This book offers the first theoretical approach to rules of evidence and the practice of judicial proof in China written in English by a Chinese professor. As Prof. He's first representative work, based on over three decades of studying and researching evidence law, it clarifies concepts relevant to evidence law, highlights the value of studying evidence law, re-examines the domain of presumption, reviews central problems in obtaining evidence, and discusses the reasons for misjudged cases. In brief, the book not only presents all major aspects of Chinese rules of evidence in criminal justice, but also introduces readers to the latest developments from a global perspective.

The essays in this book treat important aspects of most of the major themes in contemporary philosophy of law and legal theory. All reveal the distinctive authenticity of the author's work, for he is not only a reputable legal theorist but an internationally known scholar of private law, and for many years chair of the Bielefelder Kreis, an international group of legal theorists who have jointly authored major works comparing methodologies of statutory interpretation and precedent.

During the last half of the twentieth century, legal philosophy (or legal theory or jurisprudence) has grown significantly. It is no longer the domain of a few isolated scholars in law and philosophy. Hundreds of scholars from diverse fields attend international meetings on the subject. In some universities, large lecture courses of five hundred students or more study it. The primary aim of the Law and Philosophy Library is to present some of the best original work on legal philosophy from both the Anglo-American and European traditions. Not only does it help make some of the best work available to an international audience, but it also encourages increased aware ness of, and interaction between, the two major traditions. The primary focus is on full-length scholarly monographs, although some edited volumes of original papers are also included. The Library editors are assisted by an Editorial Advisory Board of internationally renowned scholars. Legal philosophy should not be considered a narrowly circumscribed field. Insights into law and legal institutions can come from diverse disciplines on a wide range of topics. Among the relevant disciplines or perspectives contributing to legal philosophy, besides law and philosophy, are anthropol ogy, economics, political science, and sociology. Among the topics included in legal philosophy are theories of law; the concepts of law and legal institu tions; legal reasoning and adjudication; epistemological issues of evidence and procedure; law and justice, economics, politics, or morality; legal ethics; and theories of legal fields such as criminal law, contracts, and property."

The claim once made by philosophers of unique knowledge of the essence of humanity and society has fallen into disrepute. Neither Platonic forms, divine revelation nor metaphysical truth can serve as the ground for legitimating social and political norms. On the political level many seem to agree that democracy doesn't need foundations. Nor are its citizens expected to discuss the worth of their comprehensive conceptions of the good life. According to Rawls, for example, we have to accept that "politics in a democratic society can never be guided by what we see as the whole truth (...)." (1993: 243) And yet we still call upon truth when we participate in defining the basic structure our society and argue why our opinions, beliefs and preferences need to be taken seriously. We do not think that our views need to be taken into account by others because they are our views, but because we think they are true. If in a democratic society citizens have to deal with the challenge of affirming their claims as true, we need to analyse the precise relationship between truth and democracy. Does truth matter to democracy and if so, what is the place of truth in democratic politics? How can citizens affirm the truth of their claims and accept - at the same time - that their truth is just one amongst many? Our book centers on the role of the public sphere in these pressing questions. It tries to give a comprehensive answer to these questions from the perspective of the main approaches of contemporary democratic theory: deliberative democracy, political pragmatism and liberalism. A confrontation of these approaches, will result in a more encompassing philosophical understanding of our plural democracy, which - in this era of globalization - is more complex than ever before.

Because a good understanding of the function, meaning and shortcomings of the public sphere is essential to answering these questions, a good deal of the book addresses these issues. Historically, after all, the idea that citizens have to engage each other in discussion in order to determine the structure and goals of society, is connected to the rational ideal of a public sphere where conflicting views can be expressed, formed, and transformed. But hasn't the collective decision making in which everyone participates on an equal footing turned out to be a deceptive ideal or a simple illusion? Not every individual in society has equal access to the podium. Furthermore, power, being an inevitable feature of the public sphere, seems to permanently endanger its democratic value. Moreover, the existence of this sphere depends on a specific ethos and particular public spaces where citizens are called upon to present themselves as citizens, as people taking responsibility for their society. It is not clear whether this ethos and these spaces exist at all, and if so, if they preserved their ascribed capacity for constituting 'democratic' truth? By answering these questions we expect to deepen our understanding of the relation between truth and democracy.

