Ours is an age of growing doubt about constitutional theory and of outright hostility to any theory that defends judicial review. Why should a tiny number of unelected judges be able to validate or invalidate laws on such politically controversial issues as abortion, religion, gender, and sex-or even determine how the president is elected? In this provocative book, a leading constitutional theorist offers an entirely original defense of judicial review. Louis Michael Seidman argues that judicial review is defensible if we set aside common but erroneous assumptions-that constitutional law should be independent from our political commitments and that the role of constitutional law is to settle political disagreement. Seidman develops a theory of "unsettlement." A constitution that unsettles, that destabilizes outcomes produced by the political process, creates no permanent losers nursing deep-seated grievances, he says. An "unsettling" constitution helps to build a community founded on consent by enticing losers into a continuing conversation. The author applies this theory to an array of well-known cases heard by the Supreme Court over the past several decades, including the fall 2000 election decision.

"Stewards of Democracy" is a celebration of a moral tradition famously observed by Alexis de Tocqueville through the eyes of Francis Lieber, a Prussian emigre who in antebellum times wrote of political ethics, hermeneutics, and comparative constitutional law as aspects of the moral duties of American lawyers and judges. The duty of the profession unifying this tradition has been to nurture and protect the institutions of self-government on which depend the stability of our complex social order and the protection of all our legal rights. Thomas Cooley, perhaps the lawyer most respected by nineteenth century Americans, is presented as a primary exemplar of the dutiful tradition. Much of the book is an account of his career as judge, scholar, teacher, and founding chair of the Interstate Commerce Commission. Cooley's career was succeeded in the tradition by a trio of Progressives: Louis Brandeis, Ernst Freund, and Learned Hand, whose careers area also examined. Finally noted is the more recent career of Byron White.Carrington contends that the dutiful tradition marked by the careers of the five exemplars is threatened by the mutually reinforcing tendencies of the Supreme Court and other high courts, of highly respected legal scholars, of the most honored of our law schools, and of noted legal journalists, all of whom tend to work from the premise that political and moral judgments can best be made by an elite and imposed on a passive citizenry, a belief tending to fulfill itself. The result is a threatened suffocation of the political institutions commanding the loyalty and enduring support of citizens. The book concludes by suggesting possible causes for a future reversal of this long-term trend and the steps such a reversal might entail.

Over recent decades, international humanitarian law has been shaped by the omnipresence of so-called expert manuals. Astute and engaging, this discerning book provides a comprehensive account of these black letter rules and commentaries produced by private expert groups and demonstrates why the general acceptance of these expert manuals is largely unjustified. This theoretically grounded book bridges the divide between theory and practice by linking legal theory to the doctrinal and practical concerns of the laws of war. The author innovatively links interdisciplinary insights to the needs of military lawyers in practice, showing the pitfalls of relying on private manuals as arguable restatements and interpretations of the law 'as it is'. At the same time, he explains why expert processes are so successful and why this should be of concern to all of us. Stimulating and challenging, this book will prove essential reading for students and scholars of public international law, legal theory, and those focussing on the laws of war more specifically. Its practical approach will also greatly benefit legal practitioners working in the field of military law.

This book discusses the legal thought of Bronislaw Malinowski (1884-1942), undoubtedly one of the titans of social sciences who greatly influenced not only the shape of modern cultural anthropology but also the social sciences as a whole. This is the first comprehensive work to focus on his legal conceptions: while much has been written about his views on language, magic, religion, and culture, his views on law have not been fairly reconstructed or recapitulated. A glance at the existing literature illustrates how little has been written about Malinowski's understanding of law, especially in the legal sciences. This becomes even more evident given the fact that Malinowski devoted much of his scholarly work to studying law, especially in the last period of his life, during which he conducted broad research on law and "primitive jurisprudence". The main aim of this book is to address this gap and to present in detail Malinowski's thoughts on law. The book is divided into two parts. Part I focuses largely on the impact that works of two distinguished professors from his alma mater (L. Dargun and S. Estreicher) had on Malinowski's legal thoughts, while Part II reconstructs Malinowski's inclusive, broad and multidimensional understanding of law and provides new readings of his legal conceptions mainly from the perspective of reciprocity. The book offers a fresh look at his views on law, paving the way for further studies on legal issues inspired by his methodological and theoretical achievements. Malinowski's understanding of law provides a wealth of fodder from which to formulate interesting research questions and a solid foundation for developing theories that more accurately describe and explain how law functions, based on new findings in the social and natural sciences.

