The book focuses on the relationship between law and politics as perceived by the legal community and more specifically, the transformation of politics into law. After exploring the relationship between law and politics as considered by the major modern schools of legal theory, the focus moves to the regions of interaction in which law and politics meet, termed the "policy of law." The policy of law is characterized in this work as the stage of the law-making process at which values entrenched in political decisions are transformed into legal concepts in order to fit the existing legal system. The space labeled as policy of law is today mainly (but not exclusively) the domain of legal actors. Consequently, the identification of a branch of the legal discipline specifically devoted to the investigation of the transformations of values into law is given: the policy of law analysis. Finally, whether and to what extent the policy of law analysis can be encompassed within the traditional legal discipline and, more particularly, as a part of jurisprudence, is explored. "Zamboni ranges broadly and knowledgeably over vast areas of legal theory. But it is no mere taxonomising - his argument is valuable and original. It is clear, learned and never boring." [Zenon Bankowski, University of Edinburgh].

An overarching question of contemporary constitutionalism is whether equilibriums devised prior to the emergence of the modern administrative-industrial state can be preserved or recreated by means of fundamental law. The book approaches this problem indirectly, through the conceptual lens offered by constitutional developments relating to the adoption of normative limitations on the delegation of law-making authority. Three analytical strands (constitutional theory, constitutional history, and contemporary constitutional and administrative law) run through the argument. They merge into a broader account of the conceptual ramifications, the phenomenon, and the constitutional treatment of delegation in a number of paradigmatic legal systems. As it is argued, the development and failure of constitutional rules imposing limits on legislative delegation reveal the conditions for the possibility of classical limited government and, conversely, the erosion of normativity in contemporary constitutionalism.

This book addresses one of the most urgent issues in contemporary American law-namely, the logic and limits of extending free exercise rights to corporate entities. Pointing to the polarization that surrounds disputes like Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, David argues that such cases need not involve pitting flesh-and-blood individuals against the rights of so-called "corporate moral persons." Instead, David proposes that such disputes should be resolved by attending to the moral quality of group actions. This approach shifts attention away from polarizing rights-talk and towards the virtues required for thriving civic communities. More radically, however, this approach suggests that groups themselves should not be viewed as things or "persons" in the first instance, but rather as occasions of coordinated activity. Discerned in the writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas, this reconceptualization helps illuminate the moral stakes of a novel-and controversial-form of religious freedom.

Contemporary Action Theory, Volume I (Individual Action) is concerned with topics in philosophical action theory such as reasons and causes of action, intentions, freedom of will and of action, omissions and norms in legal and ethical contexts, as well as activity, passivity and competence from medical points of view. Cognitive trying, freedom of the will and agent causation are challenges in the discussion on computers in action. The Volume consists of contributions by leading experts in the field written specifically for this volume. No comparable volume currently exists.

This book examines the question of whether justice or security is the primary virtue of 21st-century society. The issue of enhancing security without undermining justice - managing risk without undermining the rule of law - has always been problematic. However, recent developments such as new counter-terrorism measures, the expanding scope of criminal law, harsher migration control and an increasingly pronounced concern with public safety, have posed new challenges. The key element of these contemporary challenges is that of membership and exclusion: that is, who is to be included within the community of justice, and against whom is the just community aiming to defend itself? Justice and Security in the 21st Century brings together researchers from various academic disciplines and different countries in order to explore these developments. It attempts to chart the complex landscapes of justice, human rights and the rule of law in an era when such ideals are challenged by increasing demands for efficiency, effectiveness, public safety and security. This edited volume will be of much interest to students of critical legal studies, criminology, critical security studies, human rights, sociology and IR in general.

Informatics and the Foundations of Legal Reasoning represents a close collaboration between a wide range of disciplines and countries. Fourteen papers, together with a long analytical introduction by the editors, were selected from the contributions of legal theorists, computer scientists, philosophers and logicians who were members of an International Working Group supported by the European Commission. The Group was mandated to work towards determining how far the law is amenable to formal modeling, and in what ways computers might assist legal thinking and practice. The book is the result of discussions held by the Group over two and half years. It will help students and researchers from different backgrounds to focus on a common set of topics of increasing general interest. It embodies the results of work in progress and suggests many issues for further discussion. A stimulating text for undergraduate and graduate courses in law, philosophy and computer science departments, as well as for those interested in the place of computers in legal practice, especially at the international level.

Critical Studies in Private Law discusses the prerequisites and possibilities for an alternative or critical legal dogmatics. The starting point of the analysis is the recognition of contradictions within the legal order. In this respect the theory may use the experience of both American Critical Legal Studies and the German attempts to formulate a legal theory for the social state. The key for understanding how the contradictory concrete legal material may produce varying results on the level of legal decisions is the systematization, the general principles of the law. The analysis does not, however, stop at this theoretical level. The methodology is tested through a discussion of some features of modern private law. Some key elements of contract law, including consumer law, of the Welfare State are singled out. The work focuses on the person-orientation of modern law as a challenge to the traditional abstract legal form. The aim is to explore the limits for a contract law radically oriented towards the personal social and economic needs of the parties. This endeavour involves the creation of new legal concepts such as social force majeure.