Austin introduced theories of analytical jurisprudence and positive law in this landmark book, which also became the founding text of legal positivism. This reissue of the only edition published during his lifetime, long unavailable, will be of great interest to researchers, historians, libraries and scholars of jurisprudence. John Austin 1790-1859] is best known for developing the theory of legal positivism. After serving in the military he read law and was called to the bar in 1818. He abandoned his practice when he was appointed to the first chair of Jurisprudence at the University of London in 1826, a post he held until 1835. His work was greatly influenced by Jeremy Bentham, a close friend. Austin was the dominant English legal theorist for over a century.

This book provides a theoretical framework for explaining the choices made by international decision-makers in terms of what constitutes law. It comprehensively analyzes the practice of human rights courts in applying legal instruments outside their competence and proposes that this practice recognizes that different normative instruments coexist in an un-ordered space, and that meaning can be produced by the free interaction of those instruments around a problem. Based on this, the book advances its normative plurality hypothesis, which states that decision-makers must survey the acquis of international law in order to identify all the instruments containing relevant normative information for a particular situation. The set of rules of law applicable to the situation must then be complemented with other instruments containing specific normative information relevant to the situation, resulting in a complete system of norms advancing a common purpose.

This edited collection of papers comes from the well-established Modern Studies in Property Law biennial conference. It examines a diverse range of topics in property law and uses a wide range of methodological approaches to reflect on a variety of current and emerging themes and important issues that have been overlooked, offering new analysis and insights that will be valuable for property lawyers, academics, and students. It considers new developments in property law, including those connected with digital assets and the issues that have arisen from co-housing. The contributors are leading academics and practitioners from several common law jurisdictions, which expands the book’s focus and enhances its value to the reader.

'A leading figure in critical legal studies and renowned scholar of comparative constitutionalism, Frankenberg urges us forward, offering a new taxonomy for critical work. He illustrates its potential in terrific chapters on recent transnational legal movements: to regulate the veil, provide access to justice and reinvigorate human rights as a language of justification. A methodological tour de force.' - David Kennedy, Harvard University 'One of the most courageous and intellectually earnest legal scholars of our time, Gunter Frankenberg, has devoted his efforts to reconstructing comparative law's internal strength and potential for critical analysis. This book is a masterpiece that should be read by every serious thinker concerned with the need for legal reforms and the politics of globalization.' - Pier Giuseppe Monateri, University of Turin, Italy Presenting a critique of conventional methods in comparative law, this book argues that, for comparative law to qualify as a discipline, comparatists must reflect on how and why they make comparisons. Gunter Frankenberg discusses not only methods and theories but also the ethical implications and the politics of comparative law in order to bring out the different dimensions of the discipline. Comparative Law as Critique offers various approaches that turn on the academic discourse of comparative law, including analysis of a widespread spirit of innocence in terms of method, and critique of human rights narratives. It also analyses how courts negotiate differences between cases regarding Muslim veiling. Gunter Frankenberg presents varied critical projects that discuss methods and theories, ethics and the politics of comparative law to bring out the different dimensions of the discipline. The incisive critiques and comparisons in this book will make essential reading for comparatists working in legal education and research as well as students of comparative law and scholars in comparative anthropology and social sciences.

This multi-disciplinary, multi-jurisdictional collection offers the first ever full-scale analysis of legal fictions. Its focus is on fictions in legal practice, examining and evaluating their roles in a variety of different areas of practice (e.g. in Tort Law, Criminal Law and Intellectual Property Law) and in different times and places (e.g. in Roman Law, Rabbinic Law and the Common Law). The collection approaches the topic in part through the discussion of certain key classical statements by theorists including Jeremy Bentham, Alf Ross, Hans Vaihinger, Hans Kelsen and Lon Fuller. The collection opens with the first-ever translation into English of Kelsen's review of Vaihinger's As If. The 17 chapters are divided into four parts: 1) a discussion of the principal theories of fictions, as above, with a focus on Kelsen, Bentham, Fuller and classical pragmatism; 2) a discussion of the relationship between fictions and language; 3) a theoretical and historical examination and evaluation of fictions in the common law; and 4) an account of fictions in different practice areas and in different legal cultures. The collection will be of interest to theorists and historians of legal reasoning, as well as scholars and practitioners of the law more generally, in both common and civil law traditions.