This work explains the nature of constitutional rights. It does so by means of an analysis of the nature of law in general, the nature of constitutions, and the nature of rights. It looks in detail at several aspects of constitutional law, rights and institutions, as well as aspects related to public officials, private persons and associations. In addition, the book critically examines a considerable number of debates about whether some actual or proposed constitutional rights ought to be established and maintained in the United States constitution. It then identifies the kinds of reasons that justify or fail to justify constitutional rights. The book advances the debate and makes a contribution to the theory and the practice of constitutional rights.

This is the English version of Jerzy Wroblewski's major work in Polish, S dowe Stosowania Prawa (translated in his own preferred terms as 'The Judicial Application of Law'). The present translation arose out of a visit by the author to Scotland in 1989. In that year, the Carnegie Trust for the Universities of Scotland made it possible for Jerzy Wroblewski to spend six months as a Carnegie Fellow in the Centre for Criminology and the Social and Philosophical Study of Law at the University of Edinburgh. During that time he took a notably active part in the intellectual life of the Centre and the Faculty of Law. He gave freely of his time in teaching and advising students and also produced a series of original articles on topics connected with legal reasoning and law and computers. His major task while he was here, however, was to prepare a translation of S dowe Stosowania Prawa, and this he accomplished to the extent of completing a preliminary draft. Zenon Bankowski and Neil MacCormick were to help him in improving this linguistically and preparing the final text for publication. Wroblewski warned us, having finished his draft with great labour, that the greater labour would be in the polishing of it. For we would have, as he joked, 'to translate my English into English'. And certainly, we found it extremely time-consuming, so as to defy completion during his stay in Edinburgh.

This book offers a systematic and comprehensive account of the key cases that have come to shape the jurisprudence on emergency law in the United States from the Civil War to the War on Terror. The legal questions raised in these cases concern fundamental constitutional issues such as the status of fundamental rights, the role of the court in times of war, and the question of how to interpret constitutional limitations to executive power. At stake in these difficult legal questions is the issue of how to conceive of the very status of law in liberal democratic states. The questions with which the Supreme Court justices have to grapple in these cases are therefore as philosophical as they are legal. In this book the Court's arguments are systematized according to categories informed by constitutional law as well as classic philosophical discussions of the problem of emergency. On this basis, the book singles out three legal paradigms for interpreting the problem of emergency: the rights model, the extra-legal model and the procedural model. This systematic approach helps the reader develop a philosophical and legal overview of central issues in the jurisprudence on emergency.

This book develops the rudiments of a sociological perspective on state law and legal theory. It outlines a distinctive approach to theoretical enquiry that offers an improved understanding of law as a social and institutional phenomenon. The book draws upon Max Weber's sociological and juristic writings as a context in which to explore themes arising or selectively developed from a critical reassessment of key aspects of H.L.A. Hart's theory of law. The discussion initially centres around three problematical areas or 'Gordian Knots': essentially weaknesses in the analytical nucleus of The Concept of Law,matters of misplaced emphasis and other elements that, it is argued, have obscured fundamental aspects of a perceived social reality. Using the critique as a point of departure the book explores key issues that Hart merely touched upon or seemingly passed over: the role of the (sociologically inclined) jurist, the defensibility of an 'institutional insider's' perspective, the institutional behavioural dimension of the legal world, and the relational and social power dynamics of law-affected human behaviour.

Reason, Democracy, Society deals with basic points of legal theory and philosophy of law. The main contention of the book relates to the insufficiencies of the legal positivistic approach. Some of its claims are that we must sharply separate what the law is from, what the law ought to be, and that we can know what the law is without appealing to meta-legal considerations. These and other claims are criticized. The author shows that with the legal positivistic approach we cannot know, in all cases, what the law is, if that is equated to the rules posited by the legislator. He also challenges H.L.A. Hart's and MacCormick's points of view, amongst others, about the characteristic corner stones of legal positivism. Some other issues relate to human rights, legal rationality and efficiency and ethics. This book will be of interest to philosophers concerned with law or ethics, those concerned with justice in modern society and to jurists and law students.

Volume 37 of "Studies in Law, Politics, and Society" presents a special issue devoted to exploring humanistic perspectives on the subject of punishment. Drawing together a distinguished group of interdisciplinary scholars, it explores the way "deviant" subjects are constructed and made available for punishment, the philosophical context within which decisions about punishment are made, and the inner workings of the penal apparatus. Diverse in their theoretical inspirations and approaches, the articles published here represent a significant advance in our understanding of the complex intersections of punishment, politics, and culture.