Questions about the relationship between autonomy and authority are raised in nearly every area of moral philosophy. Although the most ob vious of these is political philosophy (especially the philosophy of law), the issues surrounding this relationship are by no means confined to this area. Indeed, as we shall see as this work progresses, the issues raised are central to moral psychology, religion, professional ethics, medical ethics, and the nature of moral systems generally. Although the title of this work is Autonomy. Authority and Moral Responsibility. we shall be concerned with the more general question about the relationship between autonomy (or self-direction) and exter nal influences, which I take to be any guide to behavior whose presence, content or substance is dependent upon something beyond the control of the agent. Something is beyond the control of the agent if the agent cannot determine whether or not it is present, what its content consists of, or whether or not (or in what way) it influences her. These "external" influences may include (but are not necessarily limited to) religious con victions (which guide behavior according to a doctrine whose content is established independently of the agent); moral obligations (which re quire action in accordance with some moral theory); and desires for ob jects or states of affairs whose presence (or absence) is beyond the con trol of the agent. Of course, external influences may also include the requirements of authority or law."

The patterns and impact of globalization have become a common concern of all international jurists, sociologists, political scientists, and philosophers. Many have observed the erosion of the powers of nation states and the emergence of new transnational governance regimes, and seek to understand their internal dynamics, re-regulatory potential, and normative quality. Karl Polanyi's seminal book - The Great Transformation - is attracting new attention to such endeavors, mirroring a growing sensitivity to the social and economic risks of dis-embedding politics. Their re-construction by Polanyi - including his warning against a commodification of labor, land, and money - provide the trans-disciplinary reference point for the contributions to this book. Political economy, political theory, sociology, and political science inform this discussion of Polanyi's insights in the age of globalization. Further theoretical essays and case studies look at his 'false commodities': money, labor (and services), and land (and the environment). Jurists have hardly ever discussed Polanyi, and the law has not been taken very seriously among 'Polanyians.' It is nevertheless clear that economic stability and social protection are simply inconceivable without the visible hand of law. The legal discussion in this book's concluding chapters do not, and cannot, depart directly from such premises. The framework of their analyses is, instead, informed by current debates on the emergence of para-legal regimes, the fragmentation of international law, and the prospects of constitutional perspectives within which the rule of law and the notion of law-mediated legitimate governance are established. Polanyi's notion of the co-originality of dis-embedding moves and re-imbedding countermoves can, however, be usefully employed in the re-construction of the sociological background of the moves and tensions which jurists discern.

Perhaps more than any other social theorist in recent history, Niklas Luhmann's work has aroused extreme, and often antagonistic, responses. It has generated controversies about its political implications, its resolute anti-humanism and its ambitious critique of more established definitions of society, social theory and sociology. Now, however, a steadily growing number of scholars working in many different disciplines have begun to use aspects of Luhmann's sociology as an important methodological stimulus and as a theoretical framework for reorientating their studies. This collection of essays includes critical and reconstructive contributions by a number of distinguished social theorists, political theorists, legal scholars and empirical sociologists. Together, they provide evidence of Luhmann's extensive and diverse relevance to the issues facing contemporary society, and, at the same time, they enhance our understanding of the challenges posed by his theoretical paradigm to more traditional conceptions of social theory.

This edited volume examines the very essence of the function of judges, building upon developments in the quality of justice research throughout Europe. Distinguished authors address a gap in the literature by considering the standards that individual judgments should meet, presenting both academic and practical perspectives. Readers are invited to consider such questions as: What is expected from judicial reasoning? Is there a general concept of good quality with regard to judicial reasoning? Are there any attempts being made to measure the quality of judicial reasoning? The focus here is on judges meeting the highest standards possible in adjudication and how they may be held to account for the way they reason. The contributions examine theoretical questions surrounding the measurement of the quality of judicial reasoning, practices and legal systems across Europe, and judicial reasoning in various international courts. Six legal systems in Europe are featured: England and Wales, Finland, Italy, the Czech Republic, France and Hungary as well as three non-domestic levels of court jurisdictions, including the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). The depth and breadth of subject matter presented in this volume ensure its relevance for many years to come. All those with an interest in benchmarking the quality of judicial reasoning, including judges themselves, academics, students and legal practitioners, can find something of value in this book.

Jurisprudential meditation and methodological performance on how feminist and legal thought come into relation. Experiments with genre, style, and form to historicise the relationship of a feminist jurisprudent to her own sources, methods, and interlocutors. The book will be a useful resource for scholars and students of law and humanities, feminism, and history.