"Law and Transcendence" examines and develops the philosophy of British Philosopher Gillian Rose. By putting Roses thought into critical dialogue with contemporary philosophers and religious thinkers, the author demonstrates the continuing importance of her work and the importance of critical engagement between philosophy and religious thought.""

Whistleblowing is the public disclosure of information with the purpose of revealing wrongdoings and abuses of power that harm the public interest. This book presents a comprehensive theory of whistleblowing: it defines the concept, reconstructs its origins, discusses it within the current ethical debate, and elaborates a justification of unauthorized disclosures. Its normative proposal is based on three criteria of permissibility: the communicative constraints, the intent, and the public interest conditions. The book distinguishes between two forms of whistleblowing, civic and political, showing how they apply in the contexts of corruption and government secrecy. The book articulates a conception of public interest as a claim concerning the presumptive interest of the public. It argues that public interest is defined in opposition to corporate powers and its core content identified by the rights that are all-purposive for the distribution of social benefits. A crucial part of the proposal is dedicated to the impact of security policies and government secrecy on civil liberties. It argues that unrestrained secrecy limits the epistemic entitlement of citizens to know under which conditions their rights are limited by security policies and corporate interests. When citizens are denied the right to assess when these policies are prejudicial to their freedoms, whistleblowing represents a legitimate form of political agency that safeguards the fundamental rights of citizens against the threat of unrestrained secrecy by government power. Finally, the book contributes to shifting the attention of democratic theory from the procedures of consent formation to the mechanisms that guarantee the expression of dissent. It argues that whistleblowing is a distinctive form of civil dissent that contributes to the demands of institutional transparency in constitutional democracies and explores the idea that the way institutions are responsive to dissent determines the robustness of democracy, and ultimately, its legitimacy. What place dissenters have within a society, whether they enjoy personal safety, legal protection, and safe channels for their disclosure, are hallmarks of a good democracy, and of its sense of justice.

This volume of "Studies in Law, Politics, and Society" presents a diverse array of articles by an interdisciplinary and international group of scholars. Their work spans the social sciences, humanities, and law and examines new perspectives on legal relationships and events, punishment as a literary and philosophical issue, and custom and experience in law and society. The articles published here illuminate some of the exciting work being done in interdisciplinary legal scholarship.

This book develops a responsible and practical method for evaluating the success, failure, or "crisis" of American civil-military relations among its political and uniformed elite. The author's premise is that currently there is no objectively fair way for the public at large or the strategic-level elites to assess whether the critical and often obscured relationships between Generals, Admirals, and Statesmen function as they ought to under the US constitutional system. By treating these relationships-in form and practice-as part of a wider principal (civilian)-agency (military) dynamic, the book tracks the "duties"-care, competence, diligence, confidentiality, scope of responsibility-and perceived shortcomings in the interactions between US civilian political authorities and their military advisors in both peacetime and in war.

This volume offers a collection of articles by leading legal and political theorists. Originally intended as a celebration of MacCormick's work on the occasion of the completion of the four-volume series on "Law, State and Practical Reason," it has turned into a homage and salute after MacCormick's passing. Cast in MacCormick's reflexive spirit, the book presents a critical reconstruction of the Scottish philosopher's work, with the aim of revealing the connections between law and democracy in his writings and furthering his insights in each specific field.

Neil MacCormick made outstanding contributions to the understanding of law and democracy under conditions of pluralism. His institutional theory of law has elucidated the close connection between the normative character of law as a means of social integration and legal social practices. This has produced a synthesis of the key insights of the legal and political theories of Kelsen, Hart, Alexy and Dworkin, and has broken new ground by undermining the 'monolithic' and 'nation-state' centered character of standard legal theories."

