Latin). My initial interest in the question was evoked by Professor Stig Kanger. Although primarily a logician and philosopher, Stig Kanger has been interested also in the fundamentals of legal theory."

Justifying Taxes offers readers some of the elements of a democratic tax law, considered within its political and philosophical context in order to determine the extent of legitimate tax obligations. The objective is to revisit some of the issues in the dogmatics of tax law from the viewpoint of a critical citizen, always ready to ask questions about the justification underlying her obligations, and especially about her paramount burden, viz., the payment of certain amounts of money. Within this purview, special attention is paid to the general principles of taxation. The argument is complemented by a detailed reconstruction of constitutional reasoning in tax matters, close attention being paid to the jurisprudence of the Spanish Tribunal Constitucional. Readership: Legal scholars, political scientists and philosophers. Especially recommended to graduate and undergraduate students of Tax Law, Constitutional Law, Jurisprudence, Philosophy of Law and Political Theory.

Most of the papers in this collection are contributions to action theory intended to be of some relevance to one or another concern of decision theory, particularly to its application to concrete human behavior. Some of the papers touch only indirectly on problems of interest to decision theorists, but taken together they should be of use to both decision theorists and philosophers of action. Robert Audi's paper indicates how a number of questions in action theory might bear on problems in decision theory, and it suggests how some action-theoretic results may help in the construction or interpretation of theories of decision, both normative and empirical. Carl Ginet's essay lays foundations for the conception of action. His volitional framework roots actions internally and conceives them as irreducibly connected with intentionality. Hugh McCann's essay is also foundational, but stresses intention more than volition and lays some of the groundwork for assessing the rationality of intention and intentional action. In William Alston's paper, the notion of a plan as underlying (intentional) action is central, and we are given both a con ception of the structure of intentional action and a set of implicit goals and beliefs - those whose content is represented in the plan - which form an indispensable part of the basis on which the rationality of the action is to be judged."

Using St. Thomas Aquinas's natural law philosophy and Divine Exemplar argument to prompt new discussion of ethical questions that lawyers and judges should confront, the author delivers a complete occupational profile for the professional conduct of judges and lawyers. St. Thomas's discourse on such topics as procedural law, judicial and advocate conduct and character, criminal and civil practice standards, and sentencing guidelines provides a blueprint for the Christian lawyer and judge by laying out the professional and ethical parameters that make the actor operate in accordance with reason and morality. This text on Thomistic jurisprudence challenges the current beliefs of law and the justice system, the functions of lawyers, advocates, and judges, and traditional views on evidence and punishment, and suggests a return to the "roots" of the system, in which reason, virtue, and justice guide the law and its practice. Lawyers, judges, students, and scholars should find in these pages a unique approach to renewing our beleaguered justice system. Relying on extensive quotations from the works of St. Thomas Aquinas, the author begins the text with an explication of St. Thomas's influences, legal philosophy, and thoughts on virtue and the law. He then devotes several chapters to specific concepts in Thomistic jurisprudence, including prudence, the common good, judicial process, judgment, and punishment. The final chapters analyze the role of lawyers and judges, and argues for the need for the application of the Thomistic model of jurisprudence to our criminal justice system.

The main purpose of this book is to offer a logical analysis of legal propositions, especially of constitutional propositions. This analysis shows the relationship between truth-conditions of legal propositions and the problem of indeterminacy. Where the law is indeterminate, legal propositions lack truth-values. The background of this approach is the philosophical debate between realism and antirealism. The book deals with the notions of legal norms and legal systems and provides an analysis of the notion of legal indeterminacy and its relation to gaps, contradictions and the vagueness of legal concepts. It shows also that the simple model of a legal system is not sufficient to account for the complexity of legal propositions referring to legal systems of some degree of maturity. Several notions from legal dynamics are presented in order to bring to light the importance of concepts like applicability or hierarchy for the determination of the truth-value of a legal proposition. Thus the primacy of constitution becomes a central idea in the theoretical reconstruction of most contemporary legal systems; a conceptual explanation of this idea is presented and some conclusions from that explanation are drawn. Finally, a particular conception of constitutional interpretation is proposed. Special attention is paid to the relationship between interpretation and legal indeterminacy and, more specifically, to the problem of the discretion enjoyed by the organs entrusted with applying the constitution and also to the several theses that have been discussed controversially in the context of constitutional interpretation, such as the relevance of the intentions for the interpretation of theconstitution and for the justification of judicial review.