Can a discipline that has become intensely specialized tell us anything about the world we live in? Or does it render itself socially irrelevant? These questions are at the heart of Richard A. Cosgrove's history of jurisprudence in England. Cosgrove's account begins with the emergence of the positivist belief that jurisprudence can solve the truly important social issues of the day and leads us through the gradual divorce of legal theory from legal history. Legal theory in the twentieth century, argues Cosgrove, has become narrow and abstract, irrelevant to the daily practice of the law. Contemporary theory, ever anxious to debunk elitism, ironically has become elitist itself. Cosgrove outlines an escape from this trap: jurisprudence must return to its interdisciplinary roots and draw upon economics, politics, and sociology. In short, theory and practice must be recombined. Cosgrove charts the history of English jurisprudence through its key figures: William Blackstone, Jeremy Bentham, John Austin, Henry Maine, Thomas Erskine Holland, and H. L. A. Hart. Through his careful, insightful scholarship and unpretentious prose, Cosgrove distinguishes the contributions of these theorists and clarifies their general move toward specialization.

Americans seem increasingly disenchanted with their legal system. In the wake of several high-profile trials, America's faith in legal authority appears profoundly shaken.

And yet, as David Ray Papke shows in this dramatic and erudite tour of American history, many Americans have challenged and often rejected the rule of law since the earliest days of the country's founding. Papke traces the lineage of such legal heretics from nineteenth-century activists William Lloyd Garrison and Elizabeth Cady Stanton, through Eugene Debs, and up to more recent radicals, such as the Black Panther Party, anti-abortionists, and militia members. A tradition of American legal heresy clearly emerges--linked together by a body of shared references, idols, and commitments--that problematizes the American belief in legal neutrality and highlights the historical conflicts between law and justice. Questioning the legal faith both peculiar and essential to American mythology, this alternative tradition is in itself an overlooked feature of American history and culture.

During the last half of the twentieth century, legal philosophy (or legal theory or jurisprudence) has grown significantly. It is no longer the domain of a few isolated scholars in law and philosophy. Hundreds of scholars from diverse fields attend international meetings on the subject. In some universities, large lecture courses of five hundred students or more study it. The primary aim of the Law and Philosophy Library is to present some of the best original work on legal philosophy from both the Anglo-American and European traditions. Not only does it help make some of the best work avail able to an international audience, but it also encourages increased awareness of, and interaction between, the two major traditions. The primary focus is on full-length scholarly monographs, although some edited volumes of original papers are also included. The Library editors are assisted by an Editorial Advisory Board of internationally renowned scholars. Legal philosophy should not be considered a narrowly circumscribed field. Insights into law and legal institutions can come from diverse disciplines on a wide range of topics. Among the relevant disciplines or perspectives con tributing to legal philosophy, besides law and philosophy, are anthropology, economics, political science, and sociology. Among the topics included in legal philosophy are theories of law; the concepts of law and legal institutions; legal reasoning and adjudication; epistemological issues of evidence and pro cedure; law and justice, economics, politics, or morality; legal ethics; and theories oflegal fields such as criminal law, contracts, and property."

This volume presents a diverse array of articles by an interdisciplinary and international group of scholars. Their work spans the social sciences, humanities, and law. It examines the many ways citizens learn about law, law beyond the nation-state and the relationship of law and labour.

It is a sine qua non of legal practice that lawyers should not allow themselves to act for two clients whose interests may,potentially, conflict. However, this principle is being placed under increasing pressure, the main reasons for this being increased demand for specialist legal services, the globalisation of commerce, a dramatic growth in the size of leading law firms, and significantly greater mobility within the legal profession. As a result, there is a growing trend, especially within the commercial legal environment, for solicitors to face conflicts of interest which have no easy solution. Increasingly, conflicts are being 'managed', rather than avoided altogether. This is a field within which the Law Society's own rules are flouted on a daily basis, and in which these rules appear increasingly at odds with the common law. Based on extensive interviews with lawyers and their clients, this book provides the first thorough consideration of how conflicts of interest are handled within law firms. It will be essential reading to all those who have an interest in professional legal ethics, including law students, legal scholars, practitioners, and regulators.