What, precisely, is the relationship between legality and morality? Does legal validity rest upon moral validity? Are legal obligations moral obligations? For some years now schools of jurisprudential Naturalism and Positivism have become increasingly ambiguous in their responses to these questions. Olsen and Toddington argue that equivocation on the central issue here -- that of obligation -- has brought legal theory to the point where leading legal positivists and natural lawyers no longer retain significant differences. Instead, they allege, we are left with the remnant of what has always been, philosophically, a phoney war.

The authors of this lucid and refreshing analysis of the concept of law, arguing from the perspectives of social science and political philosophy, show that jurisprudence must acknowledge that the political, the moral, and the legal are located within a continuum of practical reason, and that law's 'autonomy' from morality cannot entail its 'separation' from it.

This book offers educational experiences, including reflections and the resulting essays, from the Roberta Kevelson Seminar on Law and Semiotics held during 2008 - 2011 at Penn State University's Dickinson School of Law. The texts address educational aspects of law that require attention and that also are issues in traditional jurisprudence and legal theory. The book introduces education in legal semiotics as it evolves in a legal curriculum. Specific semiotic concepts, such as "sign", "symbol" or "legal language," demonstrate how a lawyer's professionally important tasks of name-giving and meaning-giving are seldom completely understood by lawyers or laypeople. These concepts require analyses of considerable depth to understand the expressiveness of these legal names and meanings, and to understand how lawyers can "say the law," or urge such a saying correctly and effectively in the context of a natural language that is understandable to all of us. The book brings together the structure of the Seminar, its foundational philosophical problems, the specifics of legal history, and the semiotics of the legal system with specific themes such as gender, family law, and business law.

This book reflects on constitutional balancing from the perspective of fundamental labour rights. It draws on neo-constitutional theories and builds on the assumption that fundamental labour rights, understood as rights aimed at protecting workers during their working life or after retirement, are the normative expression of founding values and can be balanced against equally axiological constitutional principles. The balancing of constitutional labour rights can be conducted by various institutional actors and by applying different techniques. This volume reviews the theoretical debates on judicial balancing and the approaches adopted by the Court of Justice of the European Union and the European Court of Human Rights, to proceed with a closer assessment of Italian and Spanish judicial traditions. In particular, it addresses the main profiles of the case law of the Italian and Spanish Constitutional Courts on labour and social law reforms adopted in the aftermath of the 2008 crisis, where balancing takes place between labour rights and economic principles. The analysis is focused on four main aspects: the fundamental labour rights in the balance; the role of the Courts; the technique applied by the Judges; and the constitutional interests subject to the balancing. It ultimately reveals that the axiological nature of fundamental labour rights is preserved and the economic and financial contingencies confirm their factual character, although they are occasionally recognised a prominent role in the ratio decidendi. The book will be a valuable resource for academics and researchers working in the areas of labour law, social security law, legal theory and constitutional law.

By exploring the integral relationship between democracy and economic justice, this study explains how democratic countries with market systems should deal with the problem of high levels of income-inequality. The book provides an interdisciplinary approach that combines political, economic, and legal theory. It also analyzes the nature of economic society and the considerations bearing upon the ethics of relative pay, such as the nature of individual contributions and the extent of community. Hb ISBN (2000): 0-521-79033-6

In recent decades the debate among scholars, lawyers, politicians and others about how societies deal with their past has been constant and intensive. 'Legal Institutions and Collective Memories' situates the processes of transitional justice at the intersection between legal procedures and the production of collective and shared meanings of the past. Building upon the work of Maurice Halbwachs, this collection of essays emphasises the extended role and active involvement of contemporary law and legal institutions in public discourse about the past, and explores their impact on the shape that collective memories take in the course of time. The authors uncover a complex pattern of searching for truth, negotiating the past and cultivating the art of forgetting. Their contributions explore the ambiguous and intricate links between the production of justice, truth and memory. The essays cover a broad range of legal institutions, countries and topics. These include transitional trials as 'monumental spectacles' as well as constitutional courts, and the restitution of property rights in Central and Eastern Europe and Australia. The authors explore the biographies of victims and how their voices were repressed, as in the case of Korean Comfort Women. They explore the role of law and legal institutions in linking individual and collective memories in the transitional period through processes of lustration, and they analyse divided memories about the past and their impact on future reconciliation in South Africa. The collection offers a genuinely comparative approach, allied to cutting-edge theory

In Natural Law and Civil Sovereignty new research by leading international scholars is brought to bear on a single crucial issue: the role of early modern natural law doctrines in reconstructing the relations between moral right and civil authority in the face of profound religious and political conflict. In addition to providing fresh insights into the hard-fought struggle to legitimate a desacralised civil order, the book also shows the degree to which the legitimacy of the modern secular state remains dependent on this decisive set of developments.