I begin by introducing the main issues of the work, and inviting their consideration; as enticement, I offer a sketch of their practical importance, and of the philosophical challenge they present. And I provide a preview of the work's organization and central argument. There is something so obvious that it is easily-and often-overlooked: the enforcing of criminal statutes is the most intrusive and coercive exercise of domestic power by a state. Forcibly preventing people from doing that which they wish to do, forcibly compelling people to do that which they do not wish to do-and wielding force merely attempting to compel or prevent-these state activities have extraordinarily serious ramifications. Indeed, no state institutions are likely to have more profound an impact on the lives of individual citizens than those of the criminal justice system. I endorse Herbert Packer's assessment: The criminal sanction is the law's ultimate threat. Being punished for a crime is different from being regulated in the public interest, or being forced to compensate another who has been injured by one's conduct, or being treated for a disease. The sanction is at once l uniquely coercive and, in the broadest sense, uniquely expensive. As a consequence, these state activities are in special need of moral warrant. Given the great potential for doing grave injustice, the power of the state embodied in the criminal justice system ought not be exercised in the absence of a complete and compelling moral justification.

The book presents a new focus on the legal philosophical texts of Aristotle, which offers a much richerframe for the understanding of practical thought, legal reasoning and political experience. It allows understanding how human beings interact in a complex world, and how extensive the complexity is which results from humans' own power of self-construction and autonomy. The Aristotelian approach recognizes the limits of rationality and the inevitable and constitutive contingency in Law. All this offers a helpful instrument to understand the changes globalisation imposes to legal experience today. The contributions in this collection do not merely pay attention to private virtues, but focus primarily on public virtues. They deal with the fact that law is dependent on political power and that a person can never be sure about the facts of a case or about the right way to act. They explore the assumption that a detailed knowledge of Aristotle's epistemology is necessary, because of the direct connection between Enlightened reasoning and legal positivism. They pay attention to the concept of proportionality, which can be seen as a precondition to discuss liberalism.

According to platonists, entities such as numbers, sets, propositions and properties are abstract objects. But abstract objects lack causal powers and a location in space and time, so how could we ever come to know of the existence of such impotent and remote objects? In Knowledge, Cause, and Abstract Objects, Colin Cheyne presents the first systematic and detailed account of this epistemological objection to the platonist doctrine that abstract objects exist and can be known. Since mathematics has such a central role in the acquisition of scientific knowledge, he concentrates on mathematical platonism. He also concentrates on our knowledge of what exists, and argues for a causal constraint on such existential knowledge. Finally, he exposes the weaknesses of recent attempts by platonists to account for our supposed platonic knowledge. This book will be of particular interest to researchers and advanced students of epistemology and of the philosophy of mathematics and science. It will also be of interest to all philosophers with a general interest in metaphysics and ontology.

Voluntariness is a necessary condition of valid consent. But determining whether a person consented voluntarily can be difficult, especially when people are subjected to coercion or manipulation, placed in a situation with no acceptable alternative other than to consent to something, or find themselves in an abusive relationship.

This book examines how the functioning of the International Criminal Court has become a forum of convergence between the common law and civil law criminal justice systems. Four countries were selected as primary examples of these two legal traditions: the United States, England and Wales, Germany and Poland. The first layer of analysis focuses on selected elements of the model of accusation that are crucial to the model adopted by the ICC. These are: development of the notion of the prosecutor's independence in view of their ties to the countries and the Security Council; the nature and limits of the prosecutor's discretional powers to initiate proceedings before the ICC; the reasons behind the prosecutor's choice of both defendants and charges; the role the prosecutor plays in the procedure of disclosure of evidence and consensual termination of proceedings; and the determinants of the model of accusation used during trial and appeal proceedings. The second layer of the book consists in an analysis of the motives behind applying particular solutions to create the model of accusation before the ICC. It also shows how the model of accusation gradually evolved in proceedings before the military and ad hoc tribunals: ICTY and ICTR. Moreover, the question of compatibility of procedural institutions is addressed: In what ways does adopting a certain element of criminal procedure, e.g. discretional powers of the prosecutor to initiate criminal proceedings, influence the remaining procedural elements, e.g. the existence of the dossier of a case or the powers of a judge to change the legal classification of the criminal behavior appearing in the indictment?