While much fundamental research in the recent past has been devoted to the criminal jury in England to 1800, there has been little work on the nineteenth century, and on the civil jury . This important study fills these obvious gaps in the literature. It also provides a re-assessment of standard issues such as jury lenity or equity, while raising questions about orthodoxies concerning the relationship of the jury to the development of laws of evidence. Moreover, re-assessment of the jury in nineteenth-century England rejects the thesis that juries were squeezed out by judges in favour of market principles. The book contributes a rounded picture of the jury as an institution, considering it in comparison to other modes of fact-finding, its development in both civil and criminal cases, and the significance, both practical and ideological, of its transplantation to North America and Scotland, while opening up new areas of investigation and research. Contributors: John W Cairns Richard D Friedman Joshua Getzler Roger D Groot Philip Handler Daffydd Jenkins Michael Lobban Grant McLeod Maureen Mulholland James C Oldham J R Pole David J Seipp

Information technology has served to revolutionise the use, exchange, and protection of information. The growth of the internet, the convergence of technologies as well as the development of user generated and social networking sites has meant that significant amounts of person data as well as copyrighted materials are now readily accessible. Within this changing cultural landscape the legal concepts of privacy, data protection, intellectual property and criminality have necessarily had to develop and adapt. In this volume a number of international scholars consider this process and whether it has merely been a question of the law adapting to technology or whether technology has been forced to adapt to law. Technologies have wrought a culture shift it is therefore apposite to ask whether legal concepts, as reflections of culture, should also change. It is in this volume where papers on privacy date protection, intellectual protection and cyber crime begin address this question.

This book was published as a special issue of International review of Law Computers and Technology.

Justice, conflict and wellbeing are large topics that occupy researchers from a variety of disciplines, as well as laypeople and policy makers. The three concepts are closely connected: conflict often (though not always) impairs wellbeing, whereas justice often (though not always) enhances it; perceived injustice is a common source of conflict, at multiple levels and calls for justice are a common response to conflict. In addition, each construct has subtypes, such as distributive and procedural justice, individual and group conflict and physical and psychological wellbeing. Although there are established traditions of research on the topics in multiple disciplines, there is little cross-fertilization across disciplines. This volume brings together researchers from social, clinical and educational psychology; law and political science. The unifying theme is how injustice and conflict pose threats to wellbeing, at the micro (individual) and macro (groups and societies) levels.Multi- and interdisciplinary research are at the vanguard of science in the twenty-first century, and the present work applies multi and interdisciplinary perspectives to the important real-world topics of justice, conflict and wellbeing.

How does law possess the normative force it requires to direct our actions? This book argues that this seemingly innocuous question is of central importance to the philosophy of law and, by extension, of the very concept of law itself. It advances a position grounded in the secular natural law tradition, and in doing so addresses the two success criteria for this position head on: Firstly, that commitment to the existence of a supreme moral principle is required; Secondly, that any supreme moral principle must be identifiable through human reason. The book argues that these conditions are met by Alan Gewirth's Principle of Generic Consistency (PGC), which - through a dialectically necessary argument - locates the existence of universally applicable moral norms in the concept of agency. Given the very purpose of law is to guide action, legal norms must be located in a unified hierarchy of practical reason. It follows that, if law is to succeed in claiming to be capable of guiding our action, moral permissibility with reference to the PGC is a necessary condition of a rule's legal validity. This strong theory of natural law is defended throughout, both against moral sceptics and positions within contemporary legal positivism.

This book clarifies the meaning of the most important and pervasive concepts and tools in bioethical argumentation (principles, values, dignity, rights, duties, deliberation, prudence) and assesses the methodological suitability of the main methods for clinical decision-making and argumentation. The first part of the book is devoted to the most developed or promising approaches regarding bioethical argumentation, namely those based on principles, values and human rights. The authors then continue to deal with the contributions and shortcomings of these approaches and suggest further developments by means of substantive and procedural elements and concepts from practical philosophy, normative systems theory, theory of action, human rights and legal argumentation. Furthermore, new models of biomedical and health care decision-making, which overcome the aforementioned criticism and stress the relevance of the argumentative responsibility, are included.

This book proposes a different approach to theorising and analysing antitrust issues, working on the premise that at present, antitrust is addressed from top-down and narrow perspectives which in effect limit the attention paid to or exclude issues that could otherwise be considered. This reasoning is motivated by the pursuit of inclusiveness and broadness in the antitrust context. The work contends that traditional top-down antitrust theories are weak because they are incomplete and insufficient in their description and analysis of antitrust issues. Thus, it identifies the need to construct a bottom-up approach. Invariably, such an approach would have to avoid ex ante judgments about the suitability of the normative contents of antitrust laws and theories, lest it fall into the same trap that plagues traditional theories. As a possible solution, the author proposes a procedural account referred to as the person-centred approach (built on theories such as Sen's Capability) and carefully reviews its practicality.