This book asserts that the Pacific Islands continue to struggle with the colonial legacy of plural legal systems, comprising laws and legal institutions from both the common law and the customary legal system. It also investigates the extent to which customary principles and values are accommodated in legislation. Focusing on Samoa, the author argues that South Pacific countries continue to adopt a Western approach to law reform without considering legal pluralism, which often results in laws which are unsuitable and irrelevant to Samoa. In the context of this system of law making, effective law reform in Samoa can only be achieved where the law reform process recognises the legitimacy of the two primary legal systems. The book goes on to present a law reform process that is more relevant and suitable for law making in the Pacific Islands or any post-colonial societies.

This timely interdisciplinary work on current developments in ICT and privacy/data protection, coincides as it does with the rethinking of the Data Protection Directive, the contentious debates on data sharing with the USA (SWIFT, PNR) and the judicial and political resistance against data retention. The authors of the contributions focus on particular and pertinent issues from the perspective of their different disciplines which range from the legal through sociology, surveillance studies and technology assessment, to computer sciences. Such issues include cutting-edge developments in the field of cloud computing, ambient intelligence and PETs; data retention, PNR-agreements, property in personal data and the right to personal identity; electronic road tolling, HIV-related information, criminal records and teenager's online conduct, to name but a few.

One might legitimately ask what reasons other than vanity could prompt an author to issue a collection of his previously published essays. The best reason, I think, is the belief that the essays hang together in such a way that, as a book, they produce a whole which is in a sense greater than the sum of its parts. When this happens, as I hope it does in the present case, it is because the essays pursue related themes in such a way that, together, they at least form a start toward the development of a systematic theory on the common foundations supporting the particular claims in the particular articles. With respect to this collection, the essays can all be read as particular ways of pursuing the following general pattern of thought: that a commitment to justice and a respect for rights (and not social utility) must be the foundation of any morally acceptable legal order; that a social contractarian model is the best way to illuminate this foundation; that a retributive theory of punish ment is the only theory of punishment resting on such a foundation and thus is the only morally acceptable theory of punishment; that the twentieth century's faddish movement toward a "scientific" or therapeutic response to crime runs grave risks of undermining the foundations of justice and rights on which the legal order ought to rest; and, finally, that the legitimate worry about the tendency of the behavioral sciences to undermine the values of"

Discussing classical legal positivists this book comprises a study of their work which is situated in relation to the modern tradition in legal philosophy. In this way, it is demonstrated that the theorists adhered closely to the natural law standpoint in legal philosophy, while also defending the particular view of the proper functions of law and the state that distinguished the tradition of modern liberalism. The author has also written "The Redefinition of Conservatism".

Can private law assume an ecological meaning? Can property and contract defend nature? Is tort law an adequate tool for paying environmental damages to future generations? This book explores potential resolutions to these questions, analyzing the evolution of legal thinking in relation to the topics of legal personality, property, contract and tort. In this forward thinking book, Mattei and Quarta suggest a list of basic principles upon which a new, ecological legal system could be based. Taking private law to represent an ally in the defence of our future, they offer a clear characterization of the fundamental legal institutions of common law and civil law, considering the challenges of the Anthropogenic era, technological tools of the Internet era, and the global rise of the commons. Summarizing the fundamental institutions of private law: property rights, legal personality, contract, and tort, the authors reveal the limits of these legal institutions in relation to historical international evolution and their regulation in the contexts of catastrophic ecological issues and technological developments. Engaging and thoughtful, this book will be interesting reading for legal scholars and academics of private law and, in particular, those wishing to understand the role of law when facing technological and ecological challenges.