This volume explores new interfaces between linguistics and jurisprudence. Its theoretical and methodological importance lies in showing that many questions asked within the field of language and law receive satisfactory answers from formal linguistics. The book starts with a paper by the two editors in which they explain why the volume - as a whole and with its individual papers - is an innovation in the field of language and law. In addition, an overview about the most important research projects on language and law is given. The first chapter of the book is on understanding the law. Jurists and laypersons always ask for the precise meaning of a certain piece of the law. In linguistics, the discipline investigating 'meaning' is semantics; thus, it is to be expected that semantics can contribute to a correct understanding of the law. Chapter 1 also investigates the alleged incomprehensibility of legal language with the help of psycholinguistics. Chapter 2 is on identifying the criminal. To find the author of a blackmailer's letter, text/ corpus linguistics is instrumental. If the blackmailer uses the telephone instead of the letter, speaker identification and phonetics are necessary. The BKA stores all blackmailing letters in a database, but databases are only one possibility of organizing legal systems; another possibility is the application of tools from computational linguistics and artificial intelligence. These tools can be useful to handle terminology, to retrieve information, or to model legal theorizing in a formal system. Chapter 3 demonstrates a variety of examples of organizing legal systems. The topic of chapter 4 is multilingualism and the law. The European legislation is a product of legal and linguistic diversity, as the member states do not only differ in languages but also in their legal systems. One paper shows how Switzerland handles its multilingualism in legal drafting. The input of translation studies is of course vital in this field of research. An index for both subjects and persons complements the volume.

This book reflects on constitutional balancing from the perspective of fundamental labour rights. It draws on neo-constitutional theories and builds on the assumption that fundamental labour rights, understood as rights aimed at protecting workers during their working life or after retirement, are the normative expression of founding values and can be balanced against equally axiological constitutional principles. The balancing of constitutional labour rights can be conducted by various institutional actors and by applying different techniques. This volume reviews the theoretical debates on judicial balancing and the approaches adopted by the Court of Justice of the European Union and the European Court of Human Rights, to proceed with a closer assessment of Italian and Spanish judicial traditions. In particular, it addresses the main profiles of the case law of the Italian and Spanish Constitutional Courts on labour and social law reforms adopted in the aftermath of the 2008 crisis, where balancing takes place between labour rights and economic principles. The analysis is focused on four main aspects: the fundamental labour rights in the balance; the role of the Courts; the technique applied by the Judges; and the constitutional interests subject to the balancing. It ultimately reveals that the axiological nature of fundamental labour rights is preserved and the economic and financial contingencies confirm their factual character, although they are occasionally recognised a prominent role in the ratio decidendi. The book will be a valuable resource for academics and researchers working in the areas of labour law, social security law, legal theory and constitutional law.

This collection of essays on the rule of law focuses on the traditional question whether the rule of law is necessarily the rule of moral principles, the question of the legitimacy of law. Essays by lawyers, philosophers, and political theorists illuminate and take forward both that question and debate about issues to do with the reach of the rule of law which complicate its answer. The essays are divided into sections which deal, first, with legal orders where the rule of law is under severe stress, second, with the question of the value of the rule of law as a conceptual problem, and, third, with the question of the limits of legal order. Contributors: Richard Abel, Jody Freeman, Robert Alexy, Neil MacCormick, Kenneth Winston, Andras Sajo, Alon Harel, Anton Fagan, Anthony Sebok, Christine Sypnowich, Allan Hutchinson, Bill Scheuerman, John MacCormick, Julian Rivers, Henry Richardson, David Dyzenhaus.

Based on papers given at a conference at King's College, London, in 1998, Foundations of Charity brings together established scholars in the fields of charity law, public law, and trusts law, and internationally recognized writers on social policy and legal philosophy, from England and Wales, Scotland, Australia, Canada and the United States. The contributors take an iconoclastic approach to the legal definition of charitable status, and provide an in-depth analysis of key concepts in charity law and administration, such as 'public benefit' and 'political activity'. The combination of their different perspectives on 'charity' produces a varied, stimulating, and challenging collection. It should be useful reading for academics, practising lawyers and voluntary sector managers who are looking for a sustained critique of 'charity'.

The present study which I have subtitled A Study in Law and Logic was prompted by the question of whether an investigation into law and legal systems could lead to the discovery of unrevealed fundamental patterns common to all such systems. This question was further stimulated by two interrelated problems. Firstly, could an inquiry be rooted in specifically legal matters, as distinct from the more usual writings on deontic logic? Secondly, could such inquiry yield a theory which would nevertheless embrace a strict and simple logical structure, permitting substantive conclusions in legal matters to be deduced from simple rules governing some basic concepts? Before the development of deontic logic, W. N. Hohfeld devoted his efforts to this question at the beginning of this century. However, with this exception, few jurists have studied the interrelation between law and logic projected in this way. Nevertheless, two great names are to be found, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz and Jeremy Bentham-both philo sophers with legal as weIl as logical training. Bentham's investigations of logical patterns in law have only recently attracted attention; and as for Leibniz, his achievements are still almost totally unexplored (his most important writings on law and logic have not even been translated from Latin). My initial interest in the question was evoked by Professor Stig Kanger. Although primarily a logician and philosopher, Stig Kanger has been interested also in the fundamentals of legal theory."