This first critical examination of informal dispute processing links the institutionalization of alternatives to the court process and the ideology of informalism with the evolution of the American court system. The author connects dispute processing reform to the broader social and political context in which it developed, including the rise of judicial management in the Progressive period and the reconstruction of court unification in the 1970s. Harrington defines legal resources and their distribution in alternative dispute resolution policy before focusing on the institutionalization of this reform in a case study of a federally sponsored Neighborhood Justice Center. In conclusion, Harrington finds that the symbols of informalism and its institutions are a mere shadow of conventional legal practices.

This volume explores the relation between legal reasoning and logic from both a historical and a systematic perspective. The topics addressed include, among others, conditional legal acts, disjunctions in legal acts, presumptions and conjectures, conflicts of values, Jorgensens Dilemma, the Rhetors Dilemma, the theory of legal fictions and the categorization of contracts. The unifying problematic of these contributions concerns the conditional structures and, more particularly, the relationship between legal theory and legal reasoning in the context of conditions. The contributions in this work constitute the first results of the ANR-DFG joint research project "JuriLog" (Jurisprudence and Logic), which aims at fostering the cooperation between legal scholars and philosophers. On the one hand, lawyers and legal scholars have an interest in emphasizing the logical character of legal reasoning. In this respect, the present enquiry examines the question of how logic, especially newer forms of dialogical logic, can be made fruitful as a significant area of philosophy for jurisprudence and legal practice. On the other hand, logicians find in legal reasoning a striving towards clear definitions and inference-procedures that is relevant to their discipline. In order to fully understand such reciprocal relationships, it is necessary to bridge the gap between law, logic and philosophy in contemporary academic research. The essays collected in this volume all work towards this common goal. The book is divided in three sections. In the first part, the strong relation between Roman Law and logic is explored with respect to the analysis of disjunctive statements in legal acts. The second part focuses on Leibnizs legal theory. The third part, finally, is dedicated to current interactions between law and logic.

Legal philosophy traditionally focuses on the courts, but not on the police - despite the fact that what the police do has considerable implications for what we understand law to be. Police writers in turn often overlook the subject of philosophy, and how philosophy can inform particular issues of police practice.
In The Jurisprudence of Police, Thomas Vincent Svogun closes this gap by developing a new philosophy of law in tandem with a new theory of law enforcement, thus providing the basis for a general unified theory of law that reconciles the work of legislators and judges with the work of police. Much attention is devoted to the shift in the police paradigm from technically oriented professional law enforcement to problem-oriented community policing. This book integrates literature in legal philosophy and police theory to elaborate new integrative theory, introduce new concepts, and make recommendations for future public policy.

Sovereignty, Knowledge, Law investigates the notion of sovereignty from three different, but related perspectives: as a legal question in relation to the sovereign state, as a political question in relation to sovereign power, and as a metaphysical question in relation to sovereign self-knowledge. The varied and interchangeable uses of legal sovereignty, political sovereignty and metaphysical sovereignty in contemporary debates have resulted in a situation where the word sovereignty itself has become something of a non-concept. Panu Minkkinen shows here how these three perspectives have informed one another, by addressing their shared relationship to law, and to the autocephalous function of sovereignty; that is, the attempt to provide a single source and foundation for law, power, and self-knowledge. Through an effort to domesticate the intrinsically heterocephalous nature of power, the juridical and jurisprudential aim has been to confine power within the closed vertical hierarchy of traditional legal thinking. Sovereignty, Knowledge, Law thus elaborates this heterocephaly, proposing new understandings of sovereignty, as well as of law and of legal scholarship.

This book critically examines the conception of legal science and the nature of law developed by Hans Kelsen. It provides a single, dedicated space for a range of established European scholars to engage with the influential work of this Austrian jurist, legal philosopher, and political philosopher. The introduction provides a thematization of the Kelsenian notion of law as a legal science. Divided into six parts, the chapter contributions feature distinct levels of analysis. Overall, the structure of the book provides a sustained reflection upon central aspects of Kelsenian legal science and the nature of law. Parts one and two examine the validity of the project of Kelsenian legal science with particular reference to the social fact thesis, the notion of a science of positive law and the specifically Kelsenian concept of the basic norm (Grundnorm). The next three parts engage in a critical analysis of the relationship of Kelsenian legal science to constitutionalism, practical reason, and human rights. The last part involves an examination of the continued pertinence of Kelsenian legal science as a theory of the nature of law with a particular focus upon contemporary non-positivist theories of law. The conclusion discusses the increasing distance of contemporary theories of legal positivism from a Kelsenian notion of legal science in its consideration of the nature of law.