Looking at two of the key paradigms of the post-Cold War era–national sovereignty, and human rights – this book examines the possibilities for their reconciliation from a global perspective. The real or imagined fear of a flood of immigrants has caused and fuelled the surge of an amalgam of populist political forces, anti-immigrant movements, and exclusionist nationalism in many developed countries. In the last decade, we have witnessed the emergence of two phenomena in the political and legal spheres. On the one hand, there are liberal globalists asking for respect and the protection of the basic human rights of migrants and asylum seekers and arguing for their civic and social integration into host societies. On the other hand, there are growing calls for a tougher stance on immigration, and powerful populist politicians and governments have emerged in many developed countries. How can the idea of universal human rights survive exclusionist nationalism that uses a populist, unscrupulous approach to its advantage? The contributors to this book explore the meaning of, and possible solutions to, this dilemma using a wide range of approaches and seek appropriate ways of dealing with these normative predicaments shared by many developed societies. Scholars and students of human rights, migration, nationalism and multiculturalism will find this a very valuable resource.

This collection of nine essays selected from the nonjudical writings of Judge J. Skelly Wright deals with many of the important legal-policy questions of his career. Emphasizing his long-held belief that the disadvantaged should receive special protection, he details some of the ways in which the courts have failed to meet the needs of the underprivileged. He expands his views on judical activism, the uses and abuses of money in America's political process, and other of his abiding concerns. Each essay is preceded by an introductory statement discussing the content of the article.

Many Christians ignore most Old Testament laws as obsolete or irrelevant. Others claim to honor them but in fact pick and choose among them very selectively in support of specific agendas, like opposition to homosexual rights. Yet it is a basic tenet of Christian doctrine that the faith is contained in both the Old and the New Testament. If the law is ignored, an important aspect of the faith tradition is denied. In this book Cheryl Anderson tackles this problem head on, attempting to answer the question whether the laws of the Old Testament are authoritative for Christians today. This question is crucial, because some Christians actually believe that the New Testament abolishes the law, or that the major Protestant reformers (Luther, Calvin, Wesley) rejected the law. Anderson acknowledges the deeply problematic nature of some Old Testament law, especially as it applies to women. For example, Exodus 22:16-17 and Deuteronomy 22:28-29 both deem the rape of an unmarried female to have injured her father rather than the female herself. Deuteronomy requires the victim to marry her rapist. Anderson argues that biblical laws nevertheless teach us foundational values. They also, however, remind us of the differences between their ancient context and our own. She suggests that we approach biblical law in much the same way that Americans regard the Constitution. The nation's founding fathers were privileged white males who did not have the poor, women, or people of color in mind when they agreed that "all men are created equal." The Constitution has subsequently been amended and court decisions have extended its protections to those who were previously excluded. Although the biblical documents cannot be modified, the manner in which they are interpreted in later settings can and should be altered. In addition to her work as a scholar of the Old Testament, Anderson has been a practicing attorney, and has worked extensively in critical, legal, feminist and womanist theory. This background uniquely qualifies her to apply insights from contemporary law and legal theory to the interpretive history of biblical law, and to draw out their implications for issues of gender, class, and ethnicity.

This book is concerned with a central question in contemporary legal theory: how to describe global law? In addressing this question, the book brings together two features that are different and yet connected to one another: the conceptual description of contemporary law on the one hand, and methods of taking concrete perspectives on law on the other hand.

The book provides a useful concept for describing global law: thinking of law spatially. It illustrates that space is a concept with the capacity to capture the relationality, dynamics, and hybridity of law. Moreover, this book investigates the role of topological thinking in finding concrete perspectives on law.

Legal Spaces offers an innovative and interdisciplinary approach to law.

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What should society or individuals do when the compelling dictates of personal conscience conflict with the law? To what extent should lawyers and lawmakers be influenced by considerations of morality? Are there principles that go beyond legal jurisdiction to justify acts of civil disobedience? Is it right to violate the laws of society when they are opposed to personal moral convictions? Is it ever appropriate for religious considerations to influence lawyers or the law? Few questions have had and will continue to have a more compelling effect on the human community. For this reason the editors have brought together this collection of intellectually stimulating articles, which grapple with the tough issues involving morality, justice, and the law. Part One contains articles on the connection between morality and the law by such eminent thinkers as Oliver Wendell Holmes, Cass R. Sunstein, and others. Part Two focuses on issues of morality and lawyering by looking at such questions as how lawyers should represent clients with whom they disagree ethically and how criminal defence lawyers can represent guilty clients. This section also addresses the recent law and religion movement. Part Three addresses the question concerning when civil disobedience is justified and includes an important essay by Ronald Dworkin. Part Four explores moral and legal questions related to capital punishment and includes the Supreme Court's most recent decision on capital punishment, in which the majority and the dissent had radically different views. Finally, Part Five examines the highly charged debate about immigration. This balanced anthology will be of interest to philosophers, legal scholars, and anyone concerned about the relation of law to morality.