Justifying Taxes offers readers some of the elements of a democratic tax law, considered within its political and philosophical context in order to determine the extent of legitimate tax obligations. The objective is to revisit some of the issues in the dogmatics of tax law from the viewpoint of a critical citizen, always ready to ask questions about the justification underlying her obligations, and especially about her paramount burden, viz., the payment of certain amounts of money. Within this purview, special attention is paid to the general principles of taxation. The argument is complemented by a detailed reconstruction of constitutional reasoning in tax matters, close attention being paid to the jurisprudence of the Spanish Tribunal Constitucional. Readership: Legal scholars, political scientists and philosophers. Especially recommended to graduate and undergraduate students of Tax Law, Constitutional Law, Jurisprudence, Philosophy of Law and Political Theory.

Most of the papers in this collection are contributions to action theory intended to be of some relevance to one or another concern of decision theory, particularly to its application to concrete human behavior. Some of the papers touch only indirectly on problems of interest to decision theorists, but taken together they should be of use to both decision theorists and philosophers of action. Robert Audi's paper indicates how a number of questions in action theory might bear on problems in decision theory, and it suggests how some action-theoretic results may help in the construction or interpretation of theories of decision, both normative and empirical. Carl Ginet's essay lays foundations for the conception of action. His volitional framework roots actions internally and conceives them as irreducibly connected with intentionality. Hugh McCann's essay is also foundational, but stresses intention more than volition and lays some of the groundwork for assessing the rationality of intention and intentional action. In William Alston's paper, the notion of a plan as underlying (intentional) action is central, and we are given both a con ception of the structure of intentional action and a set of implicit goals and beliefs - those whose content is represented in the plan - which form an indispensable part of the basis on which the rationality of the action is to be judged."

The main purpose of this book is to offer a logical analysis of legal propositions, especially of constitutional propositions. This analysis shows the relationship between truth-conditions of legal propositions and the problem of indeterminacy. Where the law is indeterminate, legal propositions lack truth-values. The background of this approach is the philosophical debate between realism and antirealism. The book deals with the notions of legal norms and legal systems and provides an analysis of the notion of legal indeterminacy and its relation to gaps, contradictions and the vagueness of legal concepts. It shows also that the simple model of a legal system is not sufficient to account for the complexity of legal propositions referring to legal systems of some degree of maturity. Several notions from legal dynamics are presented in order to bring to light the importance of concepts like applicability or hierarchy for the determination of the truth-value of a legal proposition. Thus the primacy of constitution becomes a central idea in the theoretical reconstruction of most contemporary legal systems; a conceptual explanation of this idea is presented and some conclusions from that explanation are drawn. Finally, a particular conception of constitutional interpretation is proposed. Special attention is paid to the relationship between interpretation and legal indeterminacy and, more specifically, to the problem of the discretion enjoyed by the organs entrusted with applying the constitution and also to the several theses that have been discussed controversially in the context of constitutional interpretation, such as the relevance of the intentions for the interpretation of theconstitution and for the justification of judicial review.

I begin by introducing the main issues of the work, and inviting their consideration; as enticement, I offer a sketch of their practical importance, and of the philosophical challenge they present. And I provide a preview of the work's organization and central argument. There is something so obvious that it is easily-and often-overlooked: the enforcing of criminal statutes is the most intrusive and coercive exercise of domestic power by a state. Forcibly preventing people from doing that which they wish to do, forcibly compelling people to do that which they do not wish to do-and wielding force merely attempting to compel or prevent-these state activities have extraordinarily serious ramifications. Indeed, no state institutions are likely to have more profound an impact on the lives of individual citizens than those of the criminal justice system. I endorse Herbert Packer's assessment: The criminal sanction is the law's ultimate threat. Being punished for a crime is different from being regulated in the public interest, or being forced to compensate another who has been injured by one's conduct, or being treated for a disease. The sanction is at once l uniquely coercive and, in the broadest sense, uniquely expensive. As a consequence, these state activities are in special need of moral warrant. Given the great potential for doing grave injustice, the power of the state embodied in the criminal justice system ought not be exercised in the absence of a complete and compelling moral justification.