At the heart of this book, a question: what to make of the creeping competences of the EU and of the role the European Court of Justice plays in this respect? Taking the implied powers doctrine as its starting point, the hypothesis is that it shows what is ultimately at stake in the concept of legal competence: the problem of creation in law, or the relationship between constituent and constituted power. By rethinking this relationship, a new conceptual framework to make sense of creeping competences is designed. For this, the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty is used. Tracing back the philosophical roots of creation, legal constitution is understood as constitution in passivity. This leads to a whole new interpretation of the relationship between law and politics, rule following, authority, competences and European integration. From this perspective specific chapters in the case law of the European Court of Justice are reread and the logic behind the competence creep is unmasked. new back cover copy: Europe's constitutional journey has not been a smooth one, and a better division and definition of competence in the European Union is a key issue that needs to be addressed. How can the division of competence be made more transparent? Does there need to be a reorganization of competence? How can it be ensured that the redefined division of competence will not lead to a creeping expansion of the competence of the Union or to encroachment upon the exclusive areas of competence of the Member States and, where there is provision, regions? And how can it be ensured that the European dynamic does not come to a halt? Indeed, has the creeping expansion of the competence of the Union already come to a halt? These are the questions this book explores. The Passivity of Law: Competence and Constitution in the European Court of Justice opens with a legal account of competence creep, including the role that the European Court of Justice plays in it and a sketch of the present division of competences and the main principles regulating it. It then discusses the relationship between constituent power and constituted or constitutional power from the viewpoint of the history of constitutional history before offering an alternative theory of their relationship, known as "chiastic theory," which is based on the philosophical investigations of Merleau-Ponty. It details how chiastic theory can be used to make sense of the Court's role in the competence creep in general and the doctrine of implied powers in particular, and it utilizes several case studies concerning competences to sustain this claim. Aimed at researchers and practitioners in Philosophy, Phenomenology, Political Science, the Social Sciences and numerous fields of law, this monograph is a seminal work in the evolving theory and practice of EU law.

During the last half of the twentieth century, legal philosophy (or legal theory or jurisprudence) has grown significantly. It is no longer the domain of a few isolated scholars in law and philosophy. Hundreds of scholars from diverse fields attend international meetings on the subject. In some universities, large lecture courses of five hundred students or more study it. The primary aim of the Law and Philosophy Library is to present some of the best original work on legal philosophy from both the Anglo-American and European traditions. Not only does it help make some of the best work available to an international audience, but it also encourages increased awareness of, and interaction between, the two major traditions. The primary focus is on fu- length scholary monographs, although some edited volumes of original papers are also included. The Library editors are assisted by an Editorial Advisory Board of internationally renowned scholars. Legal philosophy should not be considered a narrowly circumscribed field. Insights into law and legal institutions can come from diverse disciplines on a wide range of topics. Among the relevant disciplines or perspectives contribut ing to legal philosophy, besides law and philosophy, are anthropology, economics, political science, and sociology. Among the topics included in legal philosophy are theories of law; the concepts of law and legal institutions; legal reasoning and adjudication; epistemological issues of evidence and pro cedure; law and justice, economics, politics, or morality; legal ethics; and theories oflegal fields such as criminal law, contracts, and property."

This timely book offers revealing insights into the changing role of China in world governance as exemplified by the Silk Road Initiative, the People's Republic's first published major initiative for external affairs. Focusing on various aspects of the Silk Road Initiative, particularly those that are largely neglected in current discussions, including culture and philosophy, finance and investment, environmental protection and social responsibility, judiciary and lawyers, the authors explore a wide range of contexts in which China's role as an emerging power in international relations and international law is examined. In the current era of ever-increasing populism, protectionism and challenges to globalization, the authors explore the Chinese philosophy underpinning Chinese norms of regional and international development. Bearing in mind the political and economic uncertainties hampering the establishment of such norms, the authors offer crucial insights into how the Silk Road Initiative could or should be developed and regulated.Given its depth of coverage, the book is an indispensable read for anyone interested in the Initiative and its social-legal implications.